Patricia A. STEINER, Plaintiff-Co-Appellant, John M. STEINER, Plaintiff, UNITY HEALTH PLANS INS. CORP. and Healthcare Financing Administration, Involuntary-Plaintiffs, v. WISCONSIN AMERICAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent, Robert STEINER and Mt. Morris Mutual Ins. Co., Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners.
No. 2003AP1959
Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Oral argument March 1, 2005. Decided June 9, 2005.
2005 WI 72 | 697 N.W.2d 452 | 282 Wis. 2d 191
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Timothy J. Yanacheck, Ward I. Richter and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Timothy J. Yanacheck.
¶ 2. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that the period for redemption for the judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract against the Corporation (the land contract vendee) ended on October 7, 1999, and that under
¶ 3. The issue presented in this case is when, under
¶ 4. We hold that under
¶ 5. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
I
¶ 7. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court applies the standards governing summary judgment set forth in
¶ 8. There are no issues of material fact at issue in the present case. The only question presented is one of law, namely, the interpretation and application of
II
¶ 9. We set forth the facts that are, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, not in dispute.
¶ 10. Patricia Steiner and John Steiner, Sr., Patricia‘s husband, are the plaintiffs in this suit for personal injuries. They and John Steiner, Sr.‘s brother, Robert Steiner, purchased the resort property at issue in this case in 1954.8 The three will be referred to as the land contract vendors.
¶ 11. The land contract vendors conveyed their interest in the property in 1995 to the Steiner Corporation by a series of land contracts.9 The plaintiffs’ three sons, John, Jr., Patrick, and David Steiner, were the shareholders of Steiner Corporation. WAMIC provided Steiner Corporation liability insurance coverage for the property.
¶ 12. The Steiner Corporation apparently made a modest down payment and paid very little on the principal and interest under the land contract. By 1998 Steiner Corporation had stopped making payments on the land contract altogether. Third parties had liens on the property.
¶ 14. The land contract vendors’ suit for foreclosure originally sought strict foreclosure, but at the hearing the parties and the circuit court agreed that specific performance (judicial sale) would be preferable in this case because of third-party debts, including a tax lien by the state.
¶ 15. The property was not sold by judicial sale. Instead, the circuit court entered a strict foreclosure judgment on October 19, 1999, not the previously agreed-upon specific performance. The judgment provided that if the Corporation did not pay the amount owed by October 7, 1999, “all right, title and interest” of the Steiner Corporation in the property would cease to exist; title would vest in the land contract vendors. The judgment read, in relevant part:
[T]here is now due and unpaid on said Land Contract, as of September 7, 1999, the sum of [$178,330.15 plus costs, fees, and interest].... That the said Land Contracts... be strictly foreclosed. That the Defendants shall, on or before October 7, 1999, pay the Clerk of this Court the total sum now due under said Contract [plus interest to redeem the contract.]
...
That if payment is not made within the time above specified, the real estate described herein, and any interest therein of Defendants and any persons claiming under them, and all right, title and interest of Defendants therein, shall cease to exist, with the title vesting in the name of Plaintiffs....
[The judgment also contained provisions should Steiner Corporation redeem the property by paying the outstanding amount.]
The judgment‘s typewritten date line reads: “Dated September ___, 1999.” “September” is crossed out and “October” is hand-written over it; the blank is filled in with “19th.” This October 19 judgment provides for a redemption period ending 30 days after the September 7 hearing, or October 7.
¶ 16. A final judgment was entered on December 1, 1999. The final judgment states that the October 19, 1999 order provided for strict foreclosure with a redemption period ending 30 days from October 19. This final judgment does not mention the September 7 hearing or a 30-day redemption period ending on October 7. The December 1 judgment nevertheless confirmed that Steiner Corporation failed to pay the amount owed within 30 days of October 19, 1999, and that the land contract vendee‘s interest “shall cease to exist and shall be and hereby are forever barred.” The relevant portion of the December 1, 1999 judgment reads as follows:
The Court having entered its judgment... on October 19, 1999, providing for the strict foreclosure of Land Contracts by and between Plaintiffs, as vendors and Defendants... as purchasers, providing the Defendants shall have thirty (30) days from October 19, 1999 to pay the Clerk of this Court the amount due under said Land Contracts recorded on September 6, 1994....
That the Court having been further advised that no payment has been received by the Clerk of Court as appears by the Affidavit of Non-Redemption on file ....
NOW, THEREFORE, the original judgment entered by this Court on October 19, 1999 be and the same hereby
is confirmed in all respects; that any and all right, title and interest of Defendants, and each of them in the original Land Contracts between Plaintiffs and said Defendants, and any parties claiming under them, shall cease to exist and shall be and hereby are forever barred.
