Walter Clayton Jones, the petitioner in this case, was convicted of rape and aggravated sodomy. At trial the victim testified on behalf of the State that just prior to the commission of the crimes charged, the petitioner gave her alcohol and marijuana. On cross-examination
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the petitioner admitted he offered the victim marijuana and further admitted that he was married at the time the sexual acts with the victim took place. The State took the position that by admitting the crimes of possession of marijuana, OCGA § 16-13-30 (j), and adultery, OCGA § 16-6-19, the petitioner had admitted less than all of his prior criminal conduct in the attempt to portray his character, albeit bad, as better than it actually was. The trial court concluded, under the authority of
Phillips v. State,
We granted certiorari to determine the applicability of Phillips, supra, to this case.
1. In Georgia, “The general character of the parties and especially their conduct in other transactions are irrelevant matter unless the nature of the action involves such character and renders necessary or proper the investigation of such conduct.” OCGA § 24-2-2. This code section applies to both civil and criminal cases. See
Grannemann v. Salley,
Until 1895 a criminal defendant was not allowed to speak to the issues for which he was on trial as he was not considered competent to testify. See Code 1868, § 3798 (2). The Penal Code of 1895 permitted a defendant, for the first time, to make an unsworn statement to the jury which was not subject to cross-examination. Penal Code 1895, § 1010. However, the defendant was still not considered competent to testify at trial. Penal Code 1895, § 1011. It was not until 1962 that a criminal defendant was considered competent to give sworn testimony at his trial. Ga. Laws 1962, p. 133, former Code Ann. §§ 38- *755 415 and 38-416. It was at this time that the legislature enacted that portion of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) which prohibits the state from introducing evidence of a criminal defendant’s prior convictions or “general bad character” until that defendant has “first put his character in issue.” Prom 1962 until 1973 the defendant had the option of making an unsworn statement to the jury, or taking the witness stand and testifying in his own behalf subject to cross-examination by the state. In 1973 the legislature repealed that portion of former Code Ann. § 38-415 which permitted a criminal defendant to make an unsworn statement at trial, See Ga. Laws 1973, p. 292 et seq., leaving OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) as it exists today.
Well before a criminal defendant was permitted to speak to the issues against him, either through his unsworn statement or sworn testimony at trial, he was permitted to use his good character as a defense to the crime charged. However, the early cases allowed this defense only where there existed a “doubt” as to the defendant’s guilt.
Epps v. State,
The state was not allowed to introduce evidence of the character of the accused unless the accused himself “put his character in issue,” either through his own unsworn statement or by the testimony of his witnesses as to his reputation in the community.
Ward v. State,
It was stated that the prosecution was prevented from presenting
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evidence of the defendant’s bad character where the defendant had not placed his character in issue “for reasons rather of policy and humanity than because proof that the defendant has a bad character is not relevant to the [case]. 4 Chamberlayne,
Modern Law of Evidence,
§ 4526. ‘The rule is one of administrative policy. The source of it may be found in the principle of the law of English speaking people, which obtains in criminal actions, that the accused is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty. It would clearly be difficult to maintain this presumption of innocence in the minds of the jurors if testimony were given of a long list of crimes alleged to have been committed by the accused. A prejudice against him would naturally be aroused in the minds of the jurors if such a practice were followed.’ ”
Bryant v. State,
Prior to the time when the criminal defendant was considered competent to be a witness at trial, see Ga. Laws 1962, p. 133, supra, he was permitted to place his general good character in issue by either his own unsworn statement of his general reputation in the community, or by testimony of witnesses as to his general reputation in the community. See, e.g.,
Folds v. State,
While defense character witnesses were not allowed to testify to specific acts of good conduct, the defendant was permitted to prove through his character witness a general reputation for a specific trait. The State was then permitted to show “general bad character with respect to the particular trait ... in rebuttal.”
Mimbs v. State,
While the rule was that the defendant could not prove his general good reputation by a witness’ testimony of specific acts of good conduct, the defendant was allowed in his unsworn statement to tell the jury of specific transactions of his good conduct. The State was entitled to rebut such a statement only with regard to the specific transaction addressed by the defendant.
Folds v. State,
supra.
4
A defendant’s statement as to a specific instance of good conduct would not open the inquiry to his
general
reputation. Id. In this circumstance the defendant did not place his character in issue. Where the defendant’s unsworn statement included a denial of committing the crime charged, the state could rebut the statement with proof that the defendant had committed the crime charged, and with testimony contradicting the facts addressed by the defendant. The denial of the crime did not place the defendant’s general character in issue.
