Strong v. ToledoStrong v. Toledo
Appeal from Lucas County Common Pleas Court
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Andrew R. Mayle for Appellant
Tammy G. Lavalette for Appellee, City of Toledo
Kevin A. Pituch for Appellee, Toledo-Lucas County Health Department
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Charmarlyn Strong (“Strong”) appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Toledo (“Toledo”) and the Toledo-Lucas County Board of Health (“Board of Health”). For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} Toledo Municipal Code Chapter 1760 (“TMC 1760”) contains the city’s lead-paint safety ordinance for residential rental properties. Strong is the owner of a rental property in Toledo, Ohio. A provision in TMC 1760 requires the owners of residential rental properties in her area to conform to various requirements in the lead paint ordinance by June 30, 2023. (Complaint).
{¶3} In a complaint filed on June 27, 2022, Strong requested preliminary and permanent injunctions to enjoin TMC 1760. Her primary argument was that TMC 1760 was invalid because it “presumes that the [Board of Health] * * * has powers that it does not possess by statute under
{¶4} In August of 2023, Strong, the Board of Health, and Toledo each filed motions for summary judgment. The Board of Health and Toledo raised two main arguments in their motions. First, they pointed out that, in Mack v. City of Toledo, the Sixth District Court of Appeals concluded that
{¶5} On November 1, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of Health and Toledo. In its decision, the trial court set forth the following two bases for its decision:
- Pursuant to the Sixth District Court of Appeals Decision in Mack v. City of Toledo * * *, the current version of Toledo Municipal Code (“TMC”) Chapter 1760 is not an improper delegation of municipal authority by Toledo City Council to the Toledo-Lucas County Board of Health; and 2) Under the facts presented in this case,
R.C. 3709.281 does not create an unconstitutional delegation of municipal powers.
(Nov. 1, 2023 Judgment Entry). For these reasons, the trial court also denied Strong’s motion for summary judgment.
{¶6} Strong filed her notice of appeal on November 6, 2023. On appeal, she raises the following two assignments of error:
The trial court erroneously held that
R.C. 3709.281 empowers an appointee of a board of health, which is a creature of statute with limited statutory powers, to act as contemplated by a series of Toledo ordinances that would require the board’s statutory appointee to: (a) issue or reject licenses for leasing housing units in the city, (b) regulate inspectors essential to the licensing process, (c) randomly search rental residences, and (d) file judicial enforcement actions on behalf of the city. This interpretation caused the court to erroneously fail to enjoin enforcement of the underlying ordinances on summary judgment.
Second Assignment of Error
If the trial court’s interpretation of
R.C. 3709.281 is correct, then the result is thatR.C. 3709.281 is void under the anti-delegation doctrine and therefore the underlying ordinances are also invalid because their validity depends upon the validity ofR.C. 3709.281 as construed by the trial court.
Standard of Review
{¶7} “Appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo * * *.” Nuckols v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 2024-Ohio-1070, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.). Under
(1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1978). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of “specifically delineat[ing] the basis upon which the motion is brought and identify[ing] those portions of the
{¶8} If the moving party makes this initial showing, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party “to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Robinson v. Lafarge North America, Inc., 2022-Ohio-231, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), quoting Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). The nonmoving party “may not rest on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must respond with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Riesterer at ¶ 14. “A trial court must grant the motion with caution and must be ‘careful to resolve doubts and construe evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.’” Afjeh v. Ottawa Hills, 2015-Ohio-3483, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), quoting Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Cos., 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346 (1993).
{¶9} Further, “[a]n injunction is an extraordinary remedy in equity where there is no adequate remedy available at law. It is not available as a right but may be granted by a court if it is necessary to prevent a future wrong that the law cannot.” Garono v. State, 37 Ohio St.3d 171, 173 (1988).
A party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that ‘(1) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) no third parties will be unjustifiably harmed if the injunction is not granted; and (4) the public interest will be served by the injunction.’ Keefer v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-391, 2003-Ohio-6557, * * * ¶ 14[.] * * *
The test for the granting or denial of a permanent injunction is substantially the same as that for a preliminary injunction. However, in the case of a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must prove that he has prevailed on the merits, not merely that there is a ‘substantial likelihood’ of prevailing on the merits.
Gimex Properties Corp., Inc. v. Reed, 2022-Ohio-4771, ¶ 61-62 (6th Dist.). In general, “[t]he decision to grant or deny an injunction is within the discretion of the trial court, and we review that decision on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at ¶ 59. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment but is a decision that is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Id. “However, where statutory interpretation is involved, de novo review applies.” Mack, 2019-Ohio-5427, ¶ 30.
First Assignment of Error
{¶10} Strong argues that the trial court erred by concluding that
Legal Standard
{¶11}
A board of health of a city or general health district may enter into an agreement with the legislative authority of a municipality in which such health district is totally or partially located, and such legislative authority may enter into an agreement with such board of health, whereby such board of health undertakes, and is authorized by such legislative authority to exercise any power, perform any function, or
render any service, in behalf of such legislative authority which such legislative authority may exercise, perform, or render.