The judgment‘s date line reads, “Dated November ___, 1999.” November is crossed out and “December” is handwritten over it; the ___ is filled in with “1st.”
¶ 17. All the preceding hearings and judgments would have passed without notice if Patricia Steiner had not been injured on the resort property on October 15, 1999, by slipping and falling into a dry well.
¶ 18. The plaintiffs sued WAMIC in August of 2001 alleging that the Steiner Corporation was the owner of the property on October 15, 1999, and that WAMIC was responsible for paying the damages associated with her injuries. The plaintiffs later amended their complaint to include Robert Steiner and his homeowner‘s insurer, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company (Mt. Morris) as defendants. Mt. Morris filed a cross-claim against WAMIC seeking indemnification for Robert Steiner because he was allegedly acting as an agent of Steiner Corporation when he uncovered the dry well into which Patricia Steiner fell.
¶ 19. On May 20, 2003, the circuit court held that the Steiner Corporation no longer owned the property as of October 7, 1999, and that the Corporation “had no basis on which to employ Robert Steiner and no right to control his activities.” Accordingly, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of WAMIC and dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit for personal injury.
¶ 20. The plaintiffs appealed the circuit court‘s judgment. The court of appeals affirmed; the plaintiffs sought review in this court.
¶ 21. We now turn to the law of foreclosure of land contracts.
¶ 22. Land contracts are an important and long-standing instrument in Wisconsin real estate transactions. Land contracts provide a number of advantages for both the land contract vendor and land contract vendee. Because the land contract vendee may make a smaller down payment and avoid mortgage transaction costs, a land contract may present the vendee with the opportunity to purchase property. The land contract vendor has the advantage of greater flexibility in structuring terms, installment payments for beneficial income tax advantages, and alternative remedies in the event the vendee defaults.10 Similarly, it has historically been faster and cheaper to foreclose a defaulted land sale contract.11
¶ 23. A land contract vendor holds legal title as security for the unpaid balance of the contract, while the land contract vendee holds equitable title.12 Holding equitable title in effect gives the land contract
¶ 24. In addition to providing parties the flexibility to set the terms of the conveyance, the land contract offers a vendor several alternative remedies should the vendee default.16 Each remedy has advantages or disadvantages depending on the particulars of the situation. The relevant remedy in this case is strict foreclosure.
¶ 26. In strict foreclosure, the land contract vendor forgoes his or her right to collect the amount remaining on the debt19 and instead recovers the property.20 In the event of a vendee‘s default on a land contract, under strict foreclosure the circuit court‘s judgment sets a period, called the redemption period, in which the vendee must pay up or lose all his or her interest in the land.21
¶ 28. As part of
¶ 29. We turn now to an examination of
IV
¶ 30. To understand
Redemption period for land contracts. If a court finds that the purchaser under a land contract is
obligated to make certain payments under that land contract, that the purchaser has failed to make the required payments and that the vendor is entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure, the court shall set a redemption period of at least 7 working days from the date of the judgment hearing or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of the judgment order. No judgment of strict foreclosure is final until the court enters an order after the expiration of the redemption period confirming that no redemption has occurred and making the judgment of strict foreclosure absolute.
¶ 31. The first sentence of the statute requires, as we stated previously, that a court set a redemption period in a strict foreclosure judgment and further requires that, at a minimum, the redemption period be at least seven working days from the date of the judgment hearing or the date of the entry of the judgment order. This provision appears to be a direct reaction to an unpublished court of appeals decision, Walker v. Dorney, No. 1993AP2389-FT, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1994).
¶ 32. In Walker, the court of appeals affirmed a circuit court‘s strict foreclosure judgment that granted no redemption period to the land contract vendees in default. A letter in the drafting file suggested the text of the first sentence of the statute, stating: “Were it not for the Walker vs. Dorney case I would not suggest legislation—I never previously considered the possibility that a judge hearing a contested strict foreclosure action would even have the authority to issue a foreclosure judgment without a redemption period.”25
¶ 34. WAMIC asserts that
¶ 35. Conversely, the plaintiffs assert that under the common law and under
¶ 36. Relevant to interpreting the final sentence of
¶ 37. As the basis of its understanding of the common law, WAMIC relies on a passage in Exchange Corp. of Wisconsin v. Kuntz, a 1972 case.27 This court said in Exchange Corp.:
Normally, a decree in strict foreclosure, which at best is an unusual form of decree, finds a default on the part of the vendee, confirms absolute title in the vendor, and provides, subject to a condition subsequent, that the vendor may have to convey if the vendee pays the total purchase price within a given period of time.
....
[T]he judgment... becomes final or absolute only upon the expiration of the period of redemption. Such a judgment may be considered as an interlocutory judgment which automatically becomes final upon the expiration of the period of redemption without any further motion or decree making it absolute. If the record is to reflect the fact the vendee did not redeem, an order may be entered finding the vendee did not meet the conditions; sometimes an affidavit of such fact is filed.
