177 A.3d 468
R.I.2018Background
- On Sept. 25, 2010 a 14-year-old stole a Nickerson Community Center van after gaining access to the closed building; during a high-speed flight the juvenile caused a multi-vehicle crash that killed Alexis Silva and injured others.
- Plaintiffs (family members and estate) sued Nickerson for negligence, alleging Nickerson breached its duty by failing to secure the van keys and/or follow its security protocols.
- Nickerson moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits asserting the juvenile broke in through a window, stole keys from a locked-closet area, and then took the van; Nickerson denied any special relationship with the juvenile or plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs opposed with police reports, evidence of prior crime at the property, employee testimony about key-storage policies, and two unsworn, contradictory statements by the juvenile suggesting either an employee told him where the keys were or that keys were in the van ignition.
- The hearing justice excluded the juvenile’s unsworn statements as inadmissible hearsay, concluded Nickerson owed no legal duty (no special relationship and the theft/accident was an unforeseeable independent act), and granted summary judgment.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: hearsay statements were not competent for summary judgment, no special relationship existed, foreseeability and proximity were insufficient to impose a duty, and public-policy concerns weighed against expanding duty.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of juvenile’s statements | Juvenile’s statements to detective and social worker are admissible and create factual disputes | Statements are hearsay, unsworn, and not within exceptions; therefore inadmissible on summary judgment | Statements inadmissible; hearing justice properly excluded them |
| Existence of duty based on special relationship | Nickerson had a duty because it controlled the premises and storage of keys; evidence of security-policy breaches creates jury question | No permission was given to juvenile; juvenile trespassed when facility closed; no special relationship with juvenile or plaintiffs | No special relationship; no duty to control trespasser’s conduct |
| Duty based on foreseeability/location in high-crime area | High-crime location and prior incidents made theft and resulting accident foreseeable; courts in other jurisdictions apply a special-circumstances rule | Foreseeability too attenuated; sequence (break-in → key theft → van theft → remote highway crash) is unforeseeable; adopting broader duty would have adverse policy effects | Harm was not a foreseeable consequence of a break-in; location alone does not create duty; no extension of duty adopted |
| Proximate cause / public policy | If a duty existed, Nickerson’s failure to secure keys proximately caused injuries | Even if breach occurred, intervening criminal acts sever proximate causation; imposing duty would burden nonprofits and businesses in high-crime areas | Intervening criminal acts rendered the theft an independent cause; policy concerns counsel against imposing such duty |
Key Cases Cited
- Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699 (R.I. 2003) (special-relationship may impose duty to control a known dangerous person)
- Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245 (R.I. 2012) (plaintiff must show legal duty exists before other negligence elements considered)
- Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., 969 A.2d 653 (R.I. 2009) (no duty to control third-party absent special relationship)
- Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987) (factors for duty analysis: foreseeability, certainty of injury, closeness of connection, prevention policy, burden on defendant)
- Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911 (R.I. 2005) (duty may arise from provider–recipient relationship, e.g., host providing alcohol to underage guests)
- Wells v. Smith, 102 A.3d 650 (R.I. 2014) (elements of negligence and duty as question of law)