KURT STOETZL et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al., Defendants and Respondents.
S244751
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
July 1, 2019
First Appellate District, Division Four A142832; San Francisco City and County Superior Court CJC11004661
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, and Groban concurred. Justice Liu filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice Cuéllar concurred.
STOETZL v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
S244751
In this case, we decide whether a certified class of state correctional employees is entitled to additional compensation for time spent on pre- and postwork activities, including traveling from the outermost gate of the prison facility to their work posts within the facility, traveling back from their work posts to the outermost gate, being briefed before the start of a shift, briefing relief staff at the end of a shift, checking out and checking back in mandated safety equipment, putting on and removing such equipment, and submitting to searches at various security checkpoints within the facility. For convenience, we will refer to the time spent doing these pre- and postwork activities as “walk time” although we recognize that walk time includes many activities besides merely walking to and from a work post. There are two types of walk time that are relevant here. The first is the time a correctional employee spends after arriving at a prison‘s outermost gate but before beginning the first activity the employee is employed to perform (plus analogous time at the end of the employee‘s work shift). We will call this type of walk time “entry-exit walk time.” The second is the time a correctional employee spends after beginning the first activity the employee is employed to perform but before the employee arrives at his or her assigned
The trial court divided the plaintiff class into two subclasses, one for supervisory employees who were not represented by a union during the time period set forth in the class certification and the other for represented employees. We conclude that the subclass of represented plaintiffs expressly agreed, by way of the collective bargaining process, to a specific amount of compensation for duty-integrated walk time, and there is no allegation that the state failed to pay the agreed-upon amount. Moreover, the collective bargaining agreements that memorialized this agreement all provided that they constituted the entire understanding of the parties concerning matters contained therein, and thus they precluded other forms of compensation, such as compensation for entry-exit walk time. These agreements were approved by the Legislature, and each approval was signed by the Governor and chaptered into law, thus becoming specific legislation applicable to the represented plaintiffs and superseding more general laws to the extent of any conflict. Therefore, the represented plaintiffs’ claims fail insofar as they seek additional compensation for either duty-integrated walk time or entry-exit walk time.
As to the subclass of unrepresented plaintiffs, we conclude that they may be entitled to additional compensation for duty-integrated walk time. The terms and conditions that govern the employment of the unrepresented plaintiffs are determined by the Department of Human Resources (CalHR) and set forth in a manual known as the Pay Scale Manual and also in CalHR‘s regulations. The Pay Scale Manual defines compensable work time for purposes of calculating an employee‘s right to regular and overtime compensation, and duty-integrated walk time falls squarely within that definition. If, as is alleged, the state did not take duty-integrated walk time into consideration when calculating the compensation owed to the unrepresented plaintiffs, then those plaintiffs may be entitled to additional pay.
Entry-exit walk time, by contrast, does not fall within the Pay Scale Manual‘s definition of compensable work time. Moreover, because the Pay Scale Manual comprehensively addresses the question of compensation for the unrepresented plaintiffs, it precludes compensation for any work time that falls outside the scope of its definition. Therefore, insofar as the unrepresented plaintiffs are seeking compensation for entry-exit walk time, their claims must be rejected.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Pretrial Proceedings
This matter arises from the coordination (see
The trial court granted class certification in all three actions, and it certified two plaintiff subclasses, one comprising unrepresented supervisory employees and the other comprising represented employees. Defendants then moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted as to the causes of action for failure to pay contractual overtime in violation of
The matter then proceeded to trial, but the parties stipulated that the trial could proceed in multiple phases. In the first phase, several threshold questions were tried to the court. A brief overview of two regulatory schemes is helpful to understand the threshold questions tried at the first phase.
B. Regulatory Background
1. Wage Order No. 4
The Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) was created in 1913 with express authority to adopt regulations — called wage orders — governing
IWC wage order No. 4-2001, which is at issue here, governs wages, hours, and working conditions in professional,
technical, clerical, mechanical, and similar occupations. (IWC wage order No. 4-2001 (Wage Order No. 4); see
Both the minimum wage and the overtime sections of Wage Order No. 4 refer to “all hours worked,” which the wage order defines as “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” (Wage Order No. 4, § 2(K), italics added.) The parties refer to this definition of compensable work time as the “control standard.” Under applicable case law, an argument can be made that both types of walk time at issue in this case fall within this definition. (See Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 587–588 [holding that compulsory travel time on an employer‘s buses, to
By reason of a 2001 amendment, Wage Order No. 4 applies to employees of the state government, but only in part. Before the 2001 amendment, former section 1(B) of the wage order stated: “The provisions of this Order shall not apply to employees directly employed by the State. . . .” (IWC wage order No. 4-2000, § 1(B).) As a result of the 2001 amendment, section 1(B) now states: ”Except as provided in Sections 1, 2, 4, 10, and 20, the provisions of this order shall not apply to any employees directly employed by the State. . . .” (Wage Order No. 4, § 1(B), italics added.) Thus, only sections 1, 2, 4, 10, and 20 of Wage Order No. 4 govern state employment.3 (See Sheppard v. North Orange County Regional Occupational Program (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 289, 300–301 (Sheppard).) The sections that are most relevant here are section 2, which is the “Definitions” section (and which includes the definition of “[h]ours worked“), and section 4, which is the “Minimum Wages” section. Significantly, section 3 — which is the section of Wage Order No. 4 that guarantees overtime pay — is not among the excepted sections listed in the opening clause of section 1(B) of the wage order, and therefore section 3‘s overtime guarantee is not applicable to state government employees.
In summary, Wage Order No. 4‘s “Definitions” and “Minimum Wages” sections expressly apply to rank-and-file employees of the state government, and Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th 575, supports an argument that both types of walk time at issue in this case fall within Wage Order No. 4‘s definition of “[h]ours worked,” a definition that focuses on “control.”
