STORMS v. SHINSEKISTORMS v. SHINSEKI
The Plaintiff, Derrick Storms, seeks damages from several former high-level officials at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. He claims that these officials violated his First Amendment rights by persuading a private group—the Veterans of Foreign Wars—to terminate his volunteer relationship in response to Mr. Storms writing an article full of damning accusations against the Department. But the Supreme Court has not authorized a suit for damages based on the First Amendment and warns that extending such remedies to new contexts is “a disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court declines to create the remedy that the Plaintiff seeks, because authorizing damages for this conduct raises complicated policy questions that Congress—not the Judiciary—is equipped to answer. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will therefore be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 6, 2014, Mr. Storms published an article entitled “How veterans can fight back against VA abuse,” on the Daily Caller website. Compl. ¶ 11, Ex. 1.1 The article alleged that to
That night, Defendant Kevin Secor—the VA‘s Veterans Service Organizations Liaison officer, Compl. ¶ 8—exchanged emails with the Executive Director of the national Veterans of Foreign Wars organization, Bob Wallace. Id. ¶ 15, Ex. 5. Mr. Secor asked Mr. Wallace if he knew that the article was going to be published, id. Ex. 5, and when Mr. Wallace assured him that “[t]his is not the VFW position,” id. Ex. 6, Mr. Secor told him that “any help would be appreciated, I know this will be a topic at tomorrow‘s stand-up.” Id. Ex. 7.
The next day, both the VA and the VFW moved quickly. Mr. Secor sent an email asking Raymond Kelley—another VFW official— “did you see what your Legislative Vice Chairman wrote in the Daily Caller?” Id. Ex. 10. Mr. Storms alleges that Mr. Secor met with Secretary Shinseki, Defendant Jose Riojas (then the VA‘s Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, and Preparedness), and “John/Jane Does 1-100.” Id. ¶ 21. These individuals jointly resolved to “discredit and defame” Mr. Storms and terminate him from his VFW-NY position, to undermine the op-ed, deter similar articles from Mr. Storms or others, and protect Secretary Shinseki. Id. Mr. Secor also allegedly called Mr. Wallace and demanded that the VFW publish a rebuttal article and end Mr. Storms’ status as a Vice Legislative Chairman. Id. ¶ 25. The VFW‘s Commander-in-Chief emailed the Daily Caller that same day with a proposed rebuttal piece, id.
Three days later, VFW-NY removed Mr. Storms from his position as Legislative Vice Chairman, id. Ex. 15 and asked him to write a letter of apology for his article. Id. Ex. 16. Although Mr. Storms does not allege that he was salaried, the termination meant that he would not be reimbursed for future VFW travel. Id. Ex. 17. Because of his termination, Mr. Storms allegedly suffered various injuries, including chilled speech, emotional damages, lost employment opportunities within the VFW, and reputational harm.
Mr. Storms then sued Secretary Shinseki, Assistant Secretary Riojas, Mr. Secor, and 100 unidentified “John/Jane Does,” all in their individual capacities. Compl. 1-2. His Complaint‘s only count seeks damages for retaliation against First Amendment-protected speech, invoking the Supreme Court‘s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 (1971). Id. at 7-8. The named Defendants moved to dismiss, noting that their legal arguments would also apply to the unidentified Defendants as well. Mot. Dismiss 1, n.1.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
To avoid dismissal under
III. ANALYSIS
A. This Claim Presents a New Bivens Context
Because the Complaint‘s only count relies on Bivens, a brief account of that case is in order.
In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment‘s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures could be held accountable for monetary damages without explicit statutory authorization for such damages. Before Bivens, only state officials who violated individuals’ constitutional rights could be liable for money damages, see
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Congress has not enacted a similar statutory provision for federal officials. Since Bivens, the so-called implied cause of action for a constitutional violation has only been recognized by the Supreme Court in two other contexts: the Fifth Amendment‘s due process clause for an allegation of gender discrimination, and the Eighth Amendment‘s cruel and unusual punishments clause for the alleged failure to provide adequate medical treatment to an inmate.
Jangjoo v. Sieg, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2018 WL 3418784, at *4 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018) (citations omitted). In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court explained that Bivens arose when courts made different assumptions about their authority to imply causes of action, suggesting that “it is possible that the analysis in the Court‘s three Bivens cases might have been different if they were decided today.” 137 S. Ct. at 1856. In any event, “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Id. at 1857 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675).
For future Bivens cases, Abbasi clarified the correct analytical approach. First, courts must ask whether the alleged cause of action arises in a new or previously recognized Bivens
the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.
Id. at 1859-60. If the context is not new, then existing Bivens precedent controls. But if the context is new, then courts must ask whether “special factors” counsel against implying a damages action based on a violation of a constitutional right. Id. at 1857. This inquiry “must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id. at 1857-58. “[I]f there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy,” then the Judiciary should defer and allow Congress to play its proper role. Id. at 1858.
This case presents a new context. To start with, the Supreme Court has never authorized a damages remedy for a First Amendment violation, and it seems unlikely to do so in the wake of Abbasi. Id. at 1854-55, 1857 (explaining that the Court has refused to extend Bivens for 30 years, including in the First Amendment context); Jangjoo, 2018 WL 3418784, at *6 (“In the First Amendment context, the Court has addressed but never affirmatively extended Bivens.“) (citations omitted).
The Plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens remedy for First Amendment retaliation in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). Pl.‘s Mem. In Opp. To Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (Pl.‘s Opp) 8-9. He makes an understandable mistake, since Hartman was a
In any event, the “new context” inquiry does not end even if courts have extended Bivens to the relevant constitutional right. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859-60. The D.C. Circuit has recognized First Amendment Bivens claims for retaliatory arrest, Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and retaliatory prosecution, Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1255–57 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated in part by Hartman, 547 U.S. 250. The Circuit has also assumed that Bivens was available for a prisoner who asserted retaliatory restrictions in violation of the First Amendment, dismissing those claims on qualified immunity grounds. Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2016). But even assuming these cases are still good law, see Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1859 (finding that the lower court erred in its “new context” analysis
B. Special Factors Counsel Against Creating a Damages Remedy
Since this is a new Bivens context, I must now ask whether “special factors counsel[] hesitation” in allowing this suit to go forward, and “[i]n a related way, if there is an alternative remedial structure present . . . that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.” Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1858. I conclude that while the allegations here are deeply troubling for First Amendment values, special factors counsel hesitation in judicially creating a damages remedy against federal officials who persuade private entities to terminate volunteers. Those factors include the speech interests of the federal officials themselves, this country‘s reluctance to extend free speech protections to private sector employment, and the existing patchwork of federal statutes that provide accountability for federal officials. Ultimately, in the complex, fraught arena of free speech, Congress is better suited than the Judiciary to determine whether a damages action should arise.
At the outset, I assume without deciding that the Defendants’ alleged actions violated the First Amendment rights of Mr. Storms. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 372 (1983) (taking the same approach in deciding not to extend Bivens to First Amendment claims made by public employees). Thus, I take no issue with Mr. Storms’ argument that he has First Amendment
The first special factor counseling hesitation is the fact that the government has speech interests of its own, as do federal employees speaking as citizens. The government has broad authority to speak for itself, without facing unique court-imposed liability regimes.
With countless advocates outside of the government seeking to influence its policy, it would be ironic if those charged with making governmental decisions were not free to speak for themselves in the process. If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed.
Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990). Creating a Bivens remedy here would risk turning the First Amendment into a government-silencing mechanism.
“When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000). Thus,
Retaliation claims involving government speech warrant a cautious approach by courts. Restricting the ability of government decisionmakers to engage in speech risks interfering with their ability to effectively perform their duties. It also ignores the competing First Amendment rights of the officials themselves. The First Amendment is intended to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). That marketplace of ideas is undermined if
public officials are prevented from responding to speech of citizens with speech of their own. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966) (“The interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators.“).
Mulligan v. Nichols, 835 F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2016). Even to the extent that public officials speak not for the government, but in their capacity as private citizens, “the First Amendment protects a public employee‘s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). “So long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 419. These interests must be considered here.
Of course, the government action that Mr. Storms challenges is arguably destructive of First Amendment values, contributing little to “an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529. Setting aside the surrounding details, the Defendants’ alleged persuasion of the VFW to terminate Mr. Storms aimed to undermine and chill his speech, rather than advance a competing idea. This is particularly troubling since Mr. Storms claims that the article was later verified by government investigations about the VA‘s wait time practices. Compl. ¶ 13. But as Abbasi reminds us:
the decision to recognize a damages remedy requires an assessment of its impact on governmental operations systemwide. Those matters include the burdens on Government employees who are sued personally, as well as the projected costs and consequences to the Government itself when the tort and monetary liability mechanisms of the legal system are used to bring about the proper formulation and implementation of public policies.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. Not every case will involve the cover-up of a substantial scandal. Not every case will involve equities that clearly favor the plaintiff. Even if the government has
The second special factor counselling caution is the First Amendment‘s limitation to government action. The Constitution says that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
This change, even if beneficial in some respects, might create complicated issues for both private and public-sector decision making, as actors must deal with litigation risk and its inevitable costs. Such a decision would expand the First Amendment‘s scope in ways difficult to predict. For instance, it could further complicate government contractors’ hiring and firing decisions, forcing both them and their client agencies to consider what liability their internal personnel decisions may create for government officials. I hesitate to make such a significant decision as a member of the Judiciary when Congress—our Nation‘s law-making body—is fully equipped to consider the complicated factors at issue, and act.
The named Defendants also contend that the Privacy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provide alternative remedies for Mr. Storms’ injury and thus counsel caution in creating a Bivens remedy. Defs.’ Mem. In Support of Mot. Dismiss (Mot. Dismiss) 13-14. The APA does have some limited relevance, since that statute allows citizens to challenge final agency actions, including agency “sanction[s]” such as the “imposition of a penalty.”
To be fair to Mr. Storms, none of these statutes focus on remedying this particular First Amendment injury, and so none constitute “an alternative remedial structure present in [this] case,” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (2017). Thus, this specific “wrong [may] . . . go unredressed.” Bush, 462 U.S. at 388. But the fact that Congress has enacted so many measures aimed at creating federal accountability shows their engagement on this subject. This fact counsels hesitation in crafting a damages remedy that Congress itself has not approved. See Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation . . . does not by any means necessarily imply that courts should award money damages,” and a proper special factors analysis includes “an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent“) (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1988)).
IV. CONCLUSION
This Court does not condone the Defendants’ alleged actions. But no damages remedy currently exists for the First Amendment retaliation that Mr. Storms describes, and it is the job of Congress to decide if such a remedy should be created. This conclusion applies equally to the named and unnamed Defendants, so the named Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted and the Complaint will be dismissed. A separate order will issue.
Dated: August 6, 2018
TREVOR N. MCFADDEN
United States District Judge