Stroud v. StateStroud v. State
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Appellant Shamell A. Stroud was convicted of murder and related offenses in connection with the 2010 stabbing death of victim Wayne Jackson. Stroud now appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior felonies committed by Stroud; and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to object to the prior crimes evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.1
I.
At 11:31 p.m., the alarm button at Jackson‘s apartment was activated. Police arrived to find the front door open and Jacksоn lying on the floor in a pool of blood next to a bloody kitchen knife. No one else was present in the apartment. There were beer and liquor bottles scattered throughout the apartment, and a male pornographic film was playing in the master bedroom. Blood was observed throughout the аpartment, including a large amount in the foyer, more blood drops and stains in the living room and kitchen, and blood spatter on the master bedroom wall and bed. An overturned nightstand, a displaced mattress, and a second knife with its handle missing evidenced a struggle in the bedroom. Jackson had suffered multiple stab wounds to his tоrso and extremities, including at least one stab wound to the chest, two stab wounds to the back, and various defensive injuries, several which were indicative of efforts to grasp the blade end of a knife. A palm
Stroud had fled thе scene. He bought a bus ticket to New York but was apprehended during a stop in Norfolk, Virginia, where, following a waiver of his Miranda2 rights, he gave a written statement and submitted to a video-recorded interview. During the interview, Stroud told the investigators that Jackson had falsely told him there was a party at his apartment but that no one else was there when they arrived. Stroud maintained that a friend of Jackson joined them at the apartment; Jackson started taking off his clothes to get “comfortable“; the friend went into the master bedroom, where Jackson had pornography playing on the television; Stroud went in the bedroom; Jaсkson declared that “this is the party” and began making sexual advances; Stroud became angry; and he and Jackson began to argue and “tussle.” Stroud further maintained that he then retreated to the kitchen; Jackson followed, claiming to have a weapon; Jackson “jumped at” Stroud; Stroud grabbed a knife аnd stabbed Jackson; Jackson went back to his room; and when Jackson re-emerged, Stroud stabbed him again out of fear that Jackson had retrieved a weapon.
Contrary to Stroud‘s contention, the evidence described above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Stroud was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted.
II.
Stroud contends that the trial court erred in аdmitting evidence of his four felony theft convictions. This evidence — consisting of certified copies of four convictions, two for theft by taking and two for theft by receiving — was introduced during the defense‘s case-in-chief. Prior to calling the defense‘s first witness, defense counsel — anticipating that Stroud would elect to testify — sought a ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence of
The defense first presented three character witnesses, all of whom testified to Strоud‘s reputation for “peacefulness.” Stroud then took the stand and, on direct examination, acknowledged his two prior theft-by-receiving convictions. Also during his direct examination, when questioned about whether he had attempted to render aid to the victim, Stroud testified that “if I could have stopped the situаtion, I would have. I‘m a good person, I‘m not a bad person.”
At the conclusion of Stroud‘s direct examination, the State moved for leave to introduce evidence of the remaining two convictions, on the ground that, by testifying that he was “a good person,” Stroud had placed his character in evidenсe. Defense counsel essentially conceded the issue, responding, “I‘m not going to argue that.” The trial court ruled that the two
Though Stroud now asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the prior convictions evidence, he is precluded from claiming error by virtue of his acquiescence in the admission of this evidence in the trial court.3 In the initial colloquy on this issue, Stroud‘s counsel effectively invited the admission of “one or two” of the convictions and affirmatively agreed when the court ruled it would allow evidence of the latter two. Similarly, with regard to the two earlier convictions, when the State reopened the issue following Stroud‘s testimony on direct examination to being “a good person,” defense counsel stated he was “not going to argue.” Stroud thus cannot challenge thеse rulings on appeal. See, e.g., Adkins v. State, 301 Ga. 153, 154 (2) (800 SE2d 341) (2017) (despite earlier, overruled objection to certain evidence, defense counsel, by eliciting that evidence at trial, waived right to challenge its admission on appeal); Stewart v. State, 286 Ga. 669, 672
Even assuming these rulings were properly preserved, the trial court did not err in admitting Stroud‘s prior theft-by-receiving convictions because this evidence was admissible under former
[e]vidence that the defendant has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or more under the law under which the defendant was convicted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.
Thus, if the defendant testified, evidence of prior felony convictions was admissible for impeachment purposes upon the triаl court‘s determination that its probative value substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect. See Childs v. State, 287 Ga. 488, 492 (3) (696 SE2d 670) (2010). Here, the trial court agreed with the State‘s contention that, given Stroud‘s reliance on his
Regarding the remaining two convictions, we assume for the sake of argument that Stroud‘s remark that he was “a good person” did not open the door to the admission of these convictions under former
III.
Stroud‘s final contention is that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the admission of the prior crimes evidence. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel‘s performance was professionally deficient and that such deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (3) (689 SE2d 280) (2010). To prove deficient performance, one must show that his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3)
With regard to the theft-by-receiving convictions, because we have concluded that there was no error in the court‘s admission of this evidence, we cannot say that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to challenge the court‘s ruling regarding its admissibility. See Woods v. State, 271 Ga. 452, 454 (2) (c) (519 SE2d 918) (1999) (“there is no deficient pеrformance when an attorney fails to object to admissible evidence“). With regard to the theft-by-taking convictions, even to the extent they were admitted in error and counsel‘s failure to object could be adjudged as deficient performance, our finding that any error was harmless is fatal to Stroud‘s clаim of prejudice. See Mote v. State, 277 Ga. 429, 432 (4) (588 SE2d 748) (2003) (no prejudice for ineffective assistance purposes, where improper admission of evidence to which counsel had failed to object had been held harmless error). Stroud‘s
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Russell.
Jessica A. Seares, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Arthur C. Walton, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.