for the Court.
The plaintiffs, Stephanie Flynn and Louis Silva, individually and in their capacity as co-administrators of the Estate of Alexis Silva (Alexis), and Stephanie Flynn (Flynn) and Dennis Coelho, individually and as parents, natural guardians, and next friends of Nevaeha Coelho
1
(Neva-eha)
I
Facts and Travel
On September 25, 2010, a fourteen-year-old boy stole a red transport van — emblazoned with “Nickerson Community Center” on its side — and took it for a joyride, hitting a car on Mantón Avenue in Providence and fleeing the scene in thé vehicle. Next, attempting to evade police, the juvenile sped onto Route 10 heading southbound, by way of Westminster Street. The juvenile drove faster, headed toward Union Avenue, striking a black Honda. The van then crossed over into the northbound side of the expressway, colliding with a silver Nissan.
Flynn was driving the silver Nissan, and three passengers were in the car, including her two minor daughters, Nevaeha and Alexis. After the vehicle was hit by the red van, Alexis sustained fatal injuries, and Flynn and Nevaeha were transported to the hospital with severe injuries.
Later that day, Providence police officers responded to a report of a breaking and entering at Nickerson, which is a nonprofit organization located in the Olneyville section of Providence. The organization provides social services to residents in the area, including day care, after-school programs, and services for veterans; the building also houses a food pantry and clothing donation center. At the time of the break-in, Nickerson was closed for the weekend.
When the police officers arrived at the property, a Nickerson employee, Kingray Rojas, met them. Rojas told the police that a rear window screen had been broken and an individual had entered the building. Rojas stated that the person had gone into an office and rummaged through a cabinet that had been left open. Additionally, Rojas told police, the thief had taken the keys to the van that were stored on a hook on a closet door and had stolen the van, later identified as the red van involved in the Route 10 accident. The juvenile was subsequently charged in the Family Court.
On September 18, 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging negligence in- Providence County Superior Court against Nickerson and Aetna Bridge Company. 2 The plaintiffs contended that Nickerson owed a duty of care to them and that it breached its duty by failing to secure the van’s keys. Nickerson filed a third-party complaint against the juvenile for indemnity.
On July 9, 2015, Nickerson filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not owe a duty to plaintiffs because it did not have a special relationship either with plaintiffs or with the juvenile who stole the van and caused the accident. In
In response, plaintiffs submitted their opposition to Nickerson’s motion for summary judgment, supporting it with various exhibits, including two conflicting statements from the juvenile: one statement that he had made to a Rhode Island State Police detective shortly after the accident, and one statement that he had. made to a Department of Children, 'Youth and Families (DCYF) social worker more than a month after the accident, neither of which was a sworn statement. In his interview with the detective, the juvenile said that an unidentified Nickerson employee had told him where the van keys were located inside the building. Then, when the juvenile was assessed by the social worker as part of a court evaluation, he contended that he had seen the keys in the van’s ignition, prompting him to steal it.
The plaintiffs also attached to their objection numerous police reports evidencing unrelated criminal activity at the Nicker-son property. The plaintiffs argued that this documentation of rampant crime, particularly break-ins at -Nickerson and . reports of vehicles broken into and stolen from Nickerson’s premises gave Nickerson notice that the theft of the van and subsequent fatal motor vehicle accident were possible. Additionally, plaintiffs submitted that the deposition of Mario Cabral, a Nickerson employee for sixteen years, revealed that, prior to this incident, Nicker-son vans had been vandalized, including broken windows and stolen license plates.
Furthermore, plaintiffs provided evidence of Nickerson’s security protocols in an attempt to demonstrate that, had those policies been followed, there would have been no way for the juvenile to access the keys. For example, in a witness statement to police, Betty Ann Palmisciano, a board member at Nickerson, explained that the van keys were stored in the reception area of the building in “a closet with a lock box.” 4 In her deposition, D’Ambra also described this policy, stating that the reception area itself was also locked at the end of the night, in an effort to prevent th'e keys from ending up with the wrong person. =.