Upon the execution of such agreement and within the limitations prescribed by it, such board of health may exercise the same powers as such legislative authority possesses with respect to the performance of any function or the rendering of any service, which, by such agreement, it undertakes to perform or render, and all powers necessary or incidental thereto, as amply as such powers are possessed and exercised by such legislative authority directly. Any agreement authorized by this section does not suspend the possession by such legislative authority of any power or function exercised or performed by such board of health in pursuance of such agreement, and no board of health, by virtue of any agreement entered into under this section, shall acquire any power to levy taxes in behalf of such legislative authority unless approved by a majority of the electors of the municipality. * * *
(Emphasis added.)
{¶12} “With statutory construction, the ‘paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.’” Sullivan-White v. Aukland, 2023-Ohio-141, ¶ 58 (6th Dist.). “[I]f the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, the statute must be applied without interpretation.” Bowling v. Norman, 2024-Ohio-2658, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.). “It is only where the words of a statute are ambiguous, are based upon an uncertain meaning, or there is an apparent conflict of some provisions, that a court has the right to interpret a statute.” Ohio Bus Sales, Inc. v. Toledo Bd. of Edn., 82 Ohio App.3d 1, 6 (6th Dist. 1992).
Under established principles of statutory construction, where statutes are ambiguous, courts ‘may consider several factors, including the object sought to be obtained, circumstances under which the statute was enacted, the legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction.’
Mack, 2019-Ohio-5427, ¶ 61, quoting Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40 (2001).
Legal Analysis
{¶14} Strong asserts that the term “legislative authority” in
{¶15} In Mack v. City of Toledo, this Court considered the interpretation of
{¶16} In the resulting appeal, this Court found the term “legislative authority” to be ambiguous. Mack, 2019-Ohio-5427, ¶ 60-61. We reached this conclusion after noting that several attorney general opinions interpreted this term differently from the court of common pleas. Id. at ¶ 53, 60 (“A statute is ambiguous when its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”), quoting Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 274. We also observed that the text of
{¶17} Since “[t]here is minimal authority interpreting
that the [state] legislature intended for municipalities, through ordinances passed by city council, to be able to contract with a health district (or any agency) for functions or services that the municipality is otherwise authorized to perform or can appoint an agent for the carrying out of the legislative will * * *.
Id. at ¶ 64. Accordingly, we concluded that the agreement between Toledo and the Board of Health regarding the administration of TMC 1760 was permissible under
{¶19} In the case presently before us, the trial court granted summary judgment based upon the reasoning in Mack.1 On appeal, Strong approaches this Court with candor, acknowledging that Mack’s interpretation of the term
{¶20} In summary, having decided to follow the reasoning in Mack, we conclude that agreements made pursuant to
Second Assignment of Error
{¶21} Strong argues that Mack’s interpretation of the term “legislative authority” in
Legal Standard
{¶22} “The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers * * *.” Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). Under our tripartite
{¶23} Under the nondelegation doctrine, “the General Assembly cannot delegate its essential legislative power to administrative bodies or officers.” Redman v. Ohio Dept. of Indus. Relations, 75 Ohio St.3d 399, 403 (1996).
A statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it establishes, through legislative policy and such standards as are practical, an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform and further establishes a procedure whereby exercise of the discretion can be reviewed effectively.
Id. at 406, quoting Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio v. Ratchford, 64 Ohio St.2d 256 (1980), at syllabus.
{¶24} “The basic purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to control unbridled agency discretion.” Redman at 404. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “a rigid application of the nondelegation doctrine would unduly hamstring the administration of the laws.” Id. “
{¶25} Further, when arguing a statute is unconstitutional on its face, “the challenger must provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.” State v. Eaton, 2022-Ohio-2432, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.). Thus, “[a] statute is not constitutionally infirm on its face merely because it may ‘operate unconstitutionally under some plausible set of circumstances.’” Id., quoting Harrold v. Collier, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 37. In this analysis, “statutes are presumed to be constitutional * * *.” Taxiputinbay, LLC v. Put-In-Bay, 2023-Ohio-1237, ¶ 35 (6th Dist.), quoting Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2009-Ohio-1970, ¶ 12.
Legal Analysis
{¶26} Strong raises two main arguments herein. First, she identifies the following portion of Mack as the basis of her initial challenge:
the [state] legislature intended for municipalities, through ordinances passed by city council, to be able to contract with a health district (or any agency) for functions or services that the municipality is otherwise authorized to perform or can appoint an agent to for the carrying out of the legislative will * * *.
Mack, 2019-Ohio-5427, ¶ 64, citing State ex rel. Cambell v. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 97 Ohio St. 283, 293 (1918).
{¶27} Strong argues that this interpretation of
{¶28} However, the text of
{¶30} Second, Strong raises an alternative argument that is based on several assertions that she made in her brief about the purpose of the statute at issue:
R.C. 3709.281 merely enables the legislative authority of Toledo—i.e., Toledo city council—to delegate its powers to a board of health.The purpose is to empower a city council to leverage a board of health’s expertise as needed * * *.
(Appellant’s Brief, 2).3 Based on these assertions, Strong argues that
{¶31} In other words, Strong again asserts that the term “legislative authority” in
{¶32} Further, in Mack, we also noted (1) that the text of
{¶33} Based on the statutory language in
{¶34} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur.
/hls
Judges John R. Willamowski, William R. Zimmerman, and Mark C. Miller, from the Third District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.