2. The Pay Scale Manual
“Under the California Constitution it is the Legislature, rather than the Governor, that generally possesses the ultimate authority to establish or revise the terms and conditions of state employment through legislative enactments, and . . . any authority that the Governor or an executive branch entity . . . is
entitled to exercise in this area emanates from the Legislature‘s delegation of a portion of its legislative authority to such executive officials or entities through statutory enactments.” (Professional Engineers in California Government v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 989, 1015 (Professional Engineers), second italics added; see Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 188.)
The wages and hours of workers in California, including state government workers, are also governed by federal law,
specifically, the FLSA (
The latter exemption is sometimes referred to as the “section 7(k) exemption” because it appears in section 7(k) of the FLSA, a provision that is codified as
These same provisions of Section 10 of the Pay Scale Manual also incorporate the FLSA‘s definition of compensable
work time, stating that “[f]or the purpose of identifying hours worked under the provisions of the FLSA, only the time spent which is controlled or required by the State and pursued for the benefit of the State need be counted.” (Italics added.) This definition, which expressly references the FLSA, is drawn nearly verbatim from the high court‘s decision in Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944) (Tennessee Coal), which defines FLSA-regulated work as “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.” (Tennessee Coal, at p. 598, italics added.) Thus, it is clear that the Pay Scale Manual intends the FLSA‘s definition of compensable work time to
The Pay Scale Manual‘s definition of compensable work time — like that of Wage Order No. 4 — uses the word “control[].” Nonetheless, the two definitions differ on a point that is critical to the parties’ dispute. The Pay Scale Manual‘s definition is expressly based on the FLSA definition, and the FLSA, by its terms, excludes entry-exit walk time from coverage. That exclusion is a result of Congress‘s enactment, in 1947, of the Portal-to-Portal Act (
workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. . . .” (
Plaintiffs’ petition for review does not argue that entry-exit walk time is compensable under the constraints the Portal-to-Portal Act placed on the FLSA; rather, it argues that the FLSA definition of compensable work time does not apply. Therefore, we proceed under the assumption that under federal law, entry-exit walk time is not compensable. (See Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk (2014) 574 U.S. ___, [135 S.Ct. 513, 519] [“We hold that an activity is integral and indispensable to the principal activities that an employee is employed to perform — and thus compensable under the FLSA — if it is an intrinsic element of those activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal activities.
In summary, this case involves a conflict between two regulatory schemes. Wage Order No. 4 regulates the minimum wage the state government must pay its rank-and-file employees, and it defines compensable work time in a broad way that arguably includes both types of walk time at issue in this litigation. (See Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 587–588.) At the same time, the Pay Scale Manual sets forth the regular and overtime compensation that the state government must pay to certain classes of its employees (including plaintiffs’ classes), and in so doing, it expressly adopts the FLSA‘s narrower
definition of compensable work time, a definition that, by its terms, excludes entry-exit walk time.
C. The Trial
As noted, the parties stipulated that the trial could proceed in multiple phases. In the first phase, several threshold questions that were potentially dispositive of plaintiffs’ claims were tried to the court. These questions included: (1) whether plaintiffs’ compensable work time was properly determined according to the “control standard” (i.e., the standard that applies under the state‘s wage orders) or according to the “first principal activity . . . standard” (i.e., the standard that applies under the constraints the Portal-to-Portal Act placed on the FLSA), and also whether the represented plaintiffs agreed to application of the narrower federal standard; (2) whether the duty to pay plaintiffs the minimum wage was properly determined by California minimum wage law (including Wage Order No. 4‘s broad definition of compensable work time) or by federal minimum wage law (including the FLSA‘s narrower definition of compensable work time), and also whether the represented plaintiffs agreed to the application of federal minimum wage law and whether any such agreement is enforceable; and (3) whether an employee of the state can bring a common law breach of contract claim against the state for failure to pay overtime compensation that has been earned, and if so, what contractually enforceable overtime policies existed.
The evidence at the first phase of the trial established the following facts.
1. The Represented Plaintiffs
The represented plaintiffs are members of State Bargaining Unit 6, which covers state correctional employees,
and they are represented by the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA). The CCPOA and the state have negotiated several memoranda of understanding (MOUs), but the MOU in effect from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999 (the 1998–1999 MOU)
The “7k Exemption” section of the 1998–1999 MOU began with an express reference to the FLSA: “CCPOA and the State agree that the [represented plaintiffs] are working under the provisions of Section []7k of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the parties acknowledge that the employer is declaring a specific exemption for these employees under the provisions specified herein.” The 1998–1999 MOU then set forth the 168-hour work schedule, and it defined overtime as time worked in excess of that schedule. The 168 hours consisted of 160 hours of “on post” duty, four hours of “pre and post work activities,” and four hours of “training.” Regarding the four hours of “pre and post work activities,” the 1998–1999 MOU stated: “CCPOA agrees that generally this is sufficient time for all pre and post work activities during each work period, and that the compensation allotted for these activities under this provision is full compensation for all of these activities.”8 The
1998–1999 MOU further stated: “The State and CCPOA agree that they have made a good faith attempt to comply with all requirements of the FLSA in negotiating this provision.”
Significantly, the phrase “pre and post work activities” as used in the 1998–1999 MOU referred to duty-integrated walk time, not entry-exit walk time. According to testimony from David Gilb, the state‘s chief negotiator, the state took the position during negotiations that the phrase encompassed activities that occurred before correctional employees arrived at their assigned work posts and after they left those posts, but the phrase only encompassed activities that began when an employee first picked up his or her equipment in the central control area of the prison facility and that ended when an employee dropped off the same equipment at the end of his or her shift. According to Gilb, the phrase “pre and post work activities” did not include time spent between entering the outermost gate of a prison facility and first picking up equipment, or time spent leaving a facility after dropping off equipment. The union initially sought compensation for such time, but the state argued that entry-exit walk time was not compensable because the parties were negotiating under the FLSA‘s section 7(k) exemption, and the
As regards employees in two job classifications (“Correctional Counselors I” and “Correctional Counselors II“), the 1998–1999 MOU (and subsequent MOUs between the parties) did not allocate any time for “pre and post work activities.” The trial court made a factual finding, with respect to those employees, that “neither the State nor [the union] believed that these individuals engaged in any compensable [pre- and postwork activities].”