On February 23, 2016, the hearing justice heard arguments on defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and he ultimately granted the motion. The hearing justice highlighted the parties’ different versions of events that purportedly occurred on the day of the accident. The defendant, the hearing justice acknowledged, maintained that the building was locked on the day in question and that th¿ juvenile broke in and stole the van keys from a closet located in an “employee’s
The plaintiffs countered defendant’s rendition of the events, asserting that there were at least three plausible scenarios 5 that might have occurred before the juvenile caused the accident on Route 10. The three scenarios are as follows: (1) a Nick-erson employee informed the juvenile where he could find the keys, which is what the juvenile told police after the accident; (2) Nickerson could have failed to follow its security protocols in the building, which would have allowed the juvenile easier access to the keys inside the building; or (3) a Nickerson employee could have left the keys in the van’s ignition.
Initially, the hearing justice recognized that a motion for summary judgment can only be based on admissible evidence. He first focused on determining whether defendant owed a legal, duty to plaintiffs. The hearing justice concluded that .there was no special relationship between Nickerson and plaintiffs or between Nickerson and the juvenile. 6 The hearing justice also determined that there was no evidence that the keys were made available to the juvenile.
However, even assuming that the keys had been left in the van’s ignition, the hearing justice declined to expand the current duty, that vehicle owners owe to the public, absent this Court’s extension of existing case law or the adoption of new legislation. Accordingly, the hearing justice ruled that, because there was no relationship between Nickerson and the juvenile, Nickerson had'no dutyito control the juvenile’s actions, and th’e theft “was an unforeseeable independent cause of [p]lain-tiff[s’] harm.” Consequently, the hearing justice granted -Nickerson’s motion for summary judgment,
The plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court.
IÍ
Issues on Appeal
On appeal, plaintiffs first contend that there are a number of genuine issues, of material fact that must be resolved by a jury. The plaintiffs posit three factual, scenarios that arguably could haye been catalysts for the van theft, and\they argue that there are factual issues as to whether Nickerson violated its security policies, and whether, one of. its employees informed the juvenile of the keys’ location. Additionally, plaintiffs maintain that -the juvenile stated at one point that the keys were in the van’s ignition when he stole it., Therefore, plaintiffs urge this; Court to adopt a test used in some other- jurisdictions that imposes a duty on defendants who leave their keys in their vehicle’s ignition, eventually resulting in an accident, when other factors are at issue, such a§ location in a high-crime area.
The defendant counters that only one of the three factual scenarios proposed by plaintiffs is supported by admissible evidence: that the juvenile broke into Nicker-son’s • building through a back • window, stole the van keys from'inside a closet, and then stole the red van. Alternatively, defendant avers that, even if this Court considers
Ill
Standard of Review
“In reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment, this Court engages in a de novo review, ‘applying] the same standards and rules as did the motion justice.’” Danforth v. More,
IV
Discussion
A
Evidence Admissible on Summary Judgment
Before we reach the duty analysis in this case, we must first consider whether the evidence presented by plaintiffs is admissible on summary judgment. The plaintiffs contend that the juvenile’s statement to the DCYF social worker is admissible evidence and thus should have been considered by the hearing justice in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs also argue that the juvenile’s statement to the detective that a Nicker-son employee told him where to find the keys is admissible evidence and should also have been considered.
A party must submit “competent evidence” in order “to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Mruk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,
The plaintiffs posit three reasons why the juvenile’s two conflicting statements should be admitted.
