Case Information
*1 Filed 7/5/18
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA DOMINIQUE LOPEZ, a Minor, etc., )
) Plaintiff and Appellant, ) S235357 )
v. ) Ct.App. 2/8 B256792 )
SONY ELECTRONICS, INC., ) Los Angeles County
) Super. Ct. No. BC476544 Defendant and Respondent. )
____________________________________)
When a child is allegedly harmed by in utero exposure to hazardous
chemicals, which statute of limitations applies: that for toxic exposure claims
(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.8, subd. (a)),
1
or that for prenatal injuries (§ 340.4)? The
answer determines the viability of this lawsuit. Because the toxic exposure statute
was more recently enacted, and its language plainly encompasses prenatal injuries,
we conclude it applies here. The limitations period for toxic exposure suits is two
years, but it is tolled while the plaintiff is a minor. (See § 352;
Nguyen v. Western
Digital Corp.
(2014)
1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dominique Lopez was born on April 13, 1999, with multiple birth defects, including chromosomal deletion, cervical vertebrae fusion, facial asymmetry, dysplastic nails, diverticulum of the bladder, and a misshapen kidney. She also suffers from developmental delays. For over 20 years, including thе term of her pregnancy, plaintiff’s mother worked at a Sony Electronics, Inc. (Sony) manufacturing plant. She allegedly worked with and around “teratogenic and reproductively toxic” chemicals.
Plaintiff sued on January 6, 2012, when she was 12 years old. She alleged that she and her mother were exposed to toxic chemicals at the Sony plant, resulting in her birth defects. Seeking summary judgment, Sony argued the action was time-barred under section 340.4, the six-year statute of limitations for birth and prenatal injuries. It urged that, by August of 2000, plaintiff’s mother hаd reason to suspect her workplace chemical exposure had caused plaintiff’s birth defects. Plaintiff did not dispute this assertion. Instead, she maintained her action fell not under section 340.4, governing prenatal injuries, but under section 340.8, covering injuries caused by toxic exposure. Section 340.8’s limitations period is only two years but, unlike section 340.4, it permits tolling during minority and periods of mental incapacity.
The trial court applied section 340.4 and granted summary judgment. A
divided panel of the Court of Appeal affirmеd. The majority disagreed with the
Sixth District Court of Appeal’s decision in
Nguyen
,
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Relevant Statutes
The prenatal injury statute, section 340.4, states: “An action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of his or her birth must be commenced within six years after the date of birth, and the time *3 the minor is under any disability mentioned in Section 352 [providing for tolling during minority or incapacity] shall not be excluded in computing the time limited for the commenсement of the action.”
The origins of the prenatal injury statute trace back to 1872, when the
Legislature first authorized a right of action for injuries sustained before birth.
(
Young v. Haines
(1986)
The toxic exposure statute, section 340.8, subdivision (a), states: “In any civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance, the time for commencement of the action shall be no later than either two years from the date of injury, or two years after the plaintiff becomes aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, (1) an injury, (2) the physical cause of the injury, and (3) sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice that the injury was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act of another, whichever occurs later.” The statute further provides that a “ ‘civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance’ ” in subdivision (a) “does not include an action subject to Section 340.2 or 340.5.” (§ 340.8, subd. (c)(1).) These exceptions refer to the statutes of limitations specifically prescribed for asbestos-related injury claims (§ 340.2) and medical malpractice claims (§ 340.5).
The toxic exposure statute becamе effective on January 1, 2004. (Stats. 2003, ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398.) We had previously held that a tort cause of action 2 Former Civil Code section 29.
does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or has reason to suspect, that he was
injured as a result of someone’s wrongdoing. (
Norgart v. Upjohn Co.
(1999) 21
Cal.4th 383, 397-399;
Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.
(1988)
B. The Toxic Exposure Statute Applies to Prenatal Toxic Injuries
This case poses a pure question of statutory interpretation, subject to
independent review. (
Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc.
(2011) 51 Cal.4th
524, 529.) “Our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent and give
effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s
words ‘ “because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative
intent.” [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous our inquiry
ends.’ ” (
In re D.B.
(2014)
Plaintiff’s case appears to fall within the ambit of both statutes of limitations. It is “[a]n action . . . for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of . . . birth” (§ 340.4) and a “civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance” (§ 340.8, subd. (a)). Allegedly, plaintiff’s injuries were both sustained before birth and caused by toxic exposure.