Rather, asserted the state, compensable work time under the FLSA begins with the “first principal activity” that an employee is employed to perform. The testimony of CCPOA‘s chief negotiator, Stephen Weiss, confirmed that the parties did not consider entry-exit walk time to be compensable. He testified that the phrase “pre and post work activities” was not specifically defined in the MOU, “[b]ut in the conversations at the [bargaining] table, it was picking up your keys, picking up your tools, Mace, whatever was appropriate for the particular post that they were working.”
During the discussions that led to the 1998–1999 MOU there was no suggestion that state wage-and-hour protections applied. The reason CCPOA did not make that argument was that, at the time of the negotiations, the state statutes setting the minimum wage and permitting private actions to enforce the minimum wage (
The Legislature approved the 1998–1999 MOU, and this approval was signed by the Governor and chaptered into law. (Stats. 1998, ch. 820, § 2, p. 5135.) The next MOU, which was in effect between the parties from July 1, 1999 to July 2, 2001, continued the relevant provisions of the 1998–1999 MOU, and like its predecessor, it too was approved by the Legislature by
way of a regularly enacted law. (Stats. 1999, ch. 778, § 6, subd. (b), p. 5613.) The MOU in effect from July 1, 2001 to July 2, 2006 (the 2001–2006 MOU) provided for a schedule of only 164 hours in a 28-day work period, with this shorter schedule going into effect on July 1, 2004. The shorter schedule was achieved by eliminating the four hours allocated to training in the previous MOUs. As with the previous MOUs, four hours remained allocated to “pre and post work activities,” and the 2001–2006 MOU included the language from the previous MOUs, stating that those four hours were “sufficient time for all pre and post work activities during each work period” and “that the compensation allotted for these activities under this provision is full compensation for all of these activities.” The 2001–2006 MOU also included the language from the previous MOUs, stating that the parties had made a good faith attempt to comply with the FLSA. Like its predecessors, the 2001–2006 MOU was approved by the Legislature, and this approval was signed by the Governor and chaptered into law. (Stats. 2002, ch. 1, § 2, p. 3.)
“last best, and final offer” was not different from the 2001–2006 MOU.
In late 2007, the national economy went into recession, and a steep drop in state revenues seriously impacted the state‘s budget. (See Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1000-1008 [describing state‘s fiscal crisis, which began in late 2007 and continued for several years thereafter].) The state and CCPOA next entered into an MOU on May 16, 2011 (the 2011–2013 MOU). This new MOU, like its predecessors, invoked section 7(k) of the FLSA, and it continued the schedule of 164 hours in a recurring 28-day work period, a schedule that expressly included four hours for “pre and post work activities.” But, by the time of the 2011–2013 MOU, the present litigation had begun. Therefore, the 2011–2013 MOU did not include the language found in the earlier MOUs, stating that four hours constituted sufficient compensation for pre- and postwork activities. The MOU stated in a side letter that “nothing in this MOU shall have prejudicial effect to either side‘s arguments in Stoetzl v. State of California” (referring to the present litigation). The 2011–2013 MOU, like its predecessors, was approved by the Legislature, and this approval was signed by the Governor and chaptered into law. (Stats. 2011, ch. 25, § 2, p. 684.)
2. The Unrepresented Plaintiffs
Labor relations between the state and the unrepresented plaintiffs are governed by, among other things, the Bill of Rights for State Excluded Employees (
Therefore, no MOU governs the wages and hours of the unrepresented plaintiffs. Instead, CalHR, pursuant to its delegated legislative authority to set wages and hours for state workers (
Section 10 of the Pay Scale Manual divides Work Week Group 2 into three categories: (1) “employees in classes not eligible for exemption under Section 7K of the FLSA“; (2) “employees in law enforcement classes, for which exemption under Section 7K of the FLSA is claimed“; and (3) “employees in fire suppression classes, for which exemption under Section 7K of the FLSA is claimed.” As to each of these categories, the Pay Scale Manual adopts work schedules that derive directly from the FLSA (see
D. The Trial Court‘s Ruling
The gist of plaintiffs’ claims is that the state did not adequately compensate them for walk time. The trial court rejected that assertion, ruling in favor of the defendants on all issues.
As to the represented plaintiffs, the trial court concluded that the “first principal activity” standard that defines compensable work time for purposes of the FLSA governs plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court based its conclusion on the language of the MOUs (which incorporated the FLSA‘s section 7(k) schedule), testimonial evidence that the parties agreed, during negotiations, to adopt the FLSA‘s “first principal activity” standard, and the fact that the MOUs were approved by the Legislature, thus superseding conflicting laws of more general application.
As to the unrepresented plaintiffs, the trial court concluded that, by assigning various job classifications to Work Week Group 2, CalHR had determined that those job classifications should be governed by the FLSA, and more specifically by the “first principal activity” standard that defines compensable work time for purposes of the FLSA. The trial court further concluded that, in doing so, CalHR acted within its express delegated authority under
In the trial court‘s view, the foregoing conclusions disposed of plaintiffs’ minimum wage cause of action, which was based on the assertion that the “control” standard of the state‘s wage orders, not the “first principal activity” standard of the FLSA, defined compensable work time for purposes of the duty to pay the minimum wage. The trial court reasoned that by approving the MOUs (in the case of the represented plaintiffs) and by authorizing CalHR to establish work week groups that were subject to the FLSA‘s overtime standards (in the case of the unrepresented plaintiffs), the Legislature enacted specific laws that superseded the state‘s more general minimum wage laws.
As to plaintiffs’ overtime claims based on common law breach of contract, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the rule that the terms and conditions of public employment are controlled by statute and ordinance, not by contract, and that plaintiffs had not established the existence of a contractual agreement to pay overtime compensation other than as provided in the MOUs.
