Strepka v. MillerStrepka v. Miller
PORFILIO, Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of these appeals. See
Plaintiff sued the federal and local officers who arrested him, and the state judge who later issued an order to detain him, for violating his constitutional right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following his warrantless arrest. The district court dismissed the complaint and denied leave to amend. We must decide if plaintiff‘s allegations, either with or without amendment, are sufficient to establish that any of the defendants аre liable for the alleged constitutional violation.
In assessing the sufficiency of plaintiff‘s allegations, we must “accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, we also must liberally construe the аllegations of his complaint. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). This liberal construction, however, does not obligate us either to “supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff‘s complaint or [to] construct a legal theory on a plaintiff‘s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir.1997).
Plaintiff alleged that Officers Miller and Collins of the South Metro Task Force1 and Agent Nozum of the federal Drug Enforcement Agency arrested him without a warrant in Blackhawk, Colorado.2 Following his arrest, plaintiff was transported to the Gilpin County Jail, where he was held for three days. Gilpin County officers then transported plaintiff to a detention facility in Jefferson County, where he was held for one day. Finally, Arapahoe County officers transported plaintiff to a detention facility in Arаpahoe County. Plaintiff was not taken before a judge during any of this time. It was not until the fifth day following his arrest that he appeared before Arapahoe County Judge Cross, who advised him of his rights. Several hours before that, Judge Cross made a finding of probable cause and signed an order to detain plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged that being held in excess of forty-eight hours without being released on bail or taken before a neutral magistrate for a determination of probable cause violated his constitutional rights. He further alleged that Judge Cross acted outside his authority when he made the probable cause determination more than forty-eight hours after plaintiff‘s arrest, and he violated plaintiff‘s rights when he made the detеrmination before plaintiff appeared in court. Plaintiff purported to bring his claims pursuant to
Each defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff‘s complaint, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to qualified immunity. In addition, Agent Nozum argued that sovereign immunity barred any claim against him in his official capacity, and Judge Cross argued both that absolute immunity barred any claim against him for money damages and that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred any claim against him in his official capacity. Without distinguishing between official and individual capacity claims, the district court applied a qualified immunity anаlysis to all plaintiff‘s claims, granted the motions to dismiss on that basis, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion challenging the dismissal and seeking leave to amend his complaint to add further allegations against defendants. Plaintiff submitted a proposed amended complaint with his motion. The district court construed the motion as one under
At the outset, we must determine in what capacity plaintiff intended to sue de
Turning first to the individual capacity claims, the Supreme Court has recognized a qualified immunity defense both for
“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). “[T]his determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.” Id. at 125, 95 S.Ct. 854. “[A] jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). “Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” Id. at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. Even if an arrested individual receives a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours of arrest,
[s]uch hearing may nonetheless violate Gerstein if the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples of unreasonable delay are delаys for the purposes of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay‘s sake.
The determination of probable cause can be made “reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. That standard—probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime—traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony....” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120, 95 S.Ct. 854 (footnote omitted). Thus, the determination can be made ex parte, without the presence of the arrestee. See Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir.1994); King v. Jones, 824 F.2d 324, 327 (4th Cir.1987).
Plaintiff had a constitutional right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following his warrantless arrest. Plaintiff‘s allegations, taken as true, established that he was deprived of that right by someone.5 To state a claim for violation of a constitutional right against these particular defendants, however, plaintiff had to allege facts showing that each defendant personally participated in or caused the constitutional violation. Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir.1997) (“Individual liability under
Even under the most liberal construction, plaintiff‘s complaint was devoid of any allegations showing that any of the arresting officers caused or participated in the delay in providing plaintiff a prompt probable cause determination. Likewise, the complaint contained no allegations showing Judge Cross caused or contributed to that delay. Judge Cross made a determination of probable cause promptly after plaintiff was delivered into the custody of Arapahoe County. Because plaintiff had no constitutional right to be present for that probable cause determination, Judge Cross did not violate plaintiff‘s constitutional rights by making the determination in advance of plaintiff‘s first appearance before him. In the absence of any facts showing that defendants violated his constitutional rights, the district court properly dismissed plaintiff‘s claims against the individual defendants on qualified immunity grounds.