When possible, courts seek to harmonize inconsistent statutes, construing
them together to give effect to all of their provisions. (
State Dept. of Public
Health v. Superior Court
(2015)
The rules for construing irreconcilable statutes are well established. (
State
Dept. of Public Health
,
Section 340.8 postdates section 340.4 by more than 60 years. This fact is
important, though it does not end the inquiry. “[T]he rule that specific provisions
take precedence over more generаl ones trumps the rule that later-enacted statutes
have precedence.” (
State Dept. of Public Health
,
Section 340.4 encompasses a claim arising at a given time: “An action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of his or her birth.” By contrast, section 340.8, subdivision (a) provides a limitation on “any civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance.” Comparing the two, we see that the prenatal statute speaks not to the cause of injury, but to when it was inflicted. The toxic exposure statute applies to any personal injury, regardless of when inflicted, if the cause of injury was toxic exposure. When an injury was caused and how it was caused are both specific asрects of the competing statutory provisions. But neither is inherently more specific than the other. Sony argues the different statutory triggers create an ambiguity. They do not. Both statutes are clear. The difference in how the two statutes are triggered creates a conflict , not an ambiguity. It is this conflict we resolve under the guiding statutory language and interpretive tools.
The toxic exposure statute embraces “any” civil action. (§ 340.8,
subd. (a).) “Any” is a term of broad inclusion, meaning “without limit and no
matter what kind.” (
Delaney v. Superior Court
(1990)
Section 340.8 makes two exceptions to its broad limitations rule. The choice to include these exceptions, and no other, also shows the Legislature intended the toxic exposure statute to apply here. Section 340.8 states that the actions to which it applies do “not include an action subject to Section 340.2 [alleging asbestos exposure] or 340.5 [alleging medical malpractice].” (§ 340.8, subd. (c)(1).) Section 340.8 does not make an exception for prenatal injury claims falling under section 340.4.
“Under the maxim of statutory construction,
expressio unius est exclusio
alterius
, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional
exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.” (
Sierra Club
v. State Bd. of Forestry
(1994)
Moreover, section 340.8, subdivision (d) goes on to state: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit, abrogate, or change the law in effect on the effective date of this section with respect to actions not based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance.” (Italics added.) By negative inference, it *8 appears that the Legislature did intend to alter the law for all toxic exposure claims, except for those specifically excluded.
Citing various legislative committee reports, Sony argues the Legislature’s sole purpose in enacting section 340.8 was to codify the delayed discovery doctrine for toxic exposure cases. The Legislature did declare an intent to codify the delayed discovery rule (Stats. 2003, ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398), and the statutory language reflects our holdings on that concept. (§ 340.8, subds. (a), (b); see Norgart v. Upjohn Co. , supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 397-399.) However, the text of section 340.8 does more. It creates a two-year statute of limitations applicable to all hazardous exposure claims except those alleging injury due to asbestos or medical malpractice. We cannot ignore this additional language. Moreover, nothing in the legislative history suggests an intent to еxclude prenatal hazardous exposure claims from the reach of section 340.8. Because the Legislature acts with one stated purpose does not preclude it from achieving other purposes as well.
We addressed a similar question in
Young
,
Sony asserts that giving effect to section 340.8 would impliedly repeal
section 340.4 for a subset of prebirth injuries. Repeals by implication are
disfavored. “We do not presume that the Legislature intends, when it enacts a
statute, to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is
clearly expressed or necessarily implied.” (
People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)
(2000)
6
For example, in
Even Zohar
we found no conflict between the statute
limiting repeated motions for reconsideration (§ 1008) and the statute authorizing
relief from default (§ 473, subd. (b)). (
Even Zohar
, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 840-
841.) The conclusion that section 1008 restricted repeated motions for relief under
*10
Sections 340.4 and 340.8 cannot be given “concurrent operatiоn,” because two
different statutes of limitations cannot govern the same claim. (See, e.g.,
Young
,
supra
,
C. Applying the Toxic Exposure Statute Does Not Produce Absurd Results
To justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the
result must be so unreasonable that the Legislature could not have intended it. (
In
re D.B.