Based on the foregoing conclusions, which disposed of all of plaintiffs’ remaining claims, the trial court declined to reach defendants’ contentions that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and had failed to comply with the government claims statutes (
E. The Court of Appeal Decision
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court as to the represented plaintiffs, but it reversed the trial court as to the unrepresented plaintiffs.
As to the represented plaintiffs, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the Legislature‘s approval of the MOUs, and the Governor‘s signature, effectively made those agreements into laws that, because of their specificity, superseded any conflicting general laws that might otherwise apply. (Stoetzl v. State of California (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1256, 1272, review granted Nov. 29, 2017, S244751 (Stoetzl).) The MOUs expressly stated that the represented plaintiffs were
As to the unrepresented plaintiffs, the Court of Appeal concluded that their minimum wage claims should be allowed to proceed. (Stoetzl, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1276, review granted.) The court reasoned that it needed to harmonize the requirements of Wage Order No. 4, whose definition of compensable work time expressly applies to rank-and-file employees of the state government, with CalHR‘s Pay Scale Manual, which likewise defines compensable work time for specified classes of state government employees, including plaintiffs’ classes. (Stoetzl, at p. 1275Ibid.) The Court of Appeal further noted that the Manual‘s definition of compensable work time uses the word “control[],” which, in the Court‘s view, suggested a parallel to the “control” standard that applies under the state‘s wage orders. (id. at pp. 1275-1276.) Moreover, the Court of Appeal noted that the Manual‘s definition of compensable work time, although drawn nearly verbatim from FLSA definition, does not expressly exclude entry-exit walk time. (id. at p. 1276.) Finally, the Court of Appeal noted that the Pay Scale Manual does not contain an express provision stating that Wage Order No. 4 does not apply, whereas Wage Order No. 4 expressly states that its “Definitions” and “Minimum Wages” sections apply to state government employees. (Stoetzl, at p. 1276.)
Therefore, the Court of Appeal concluded that Wage Order No. 4‘s broad definition of compensable work time governed the state‘s obligation to pay the minimum wage to the unrepresented plaintiffs. The Court said: “We may reasonably construe the regulatory schemes to mean that entitlement to overtime compensation is controlled by the FLSA but that the meaning of
As to the breach of contract claims of the unrepresented plaintiffs — claims that sought overtime compensation for walk time — the Court of Appeal concluded that those claims, too, should be allowed to proceed because the unrepresented plaintiffs “are entitled to compensation for all hours worked under California‘s broader standard.” (Stoetzl, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1279, review granted.) The Court of Appeal held, however, that the trial court properly rejected the unrepresented plaintiffs’
Both sides petitioned for review, and we granted both petitions.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek additional compensation for walk time, basing their claims on three legal theories set forth in three causes of action: (1) failure to pay the minimum wage in violation of state minimum wage laws; (2) failure to pay overtime compensation in breach of common law contractual obligations; and (3) failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of
A. The Minimum Wage Cause of Action
1. The Represented Plaintiffs
We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeal that the represented plaintiffs agreed, through the collective bargaining process, to receive a specific amount of compensation for walk time, and the state‘s minimum wage laws do not entitle them to additional compensation.
The represented plaintiffs agreed through the foregoing collective bargaining process to a specific amount of compensation for duty-integrated walk time. Specifically, they agreed to four hours’ pay for “pre and post work activities” in a recurring 28-day work period, and the record supports the trial court‘s finding that the phrase “pre and post work activities” was used by the parties to refer to duty-integrated walk time.11
Moreover, CCPOA expressly conceded in the text of three of the four MOUs at issue here “that generally [four hours] is sufficient time for all pre and post work activities during each work period, and that the compensation allotted for these activities under this provision is full compensation for all of these activities.” Significantly, the trial court made a finding that the word
Although CCPOA did not make this same concession in the 2011-2013 MOU, the parties agreed in a side letter that “nothing in this [2011-2013] MOU shall have prejudicial effect to either side‘s arguments in Stoetzl v. State of California,” referring to the present litigation. Therefore, the omission of language that had been included in all the previous MOUs, stating that four hours was generally sufficient for pre- and postwork activities, cannot be construed as an indication that four hours had somehow ceased to be sufficient, at least under ordinary circumstances. In addition, there is no allegation that the represented plaintiffs were barred from applying for additional compensation if such compensation became necessary due to the “dynamic environment” of the prison. As noted, the trial court found that the state permitted employees to apply for such additional compensation. Therefore, the represented plaintiffs cannot, as a factual matter, show that duty-integrated walk time ever went uncompensated.
Moreover, the MOUs were all approved by the Legislature, with this approval signed by the Governor and chaptered into law. Thus, the MOUs became legislative enactments that because of their specificity, supersede the more general state laws on which the represented plaintiffs base their claims. (See, e.g., Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 634 [in the event of a conflict, specific provisions ordinarily prevail over general ones].) It would be unfair to allow the represented plaintiffs, who negotiated a favorable deal at the bargaining table and who agreed to certain concessions as part of that deal, including concessions concerning compensation for walk time, to avoid those concessions after the Legislature passed a series of special laws approving their agreement.
This is not a case in which a party to a labor agreement agreed to waive state law protections that are not subject to waiver. (Cf. Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 455 [“By its terms, the rights to the legal minimum wage and legal overtime compensation conferred by the statute are unwaivable.“]; Hoover v. American Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1208 [“[T]he rights accorded by [Labor Code] section[] . . . 1194 ... may not be subject to negotiation or waiver.“]; Grier v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 325, 335 [“[F]ull payment of accrued wages is an important state policy, enacted for protection of employees generally. As such, it is not to be avoided by the terms of a private agreement.“].) Rather, this is a case in which a party to a labor agreement agreed, subject to legislative approval, to certain specified terms of employment, and the Legislature then enacted a special law approving the agreed-upon terms. Having expressly agreed to specific terms of compensation for pre- and postwork activities, and having declared those terms to be the “entire agreement” of the parties concerning compensation for such activities, and, most important, having received legislative approval of the agreement, the represented plaintiffs cannot credibly argue that they should now be released from the terms of the agreement and granted additional compensation based on the general laws of the state.