Although the district court did not separately anаlyze plaintiff‘s claims against defendants in their official capacities, its dismissal of those claims also was correct. An official capacity claim against a government officer is really a claim against the government that employs that officer. See Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Com‘rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 n. 2 (10th Cir.1998). Plaintiff‘s official capacity claims against Agent Nozum, therefore, were really claims against the United States, and were barred by sovereign immunity in the absence of a waiver. See Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 793 (10th Cir.1989). Plaintiff did not identify any waiver of sovereign immunity for the type of claims he asserted, and we know of none. Therefore, plaintiff‘s official capacity claims against Agent Nozum were barred.
Plaintiff‘s official capacity claims against Judge Cross were really claims аgainst the State of Colorado. The Eleventh Amendment “generally bars suits brought by individuals against state officials acting in their official capacities. This bar does not apply, however, if the state waives its sovereign immunity, if Congress validly abrogates the state‘s immunity, or if the suit falls within the legal fiction of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 ... (1908).” Harris v. Owens, 264 F.3d 1282, 1289-90 (10th Cir.2001). Plaintiff did not identify any waiver of immunity by the State or any abrogation of that immunity by Congrеss. Ex parte Young creates an exception to
Plaintiff‘s official capacity claims against Officers Miller and Collins were really claims against the local government that employed them.
Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a local government may be held liable for the constitutional violation of its employees only when employee action pursuant to official municipal policy ... caused a constitutional tort. Therefore, to establish municipal liability a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct causal link between the custom or policy and the violation alleged.
Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 742 (10th Cir.1997) (citation and quotations omitted; alteration in original). Plaintiff did not allege any municipal custom or policy in his complaint, much less a link between that custom or policy and the violation. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the claims against Officers Miller and Collins in their official capacities.
Likewise, although the district court did not separately analyze plaintiff‘s
After the district court dismissed his complaint, plaintiff filed a Rule 59(e) motion objecting to the dismissal and seeking leave to amend. Plaintiff also filed a proposed amended complaint. “[O]nce judgment is entered, the filing of an amended complaint is not permissible until judgment is set aside or vacated pursuant to
The only ground for relief plaintiff asserted in his Rule 59 motion was that he should be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies brought to light in the district court‘s dismissal order. Plaintiff proposed amending his complaint to include the following allegations. Officer Miller arrested him without a warrant in a “foreign” county and neither released him when no evidence was discovered at the time of his arrest nor
Although the proposed allegations were probably sufficient to state a claim for relief against at least Officer Miller and Agent Nozum, the interests of judicial economy counsel against remanding the action to allow plaintiff to proceed on those allegations. If we were to remand, the officers would undoubtedly reassert their claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that an arresting officer had a constitutional duty to ensure that an arrested individual received a prompt probable cause determination.
“Ordinаrily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Currier, 242 F.3d at 923 (quotation omitted). Although Supreme Court opinions have clearly established the right to a prompt probable cause detеrmination, they have not established that the duty to ensure that right rests with the arresting officer. Nor have any Tenth Circuit cases—or the majority of cases from other circuits—so held. Because remanding the action to the district court to proceed on plaintiff‘s amended complaint would serve no useful purpose and would disserve the interests of judicial economy, we will uphold the district court‘s denial of plaintiff‘s post-judgment motion to amend his complaint.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff‘s motion to exceed the line count on his reply brief is GRANTED. Plaintiff‘s objection to Officers Miller and Collins filing a separate appellees’ brief is DENIED. Plaintiff‘s motion to strike a referencе in those officers’ brief to facts not raised in the district court is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff is reminded of his continuing obligation to make partial payments of his filing fee until that fee is paid in full.