Sulandari v. PermadiSulandari v. Permadi
Dated: November 21, 2016
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Ninek Sulandari (Appellant), appeals the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying her motion to vacate the court’s previously-issued dissolution decree. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.
{¶2} The trial court issued a decree in August 2013 dissolving the marriage of Appellant and Appellee, Ignatius Permadi (Appellee). The decree incorporated the parties’ separation agreement as to a variety of issues, including property division. Section 7 of the parties’ agreement states that each party would retain as his or her own any intangible asset titled in his or her own name * * * free and claims of any claims of the other. Intangible assets was defined in the agreement as including, but not limited to, pension and/or retirement
Approximately 10 months later, Appellant filed a
{¶3} The trial court denied all of Appellant’s motions without holding an evidentiary hearing. Appellant filed this timely appeal, which presents four assignments of error for this Court’s review. Since the third and fourth assignments of error implicate similar issues, we elect to address them together.
II.
Assignment of Error I
The trial court abused its discretion in overruling [Appellant]’s Motion to Vacate the Decree.
{¶4} In her first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to vacate the decree. She advances two alternative arguments for this
A. Standard of Review
{¶5} The first assignment of error implicates Appellant’s request that the trial court exercise its inherent authority to vacate a void judgment. We review the denial of a motion to vacate a void judgment for an abuse of discretion. Buckingham Doolittle Burroughs, L.L.P. v. Izaldine, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27956, 2016-Ohio-2817, ¶ 7. An abuse of discretion implies more than an error of judgment; it implies that the trial court’s judgment was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
B. The Dissolution Decree Is Not Void
{¶6} In Ohio, dissolution is a creature of statute that is based upon the parties’ consent. In re Whitman, 81 Ohio St.3d 239, 241 (1998). An integral part of the dissolution proceeding is the separation agreement agreed to by both spouses, id., and which the trial court is required to incorporate into the dissolution decree,
{¶8} We agree with Murphy’s handling of this issue and adopt its rationale here. Even if the dissolution decree in this matter does not explicitly address all of the parties’ property, such a defect merely renders the decree voidable, not void. And, because [a] trial court lacks authority to grant relief from a voidable judgment entry outside of [the] proscribed procedures [of
C. The Decree Was Final and Appealable
{¶9} Having rejected Appellant’s argument that the decree was void, we turn to her contention that the decree was not final and appealable, which renders the trial court’s ruling on
{¶10} However, this line of case law has not been applied in the context of dissolution proceedings, which conclude with the parties agreeing that the dissolution decree resolves all issues between them. See Knapp v. Knapp, 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 144 (1986) (After the petition and accompanying separation agreement have been filed, the case proceeds to a final hearing. Again, mutual consent is the key.). Furthermore, this Court has only determined that a divorce decree is not final and appealable when it fails to include property that was disclosed to the court and litigated over at trial. Conversely, the book of business implicated in this matter was not disclosed to the court during the initial dissolution proceedings and was therefore not in dispute. Compare Baker v. Baker, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009603, 2009-Ohio-6906, ¶ 8 (concluding that divorce decree was not final and appealable where the trial court was made aware of the parties’ tractor, boat, and trailer but none of those items were distributed in the decree). In light of these differences between the line of divorce cases and this matter, we conclude that the dissolution decree in this case is final and appealable despite the lack of an explicit provision for the book of business. Accordingly, because the dissolution decree was final and appealable, the
{¶11} The result of Murphy supports this conclusion. There, the court addressed a trial court’s vacation of a previous dissolution decree for failing to include a distribution of significant assets. In doing so, the court explicitly said that the dissolution decree was subject to possible vacation under
{¶12} In sum, the dissolution decree in this matter was merely voidable and final and appealable. Thus, Appellant was not entitled to the vacation of the decree under the trial court’s inherent authority. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first assignment of error.
Assignment Error II
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the Appellant’s Motion to Convert the Dissolution of Marriage petition into a divorce proceeding as required by [
{¶13} In her second assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to convert the dissolution proceedings into divorce proceedings. We disagree.
{¶15} Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second assignment of error.
Assignment of Error III
The trial court abused its discretion in summarily overruling [Appellant]’s [
Assignment of Error IV
The trial court abused its discretion in summarily overruling [Appellant]’s [
{¶16} In her third and fourth assignments of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her
Civ.R. 60(B) Standard
{¶17}
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; * * * (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; * * * or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
To prevail on a
{¶18} Further, a movant has no automatic right to a hearing on a motion for relief from judgment. (Internal citation and quotation omitted.) McFall v. McFall, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26418, 2013-Ohio-2320, ¶ 13. Consequently, trial courts abuse their discretion by denying
B. Appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B)(1) Argument
{¶19} Appellant’s basis for relief under
C. Appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B)(3) Arguments
{¶20} Appellant’s grounds for relief under
{¶22} As to Appellant’s duress claim, we note that she had to allege operative facts to show three elements: first, that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; second, that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and third, that the opposite party’s coercive acts caused those circumstances. Quebodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 102 Ohio App.3d 502, 505 (9th Dist.1995), citing Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 246 (1990). The trial court concluded
{¶23} In making this determination, the trial court relied on the transcript from the hearing on the parties’ dissolution petition. See McNamara v. McNamara, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102330, 2015-Ohio-2707, ¶ 29-30 (affirming denial of
{¶24} Finally, in order to support her undue influence claim, Appellant had to allege operative facts showing (1) that she was susceptible to influence; (2) that Appellee had an opportunity to influence her; (3) that Appellee actually or attempted to influence her; and (4) that the result of Appellee’s influence shows the effect of improper influence. Abate v. Abate, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19560, 2000 WL 327227, *5 (Mar. 29, 2000), citing DiPetro v. DiPetro, 10 Ohio App.3d 44, 46 (10th Dist.1983). The trial court found that Appellant failed to allege
D. Appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B)(5) Argument
{¶25} Appellant’s basis for relief under
E. Trial Court’s Failure to Hold a Hearing
{¶26} As discussed above, we have determined that Appellant failed to allege sufficient operative facts to show that she was entitled to relief under
{¶27} In sum, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion for relief from the dissolution decree under
III.
{¶28} Having overruled all four of Appellant’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
MOORE, J. CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
CARR, P. J. DISSENTING.
{¶29} I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s
APPEARANCES:
CHRISTOPHER R. REYNOLDS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
JACK W. ABEL, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.