Of course, there was no special law approving the terms of defendants’ “last, best, and final offer” (see
Plaintiffs, however, misread the law that applies to a last, best, and final offer. As noted, the Dills Act requires that an MOU be presented to the Legislature for approval if it requires the expenditure of state funds or if its implementation requires the amendment of statutory provisions that are not among those provisions that the MOU automatically supersedes. In Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court (Greene) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 155 (Greene), the Court of Appeal considered whether, in the context of the state‘s 1991-1992 fiscal crisis, CalHR‘s predecessor could, after bargaining to an impasse, unilaterally impose its last, best, and final offer regarding wages and health care contributions. (Id. at pp. 162-164.) The court held that when an MOU expires, its supersession of conflicting state laws comes to an end, and therefore those state laws come back into full effect. (Id. at p. 176.) Accordingly, the court concluded that the
The holding of Greene, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 155, created problems for state employees because the expired MOU often offered greater employee protections than the general state laws that came back into full effect upon the MOU‘s expiration. Of particular concern to state employee unions was the continuing ability to collect fair share fees14 and to rely on arbitration to resolve disputes. The CCPOA therefore sponsored legislation to set aside the holding of Greene. (See, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 683 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 30, 2000, pp. 2-4; Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 683 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 19, 1999, pp. 1-2; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 683 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 19, 1999, pp. 2-5.) That legislation added section 3517.8 to the Government Code — sometimes referred to as the “evergreen” law — addressing the situation where an MOU expires with no new MOU in place.
If, upon expiration of the MOU, negotiations over a new MOU are ongoing, subdivision (a) of
The represented plaintiffs argue that here, because the state‘s last, best, and final offer was not approved by the Legislature, there was no supersession of conflicting state laws, and therefore their claims for additional minimum wage compensation should prevail at least as to the 44-month impasse period in which no MOU was in place. What plaintiffs overlook is that the legislative approval required by
In fact, our opinion in Professional Engineers went even further, stating that the Legislature can use appropriations bills to modify the terms of state employment even while an MOU is in effect. Our decision in Professional Engineers arose in the context of the state fiscal crisis that began in late 2007 and continued for several years thereafter. (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1000-1008.) In December 2008, the Governor issued an executive order instructing the Department of Personnel Administration (now CalHR) to implement a mandatory two-day-a-month unpaid furlough of most executive branch employees. (Id. at p. 999.) In reviewing the legality of that mandatory furlough, we noted that when the Legislature revised the Budget Act of 2008, it reduced the relevant appropriation to a level that reflected the Governor‘s furlough plan. (Id. at 1043.) We said: “By reducing the appropriation for employee compensation, the Legislature no longer had ‘fully funded’ the provisions of the MOU‘s supporting the higher level of pay that previously had been approved, and thus . . . the provisions of the applicable MOU‘s . . . no longer were effective.” (Ibid., italics added; see Service Employees Internat. Union, Local 1000 v. Brown (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 252, 263 [”Professional Engineers made it clear that it is the Legislature which has . . . the final say [] in fixing the compensation paid to represented state employees, with that final say often being expressed in the budget process.“].)
The holdings of Professional Engineers suffice to answer the represented plaintiffs’ argument that there was no legislative approval here. (See also Brown v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 971, 998 [appropriations bills satisfy legislative approval required by
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeal that the represented plaintiffs are not entitled to additional minimum wage compensation for either duty-integrated walk time or entry-exit walk time. The MOUs made specific provision for duty-integrated walk time, and the trial court‘s findings of fact, which are supported by trial testimony, do not suggest that duty-integrated walk time ever went uncompensated. Although the MOUs did not specifically refer to entry-exit walk time, they expressly stated that they constituted the entire understanding of the parties regarding the matters they addressed, and compensation for pre- and postwork activities was one of those matters. Moreover, the Legislature‘s enactment of special laws approving the MOUs (and its decision to fund the state‘s last, best, and final offer) precludes the represented plaintiffs’ reliance on more general state laws to support their minimum wage claims.
2. The Unrepresented Plaintiffs
As noted, the trial court concluded, as to the unrepresented plaintiffs, that the specific statutes authorizing CalHR to set the wages and hours of employees of the state government (see
The Court of Appeal suggested that this case pitted an IWC wage order that has the “dignity” of statutory law against a provision of CalHR‘s Pay Scale Manual that does not. (See Stoetzl, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1275, review granted.) That characterization is not completely accurate, however. Rather, we are confronted here with two competing statutory schemes, each broadly authorizing administrative action. It is true that the IWC‘s wage orders are entitled to extraordinary deference and that they must be harmonized, to the extent possible, with conflicting laws and regulations, but that harmonization does not mean that the wage orders must invariably prevail over the regulations of other agencies.
On the other hand, the Legislature empowered CalHR to set the wages and hours of employees of the state government (
Given these two broad delegations of quasi-legislative authority, it is not obvious that, in the case of a direct conflict, the decisions of the IWC should invariably prevail over those of CalHR. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the IWC‘s wage orders “have ‘the same dignity as statutes,‘” whereas “the Pay Scale Manual is not a legislative enactment” (Stoetzl, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1275, review granted), but the underlying basis for treating the wage orders like statutes is the Legislature‘s broad delegation of legislative power to the IWC (see Martinez, supra, at p. 61), and the Legislature‘s delegation of legislative power to CalHR is likewise very broad. We are not dealing here with an ambiguous statutory phrase or standard that CalHR must clarify, nor has the Legislature given CalHR much specific guidance as to what terms of employment it should adopt. Rather, we are dealing with a broad legislative gap — the terms of employment, including specific salary ranges, for thousands of state job classifications — and CalHR has filled that legislative gap, exercising its delegated legislative authority. Therefore, the provisions of the Pay Scale Manual at issue here are best characterized as quasi-legislative rules. (See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 10-11 [defining quasi-legislative rules as those that result from a delegation of legislative power, not those that merely represent the agency‘s view of a statute‘s meaning]; id. at p. 6 fn. 3 [noting that “the terms ‘quasi-legislative’
Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration (D.C.Cir.1993) 995 F.2d 1106, 1110 [“[T]he dividing line [between interpretive and quasi-legislative regulations] is the necessity for agency legislative action . . . [.] [A] rule supplying that action will be legislative . . . , and an interpretation that spells out the scope of an agency‘s or regulated entity‘s preexisting duty . . . will be interpretive . . . .“].) As such, the provisions of the Pay Scale Manual, like the IWC‘s wage orders, “have the dignity of statutes.” (Yamaha, at p. 10.)16
It is true that IWC wage orders must, when possible, be harmonized with statutes. (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1027.) It is also true that the Legislature‘s authority to delegate its legislative power to the IWC is expressly recognized in the state‘s Constitution. (
We also reject the Court of Appeal‘s suggestion that, by using the word “control[],” the Pay Scale Manual intended to incorporate Wage Order No. 4‘s broad definition of compensable work time, a definition that also happens to use the word “control.” (See Stoetzl, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1275-1276, review granted.) Rather, the Pay Scale Manual‘s definition of compensable work time expressly incorporates the FLSA‘s definition.