Lee v. State,
Prior to 1962 the rule was, as it is today, that where the defendant had not placed his general character in issue, proof of prior offenses or convictions was not admissible unless offered for some proper purpose
5
other than to show the defendant is a person of bad character.
6
Mimbs v. State,
supra;
Chambers v. State
This was the law in Georgia when the legislature enacted that portion of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) which provides that “no evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue.” The aforementioned cases support a conclusion that prior to the enactment of this code section, a defendant did not place his general good character in issue by inadvertence, but by design: the defendant either presented defense witnesses who testified to his general reputation in the community, or gave an unsworn statement which amounted to his own assessment of his general reputation in the community. See, e.g.,
Bacon v. State,
We further hold that a defendant does not put his “character in issue” within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) by inadvertent statements regarding his own good conduct. 9
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There are a number of circumstances in which it has been stated that the defendant has placed his “character in issue” when something entirely different has occurred. As Judge Benham points out in his special concurrence to
Phillips v. State,
(a) Where the defendant testifies in his own behalf and “ ‘falsely denies past criminal conduct [or past misdeeds,] the State may introduce evidence reflecting negatively on the defendant’s character only insofar as that evidence proves the falsity of
specific testimony
of the defendant.’ ”
Porter v. State,
(b) Where the defendant testifies and admits prior criminal conduct, he has not placed his character “in issue” within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b). Rather, he has raised an issue which may be fully explored by the State on cross-examination.
McDaniel v. State,
(c) There are numerous instances where the state may properly offer evidence that the defendant has committed prior crimes for a purpose other than to show the defendant is a person of bad character. See, e.g.,
Rainwater v. State,
2. As noted above, the Court of Appeals in the case before us held under the authority of
Phillips v. State,
In Phillips, the defendant testified on direct examination that he had been in Florida at the time the crime with which he was charged was committed in Georgia. When asked by defense counsel why he had gone to Florida, the defendant replied, “Well, I was on parole and I had violated my parole. . . .” The issue before this court was whether the defendant’s testimony placed his character in issue within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) such that the State could introduce the defendant’s prior felony conviction, for which he was on parole, in evidence. The majority opinion concluded that it did, holding that “where a defendant admits any prior criminal conduct less than all his criminal offenses, he has put his character in issue within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) . . . by attempting to portray his character, albeit bad, as being better than it actually is. Thus, where a defendant admits any prior criminal conduct, the prosecutor may cross-examine him as to such conduct, and may prove other convictions.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This holding is inconsistent 10 with the prior decisions and rationale stated herein, and is therefore overruled.
In the case before us the petitioner admitted committing two crimes other than the crime with which he was charged. The State was entitled to fully explore this testimony on cross-examination. However, under the holding of this opinion the petitioner did not place his character in issue within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b), and the State was therefore not entitled to introduce petitioner’s prior felony convictions against him.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
For example, where the defendant presented evidence of his general good character, the State could not offer testimony by the arresting sheriff that he had previously smelled liquor on the defendant’s breath, or had been called to quell disturbances at the defendant’s house.
Smith v. State,
Here the State was permitted to ask the defense character witness on cross-examination whether he had ever heard that the defendant beat the victim in the past.
For example, in
Mimbs
the question was whether the defendant had put his reputation for “peaceableness” in issue such that the state could show the defendant had a reputation for violence. Likewise, in
Eidson v. State,
For example, where the defendant in his unsworn statement stated he had never had “any trouble fighting anyone,” the State was not permitted to rebut this by showing the defendant had previously been convicted of gaming with cards.
Carroll v. State,
A proper purpose does not include the traditional method of impeaching an ordinary witness by proof that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Agnor, Georgia Evidence, § 5-8 (1976);
Powell v. State,
For example, a prior offense was admissible when “offered for the purpose of proving and tending] to show a common design, scheme, plan or purpose, or some other rational
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connection with the offense for which [the defendant] is being tried.
Mimbs v. State,
In
Frazier v. State,
The rules regarding use of character evidence changed little after the adoption of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b). Character evidence is still regarded as a substantive fact indicative of the defendant’s innocence,
Conner v. State,
In
State v. Braddy,
Perhaps it would be helpful if, by statute, a defendant were required to give written notice of an election to put his character in issue. This would clearly distinguish an inadvertent statement from a choice to use character as a defense.
However, the result in this case is consistent with prior decisions of this court because the defendant’s testimony concerning his parole opened the door to cross-examination as to the conviction for which he was on parole.