7
In doing so, they point to three rules: Rules 804(b)(3), 801(d)(2)(A), and 801(d)(1)(A) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. We believe both the statement to the social worker and the statement to the detective are too conjectural to be considered in .a summary judgment analysis. First, in order for the “[statement against interest” hearsay exception to apply pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3),
8
the declarant must be unavailable. There is no evidence that the juvenile was unavailable in the present case. Consequently, this exception, does not apply. Second, to be .considered nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), a statement must be “the party’s own statement” and “offered against a party.” Further, •. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) does not apply to statements of a party that are “not offered against” that party. See State v. Chum,
The plaintiffs did not document the statement, to the social worker or the statement to the detective in any way that is sufficient at a hearing on summary judgment. They provided no depositions from the social worker, the detective, or the juvenile,
10
nor were any affidavits presented to the court. Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to ask for a further continuance of the hearing on defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they had not yet deposed the juvenile. See Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, Inc.,
B
Duty
We now address plaintiffs’ only remaining factual scenario. The plaintiffs contend that Nickerson may have failed to follow its security protocols, which would have allowed the juvenile easier access to the van keys inside the building. To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of'that duty, proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage.” Wells v. Smith,
Yet, the jury may still play a role in the duty analysis if there is a need “to determine the existence of those predicate facts that trigger the presence of the legal duty.” Kuzniar v. Keach,
-We do not have a “set formula for finding [a] legal duty,” and thus “such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Wells,
“(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (3) the closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct, and the injury suffered,^) the policy of preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.” See also Woodruff v. Gitlow,91 A.3d 805 , 815 (R.I. 2014).
In addition, “[t]he ‘relationship between the parties’ * * * [is also a consideration] in our duty analysis.” Gushlaw,
1
Rhode Island Case Law
Ordinarily in Rhode Island, no legal duty exists “to control a third party’s conduct to prevent harm to another individual.” Santana v. Rainbow Gleaners, Inc.,
■ For-example, in Volpe v. Gallagher,
Additionally, in Martin v. Marciano,
In contrast, in Ouch,
Moreover, in Santana,
In Gushlaw, 42, A.3d at 1247, 1249, we also declined to impose a duty on an underage drinker to prevent his intoxicated friend whom he transported to the friend's vehicle from subsequently driving and injuring a third party. There, the plaintiffs husband was killed when his vehicle was hit by an intoxicated person, who had been dropped off at his car by the defendant. Id. at 1248-49. The defendant knew his friend was drunk when he left him at his vehicle. Id. at 1248. We held that there was no special relationship between the parties because the defendant had neither served the underage driver alcohol, nor had the driver consumed alcohol on the defendant’s premises. Id. at 1257. We concluded that the defendant did not have control over the driver’s conduct that caused the plaintiffs harm. Id.
2
Special Relationship
We first examine whether Nickerson owed any duty on the basis of a purported special relationship between Nickerson and either the juvenile or plaintiffs. When property owners
“allow one or more persons to use their land or personal property, they are, if present, under a conditional duty to exercise reasonable care to control the conduct of such users to prevent them from intentionally harming others or from conducting themselves on the possessors’ property in a manner that would create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others.” Volpe,821 A.2d at 706 (citing Restatement (Second) Torts, § 318 at 126-27).
It is important to note, however, that, in order for a duty to exist, landowners must “know or have reason to know that they
The juvenile in the present matter was trespassing on defendant’s property during a weekend when the facility was closed’. The plaintiffs seem to suggest that Nickerson’s duty arises based on its identity as a landowner. However, here, Nicker-son never gave the juvenile permission to enter the budding, nor were any Nickerson employees present at the time of the theft, nor was there anything to demonstrate that the juvenile was known to defendant. See Santana,
The plaintiffs suggest that defendant’s proposition that the juvenile broke into the facility is impossible unless Nickerson breached its security policies. Even if Nickerson violated all of its own security rules by failing to properly secure its premises or to lock the closet where the van keys were kept, we cannot extend.a duty based on premises liability. While a break-in very well may have been foreseeable if a Nickerson employee left the building unlocked, it is much less foreseeable, if it is at all, that a thief would break into the building, steal the van keys, steal the van, then drive the van negligently, resulting in harm to plaintiffs driving on a nearby highway. We decline to recognize a duty because it would amount to imposing a duty of care on victims of illegal entries to unknown'plaintiffs.