More to the point, the definition of compensable work time that appears in Section 10 of the Pay Scale Manual not only expressly references the FLSA, but it also tracks the language of the definition that applies under the FLSA. Specifically, the Pay Scale Manual states in relevant part: “For the purpose of identifying hours worked under the provisions of the FLSA, only the time spent which is controlled or required by the State and pursued for the benefit of the State need be counted.” (Italics added.) By way of comparison, the interpretive bulletin of the United States Department of Labor, defining compensable work time for purposes of the FLSA, states in relevant part: “[E]mployees subject to the act must be paid for all time . . . ’controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.’ [Citation.]” (
It is true that the Pay Scale Manual‘s definition, like that of Wage Order No. 4, uses the word “control[].” It is also true that, in Morillion, we focused on the word “control” in the wage order‘s definition of compensable work time, making that word the basis of our decision. (See Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 587-588 [holding that travel time is compensable under the wage orders because it was under the “control” of the employer].) But because the Pay Scale Manual‘s definition of compensable work time expressly refers to the FLSA, and because its language tracks that of the FLSA definition almost verbatim (including the word “‘control[]‘” that appears in that definition) (
Moreover, the Pay Scale Manual‘s definition of compensable work time includes, by implication, the limitation that the Portal-to-Portal Act placed on the FLSA. It is simply not credible that the Manual - which (1) uses the
The Court of Appeal, however, strained the plain meaning of both the wage order and the Pay Scale Manual to hold that the latter incorporated the former‘s definition of compensable work time. The court did so because it correctly saw the need to harmonize the two administrative schemes to the extent possible. We conclude, however, that Wage Order No. 4 and the Pay Scale Manual cannot be harmonized and that the Pay Scale Manual must be treated as a statutorily authorized exception to Wage Order No. 4.
As discussed, the IWC was given authority to adopt regulations governing wages, hours, and working conditions for “all employees” - private and public - in the state of California. (
In summary, the IWC was authorized to adopt general background rules governing employee wages and hours, but CalHR was the recipient of a more specific delegation, to establish salary ranges for state workers and to adopt, as appropriate, FLSA overtime standards for such workers. Regardless of which agency most recently exercised its delegated authority, to the extent CalHR‘s standards conflict with the more generally applicable wage order standards, they supersede them. It follows, therefore, that the Pay Scale Manual, including its narrow FLSA-based definition of compensable work time, governs the right of the unrepresented plaintiffs to compensation and that they are not entitled to minimum wage compensation based on Wage Order No. 4‘s broader definition of compensable work time.19
We conclude that the trial court was correct to reject the minimum wage claims of the unrepresented plaintiffs and that the Court of Appeal erred in reversing that portion of the trial court‘s judgment.
Plaintiffs argue on a breach of contract theory that they are entitled to overtime compensation for walk time that the state did not properly accredit to them as compensable work time. Plaintiffs rely on White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528 and Madera Police Officers Assn. v. City of Madera (1984) 36 Cal.3d 403. In White and Madera, we recognized an exception to the general principle that public employment is a creature of statute or ordinance, not contract. Specifically, we held that although the terms of public employment are legislatively determined, when a public agency employee has completed his or her work in accordance with those legislative terms, the employee‘s right to receive compensation for the completed work ripens into a contractual right that is protected by the contract clause of the state Constitution. Thus, in Madera, the court said: “‘[T]o the extent services are rendered under statutes or ordinances then providing mandatory compensation for authorized overtime, the right to compensation vests upon performance of the overtime work, ripens into a contractual obligation of the employer and cannot thereafter be destroyed or withdrawn without impairing the employee‘s contractual right.‘” (Madera, at p. 413, quoting Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25 Cal.3d 14, 23, italics added.) Likewise, in White, we said: “[P]ast California cases clearly establish that although the conditions of public employment generally are established by statute rather than by the terms of an ordinary contract, once a public employee has accepted employment and performed work for a public employer, the employee obtains certain rights arising from the legislative provisions that establish the terms of the employment relationship - rights that are protected by the contract clause of the state Constitution from elimination or repudiation by the state. . . . [A] number of cases have stated broadly that among the rights protected by the contract clause is ‘the right to the payment of salary which has been earned.‘” (White, at p. 566, quoting Kern v. City of Long Beach (1947) 29 Cal.2d 848, 853, italics added.) We recently reaffirmed these conclusions in Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (2019) 6 Cal.5th 965.