,
supra
,
The Legislature could reasonably have chosen to treat in utero toxic
exposure cases differently from the more general class of injuries suffered before
or during birth. The potential causes of many birth-related injuries will be readily
identifiable, and it is reasonable to expect their effect will manifest before a child
section 473, subdivision (b) gave full effect to the language of both statutes.
Similarly, in
In re Greg F.
(2012)
reaches age six. A prohibition against tolling during minority may not be onerous in those circumstances.
The toxic exposure statute, on the other hand, is not limited to an identifiable period like gestation and birth. It covers an exposure occurring at any age. The exposure may also occur under circumstances less likely to put a plaintiff on notice. It may happen over a brief or extended period, in the workplace, the home, or other frequented locations. The harmful effects of exposure may take longer to manifest than injuries from other causes, regardless of whether the exposure occurred before or after birth. The Legislature’s policy choice to permit tolling during a period of minority or incapacity, as section 352 does, reflects these differences. 7
7
The toxic exposure statutе does not specifically mention tolling. However,
its limitations period appears subject to tolling under section 352, subdivision (a).
(
Nguyen
, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540-1541; see
Williams
,
supra
, 68 Cal.2d
at p. 601.) The parties do not dispute this point. However, an amicus curiae brief
filed on Sony’s behalf contends a different rule should apply if the hazardous
exposure occurred before birth. These amici argue the no-tolling rule of
section 340.4 can be severed and applied to
all
prenatal injury claims, making
plaintiff’s claims untimely even if section 340.8 applies. We are aware of no
authority for parsing statutory provisions in this fashion, restoring vitality to some
parts while leaving others inoperative. The amici rely on
California
Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos
(2011)
Moreover, the language of section 340.4 does not support extending the no- tolling rule outside the statute’s own boundaries. Section 340.4 is a single sentence: “An action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of his or her birth must be commenced within six years after the date of birth, and the time the minor is under any disability mentioned in Section 352 shall not be excluded in computing the time limited for the commencement of the action.” Under a straightforward reading, “ the minor” (§ 340.4, italics added) in the second clause refers to the same “minor” in the first
We presume the Legislature was aware of section 340.4 when it enacted
section 340.8. (See
People v. Harrison
(1989)
confront difficult factual questions about when an exposure occurred and when it caused injury.
“When statutory language is unambiguous, we must follow its plain
meaning ‘ “ ‘whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the
act, even if it appears probable that a different object was in the mind of the
legislature.’ ” ’ ” (
In re D.B.
,
D. Application
At the earliest, plaintiff’s claims against Sony accrued in 1999, when she was born. Section 340.8 did not go into effect until January 1, 2004. (Stats. 2003, ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398.) Before that time, plaintiff’s claims would have been subject to section 340.4’s shorter period for filing suit.
Previous decisions have established rules for determining the effect of
extending a limitations period. “As long as the former limitations period has not
expired, an enlarged limitations period ordinarily applies and is said to aрply
prospectively to govern cases that are pending when, or instituted after, the
enactment took effect. This is true even though the underlying conduct that is the
subject of the litigation occurred prior to the new enactment.” (
Quarry v. Doe I
(2012)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The case is to be remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its order granting summary judgmеnt.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J
HOFFSTADT, J.*
_______________________
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc.
__________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S235357
Date Filed: July 5, 2018
__________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Frederick C. Shaller
__________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel:
Waters Kraus & Paul and Michael B. Gurien for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett, William A. Bossen, Alejandro H. Aharonian and Cheryl A. Orr for Defendant and Respondent.
Hugh F. Young, Jr.; Drinker Biddle & Reath and Alan J. Lazarus for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Keller/Anderle, Jennifer L. Keller, Yen-Shyang Tseng and Michael A. Schachter for Western Digital Corporation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Horvitz & Levy, Jeremy B. Rosen, John F. Querio, Scott P. Dixler; Janet Y. Galeria; and Fred J. Hiestand for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American Insurance Association, Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and Civil Justice Association of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): Michael B. Gurien
Waters Kraus & Paul
222 North Sepulveda Boulevard, Suite 1900
El Segundo, CA 90245
(310) 414-8146
Cheryl A. Orr
Musick, Peeler & Garrett
One Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2000
Los Angeles, CA 90017-3383
(213) 629-7600