3
Banks Factors
a
Foreseeability
Absent a special relationship between Nickerson and the juvenile or plaintiffs, we consider a number of other factors in determining whether to impose a duty on defendant. To start, foreseeability is “[t]he linchpin in the analysis of whether a duty flows from a defendant to a plaintiff * * *." Selwyn,
As we stated earlier, while it may have been foreseeable that Nickerson might be the victim of a break-in if one of its employees violated the security procedures, it cannot be said that the juvenile’s break-in, theft of the keys and the van, and subsequent accident that caused plaintiffs’ injuries were a foreseeable sequence of events resulting from Nickerson’s failure to lock the building. See Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc.,
The plaintiffs make much of defendant’s location in the high-crime area of Olney-ville. However, we have never held that a property’s location in a high-crime area, in and of itself, is a determinative factor in considering whether, an individual owes a duty to another, and we will not do so here. See Thanadabouth v. Kongmany,
b
Closeness of Connection
As part of the duty analysis, we look next to the closeness of the connection between Nickerson’s purported negligence in violating its security protocols and plaintiffs’ injuries. See Gushlaw,
■Further, in between the accident that caused plaintiffs’ injuries and the time of the theft, the juvenile hit a parked car and fled the scene of that crash while evading police, then hit a second car, and finally drove across the median divider into plaintiffs’ oncoming car. Moreover, the juvenile’s crash with plaintiffs occurred some distance away from Nickerson. As such, the timeline of events in this case distances plaintiffs’ injuries from any action of Nick-erson. See id. at 1262 n.20 (noting that harm was caused to the plaintiff by the drunk driver about one hour after the defendant dropped the intoxicated friend at his car).
c
Extent of Burden & Public Policy Concerns
• Finally, we turn to the policy considerations in a case such as this. Nickerson contends that, if we were to extend a duty in this instance, it would “open[ ] the door
Additionally, “it is not the function of this Court to act as a super legislative body and rewrite or amend statutes al-rea’dy enacted by the General Assembly.” Willis,
Further, it is significant to note the dire consequences that could result from an imposition of a duty in this case based solely on the high-crime area in which Nickerson is located. A number of courts have recognized the policy implications in these types of negligence actions. See, e.g., Kim v. Budget Rent A Car Systems, Inc.,
As such, imposing a duty on defendant here would be akin to imposing a duty on every person who stores car keys in his or her home, fails to effectively secure the house, and is the victim of theft by a criminal who breaks into the dwelling to steal the keys, the car, and then injures a third party in a subsequent motor vehicle accident. We decline to do so. 11
V
Conclusion
While we sympathize with the victims of the horrific event at issue in this case,
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court.
Notes
. We will refer to Alexis Silva and Nevaeha Coelho by their first names to avoid any confusion.
. The plaintiffs dismissed all claims against Aetna Bridge Company on May 28, 2014.
. The plaintiffs provided evidence that at least one vehicle owned by other individuals had been stolen from Nickerson’s premises prior to the accident.
. However, Mario Cabral testified at his deposition that the keys were kept inside a locked closet, but he added that there was "not a lockbox" inside the closet.
. The plaintiffs once again advance these three possible scenarios on appeal.
. The hearing justice noted that the only evidence of any connection between Nickerson and the juvenile were the two statements by the.juvenile after.the theft. He determined that those two contradictory statements were inadmissible hearsay and not proper for con- ' sideration in deciding a motion for summary judgment! '
. In addition to the three arguments which apply to both statements, plaintiffs also argue that the statement to the social worker is admissible under the “public records and reports" exception to the hearsay rule outlined in Rule 803(8) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, which provides, in relevant part:
"Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel * *
The language in Rule 803(8) “substantially tracks the language of its federal counterpart," Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and so we turn to federal case law for guidance. State v. Traficante,
Here, the social workér’s report contains a summary of what the juvenile told the social worker, making the statement double hearsay; and, accordingly, this exception does not apply. See United States v. Mackey,
. Rule 804(b)(3) provides, in pertinent part, as follows;
“A státement which * * * at the time of its making * * * so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability * * * that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose- the declarant to criminal liability and offered.to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstance? clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”
. Rule 801(d)(1) provides, in relevant part, that ''[a] statement is not hearsay if * * * [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony[.]”
. The plaintiffs submit that they attempted to depose the juvenile prior to the hearing on summary judgment and issued a subpoena to that effect. DCYF filed a motion to quash the subpoena, contending that the juvenile was not fit for a deposition; the motion was rendered moot once summary judgment was granted.
. " ’[T]he cardinal principle of judicial restraint’ is that ‘if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more[.]’ ’’ Tempest v. State,