These cases do not help plaintiffs except insofar as the legislatively created terms of their employment included walk time that these employees actually worked and that the state failed to compensate. As to the represented plaintiffs, the Legislature approved the MOUs governing their employment, and it also approved the last, best, and final offer that applied during the 44-month impasse period in which no MOU was in place. We have already determined that in light of those legislative approvals, the represented plaintiffs’ claims for additional compensation fail. Under White and Madera, plaintiffs’ contractual rights are derivative of and limited by the legislatively
As to the unrepresented plaintiffs, the Legislature delegated its power to set the terms of their employment to two administrative agencies, the IWC and CalHR, and we have already determined that CalHR‘s Pay Scale Manual, which adopts the FLSA definition of compensable work time, controls the unrepresented plaintiffs’ right to compensation. To the extent the breach of contract claims of these plaintiffs are based on the failure to pay overtime for entry-exit walk time, such time is not compensable under the Pay Scale Manual‘s narrow definition of compensable work time, and therefore their claims lack merit. To the extent, however, that their claims are based on the failure to pay overtime for duty-integrated walk time, such time is compensable under the Pay Scale Manual‘s narrow definition of compensable work time. The unrepresented plaintiffs, having alleged that they performed such work and did not receive overtime compensation for it, may have a contractual interest in receiving that compensation. Whether they do depends, of course, on whether they can prove their allegations in future phases of the trial.
Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred in rejecting the breach of contract claims of the unrepresented plaintiffs, although we do not agree with the Court of Appeal that the unrepresented plaintiffs can seek overtime compensation based on the broad definition of compensable work time that appears in Wage Order No. 4. Rather, they can only do so based on the FLSA‘s narrower definition of compensable work time, a definition that excludes entry-exit walk time.
C. Labor Code sections 222 and 223 Cause of Action
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the trial court properly rejected the plaintiffs’ claims for overtime compensation under
Plaintiffs’ claims for overtime compensation under
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it rejected the claims of the represented plaintiffs.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it allowed the unrepresented plaintiffs’ minimum wage claims to proceed.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it rejected the unrepresented plaintiffs’ claims under
We remand the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. During such proceedings, defendants can raise any defenses that the trial court did not reach in its previous consideration of the case.
CHIN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu
I agree with today‘s opinion that the represented plaintiffs cannot pursue claims for duty-integrated walk time for the period when a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was in effect. The represented plaintiffs appear to have explicitly bargained for a specific amount of compensation for duty-integrated time, and they do not allege that the state failed to pay the agreed-upon amount. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 27-28.) With regard to the unrepresented employees, I agree that the Department of Human Resources (CalHR) Pay Scale Manual‘s definition of compensable work does not expressly include entry-exit walk time and that the state therefore has no obligation to pay regular or overtime compensation for that time. (Id. at pp. 10-12.) I also agree that plaintiffs’
I disagree, however, with the court‘s rejection of the represented plaintiffs’ and unrepresented plaintiffs’ minimum wage claims for entry-exit walk time. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2-3, 26-45.) The 2001 revisions to the Industrial Welfare Commission‘s (IWC) wage order No. 4-2001 (Wage Order No. 4) extended minimum wage protections to rank-and-file employees of the state government. (Wage Order No. 4, § 1(B); see
I.
Today‘s opinion concludes that the represented plaintiffs “agreed through the collective bargaining process to forgo compensation for entry-exit walk time.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.) But nothing in the text of the MOUs or the record of the bargaining history indicates that the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) intended to forgo any entitlement that its members may have to minimum wage compensation for entry-exit walk time under Wage Order No. 4.
Through the MOUs, the represented plaintiffs “agreed to four hours’ pay for ‘pre and post work activities’ in a recurring 28-day work period, and the record supports the trial court‘s finding that the phrase ‘pre and post work activities’ was used by the parties to refer to duty-integrated walk time.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.) In concluding that the represented plaintiffs agreed to forgo compensation for entry-exit walk time, the court explains that each MOU “included a heading that read ‘Entire Agreement,’ followed by a provision that stated: ‘This [MOU] sets forth the full and entire understanding of the parties regarding the matters contained herein . . . .’ Because the MOUs ‘set[] forth the full and entire understanding of the parties regarding the matters contained [t]herein,’ and because compensation for pre- and postwork activities was one of the ‘matters contained’ in each of the MOUs, the MOUs precluded compensation for entry-exit walk time by not making any provision for it.” (Id. at pp. 30-31.)
Although it may be plausible to adopt such a reading of the MOUs, it is equally plausible to understand “the matters contained herein” as referring only to matters addressed by the specific provisions of the MOUS - i.e., duty-integrated walk time, and not “compensation” generally or “pre- and postwork activities” generally. On this view, the parties reached an agreement on compensation for duty-integrated walk time and simply did not reach an agreement on entry-exit walk time.
But even if we assume the represented plaintiffs agreed to forgo compensation for entry-exit walk time in the 1998-1999 MOU, it is clear from the bargaining history that they did not agree to forgo any current or future protections to which they may be entitled under state wage and hour law. At
“Q: Do you recall there any being [sic] discussion whatsoever during the 1998 negotiations with respect to whether CCPOA was offering to or attempting on behalf of its members to waive any state wage and hour laws?
“A: They were not.
“Q: Do you recall any discussions during the 1998-1999 negotiations in which any representative of CCPOA made any concession or statement that you interpreted as a concession that state minimum wage law was either waived or otherwise agreed to not be utilized in determining the rights of CCPOA members?
“A: They made no statements. The issue never came up in bargaining.
“Q: So [sic] the extent that you do not recall any discussion of state wage and hour law, you would agree nobody at CCPOA made a statement or comment that was communicated to the State that you interpreted as an intent to waive any such wage and hour rights of the employees.
“A: It did not.”
It is not surprising that the parties did not discuss any waiver by CCPOA of its members’ right to minimum wage compensation at the time of the 1998-1999 MOU negotiation. In 1998, the IWC wage orders did not require state employers to provide minimum wage compensation. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 5-6.) In 2001, however, Wage Order No. 4 was amended to extend minimum wage compensation to state employees, and this guarantee, which has the same dignity and force as statutory law (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1027 (Brinker)), arguably extends to entry-exit walk time. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6-7; see Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 587-588.) Nothing in the bargaining history of the 1998-1999 or later MOUS suggests that the represented plaintiffs ever agreed to forgo the benefits of this change in the law. Even if the represented plaintiffs agreed to forgo minimum wage compensation for entry-exit walk time at a time when they had no right to such compensation under state law, that agreement cannot plausibly be understood to include agreement to forgo
The 2001 revision to Wage Order No. 4 changed the default law governing the relationship between state employers and their employees. From 2001 onward, the burden was on the employer to seek a concession from its employees that entry-exit walk time would not be compensable in future MOUs. Yet nothing in the bargaining history of the subsequent MOUS indicates that the parties revisited this issue or that CCPOA later agreed to waive any right its members may have to minimum wage compensation under the amended wage order in exchange for some other benefit. Thus, there is no basis in the text or bargaining history of any of the MOUs, either before or after 2001, for concluding that the represented plaintiffs agreed to forgo minimum wage compensation for entry-exit walk time under Wage Order No. 4 as revised in 2001.
Today‘s decision awards the employer an exemption from Wage Order No. 4‘s potential applicability to entry-exit walk time, even though the parties never negotiated over this issue after the IWC extended the wage order‘s minimum wage requirement to state employees in 2001. On its face, the court‘s opinion seems to suggest that any state employee union seeking to preserve state law rights not addressed in an MOU‘s specific provisions must incorporate into the MOU an express reservation of all state law provisions conferring such rights, present or future. This is in substantial tension with extensive case law holding that waiver of statutory rights in collective bargaining occurs only when such waiver is “clear and unmistakable.” (Choate v. Celite Corp. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465; see Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 236, 245; Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 543; Vasquez v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 430, 432; 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett (2009) 556 U.S. 247, 272 [same rule for federal statutory rights]; Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB (1983) 460 U.S. 693, 708.) “[S]ilence in a bargaining agreement with respect to an issue previously in dispute does not meet the test of ‘clear and unmistakable’ language of relinquishment of that issue.” (Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1011.)
The court‘s reliance on the Legislature‘s approval of the post-2001 MOUs is also unavailing. Although the Ralph C. Dills Act (the Dills Act) (
In sum, the 2001 revision to Wage Order No. 4 changed the baseline expectations with respect to minimum wage compensation for entry-exit walk time. Because there is no indication, much less a clear and unmistakable indication, that the represented plaintiffs agreed to waive any right they may have to such compensation in the post-2001 MOUs, I would allow their claim for such compensation to proceed.
II.
As for the unrepresented plaintiffs, today‘s opinion concludes that Wage Order No. 4 and CalHR‘s Pay Scale Manual are in “direct conflict” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 39) and “cannot be harmonized” (id. at pp. 43-44) with respect to their definitions of compensable work time, and that the Pay Scale Manual‘s definition must prevail because of “CalHR‘s more specific authority” (id. at p. 44). But I see no direct conflict here. Nor do I think it necessary or wise to opine on whether the Pay Scale Manual is entitled to the same degree of judicial deference as IWC wage orders. As the court acknowledges, we must accord great deference to IWC wage orders, and we must “harmonize[]” those orders with other statutory directives whenever possible. (Id. at p. 38.) Such harmony is achievable here because the Pay Scale Manual can be readily construed in a manner that poses no obstacle to the unrepresented plaintiffs’ minimum wage claim for entry-exit walk time under Wage Order No. 4.
In interpreting wage orders, we have long observed the “remedial nature” of the legislative enactments empowering the IWC to regulate “wages, hours
The text of the Pay Scale Manual contains nothing that expressly excludes the unrepresented employees from the wage order‘s coverage. Nor does it specifically address the availability of minimum wage compensation for entry-exit activities. By contrast, the 2001 revision to Wage Order No. 4 expressly extended the “Definitions” and “Minimum Wage” sections to apply to state employees (
Thus, Wage Order No. 4 and the Pay Scale Manual are overlapping administrative schemes that can both be enforced. Wage Order No. 4 defines compensable work time broadly, using a definition that arguably includes entry-exit walk time. But Wage Order No. 4 applies only in part to state employees. Specifically, its minimum wage provision applies, but not its overtime provision (Wage Order No. 4, § 1(B)), and its minimum wage provision does not apply to administrative, executive, or professional employees (id., § 1(A)). Meanwhile, the Pay Scale Manual defines compensable work time narrowly, incorporating the definition established by the federal
The court concludes that “the Pay Scale Manual occupies the field with respect to the compensation rates of state employees” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 45, fn. 18) because CalHR‘s regulations say: “Unless otherwise indicated in the pay plan, the rates of pay set forth represent the total compensation in every form except for overtime compensation.” (
Today‘s opinion takes insufficient account of our long history of deference to IWC wage orders and unnecessarily suggests that the Legislature‘s delegation of authority to CalHR is enough to afford its manual the same dignity as IWC wage orders. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40-41.) There is no reason here to address whether an ordinary statutory delegation of authority is equivalent to a constitutionally authorized delegation of legislative, judicial, and executive authority, let alone a delegation of authority that has been affirmed repeatedly, over nearly a century, by “formal expressions of legislative and voter intent” construed to insulate the IWC‘s work from judicial interference. (See Martinez, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 61; see
I respectfully dissent from the court‘s rejection of the represented plaintiffs’ and the unrepresented plaintiffs’ minimum wage claims.
LIU, J.
I Concur:
CUÉLLAR, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Stoetzl v. State of California
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 14 Cal.App.5th 1256
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S244751
Date Filed: July 1, 2019
Court: Superior
County: San Francisco
Judge: John E. Munter
Counsel:
Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, Laurie J. Helper; Squire Patton Boggs (US), David M. Rice; Messing Adam & Jasmine, Jack T. Friedman, Gary M. Messing, Gregg McLean Adam, Yonatan L. Moskowitz, Monique Alonso; Goyette and Associates, Inc., and Gary G. Goyette for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard, David W. Tyra, Kristianne T. Seargeant; Joan A. Markoff, Frolan R. Aguiling, Christopher E. Thomas and David D. King for Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Gregg McLean Adam
Messing Adam & Jasmine
235 Montgomery Street, Suite 828
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 266-1800
David W. Tyra
Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard
400 Capitol Mall, 27th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 321-4500