But if the order is used, it would normally not confirm the title but merely reaffirm the legal title in the vendor.28
¶ 38. In essence, the judgment, under Exchange Corp., is an interlocutory judgment that automatically becomes final on the expiration of the redemption period. That is, the parties need take no further action to affect title; failure of the vendee to redeem means the vendor has complete title.
¶ 39. The Exchange Corp. court also concluded that a circuit court could extend the period of redemption if the current period of redemption had not yet expired, but once the period expired, the period of redemption could not be extended unless the circuit court had reserved the power to do so.
¶ 40. WAMIC is correct: Exchange Corp. can be viewed as holding that when a vendee is in breach of a land contract and the circuit court has entered a strict foreclosure judgment, title vests in the vendor without any further action of the parties or the circuit court should the vendee fail to pay the full purchase price during the redemption period set by the court. WAMIC‘s position is supported by at least two property treatises that state that upon expiration of the redemption period, the land contract vendee‘s equitable rights in the property are cut off, and the vendor is the sole owner of the property.29
¶ 41. Given this, WAMIC asserts that the failure of
¶ 42. The plaintiffs dispute WAMIC‘s reading of the common law under Exchange Corp. They contend that in a defaulted land contract, equitable title does not automatically revert to the land contract vendor at the end of the redemption period absent any additional court action. The plaintiffs rely on a 1937 case, St. Joseph‘s Hospital v. Maternity Hospital, as a declaration of the common law.30 In St. Joseph‘s Hospital, the court concluded, “A judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract does not produce absolute finality. In such judgments, a subsequent order barring the defendant‘s interest and claims for want of redemption is essential in order to declare and quiet title in the plaintiff ....”31 The St. Joseph‘s Hospital court declared that because the strict foreclosure judgment was not absolute, a court has equitable power to allow a land contract vendee to pay under the land contract, even if the vendee had failed to pay before expiration of the redemption period.32
¶ 43. The plaintiffs are correct: St. Joseph‘s Hospital demonstrates that the land contract vendee‘s equitable ownership interest does not automatically transfer to the vendor; a judicial decree is needed. According to St. Joseph‘s Hospital, if the land contract
¶ 44. Although cases subsequent to St. Joseph‘s Hospital have expressed reservations about the continued vitality of the St. Joseph‘s Hospital rule,33 the plaintiffs argue that St. Joseph‘s Hospital was the basis for the second and final sentence of
¶ 45. The first sentence of
¶ 46. It is not clear whether the second and final sentence of
¶ 47. The last sentence of
¶ 48. Given that the common law is not clear on when equitable title reverts to a land contract vendor, we turn to the practice of attorneys in land contract foreclosure, as well as the legislative drafting records, to cast light on the meaning of
¶ 50. The drafting record for
¶ 51. The most relevant document in the drafting file on the issue presented in the instant case is a September 29, 1995 letter from the Chicago Title Insurance Company to Atty. Peter Christianson, suggesting what would become the last sentence of
¶ 52. The letter reads in relevant part:
This bill formalizes the requirement for a redemption period after a judgment of strict foreclosure. Such a right has been recognized under [Godwin and Kallenbach]. However, the bill overlooks the requirement for a final order established under St. Joseph‘s Hospital . . . , which states at page 430: “A judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract does not produce absolute finality. In such judgments, a subsequent order barring the defendant‘s interest and claims for want of redemption is essential in order to declare and quiet title in the plaintiff. . . .”
We should take this opportunity to propose that AB 579 be amended to include a requirement for a final order. This can be done very simply by adding the following language as part of proposed Section 846.30, Wisconsin Statutes, or as a new section:
No judgment of strict foreclosure shall be final until the entry of an order, after the expiration of the redemption
period, confirming that no redemption has been made and making the judgment of strict foreclosure absolute (emphasis added).
¶ 53. Representative Marty Reynolds requested that the Legislative Reference Bureau draft legislation based on the problems discussed in the Chicago Title Insurance Company letter.
¶ 54. The suggested change makes sense from the perspective of a title insurance company. A title insurance company would be interested in pinpointing, to the extent possible, the date on which a land contract vendee‘s equitable title passes to the vendor. A circuit court order creates certainty, finality, and clarity for passage of title, easing the task of examining real property records to determine and insure ownership. A title insurance company‘s interest in clarity and finality of the rights and interests of the parties to the land contract is especially strong because, as we discussed above, the case law is confusing concerning rights and interests in the event of strict foreclosure and failure to redeem. In light of the Exchange Corp. and St. Joseph‘s Hospital cases, clarification of when a land contract vendee‘s equitable interest reverts to the vendor should be welcome.
¶ 55. On the basis of the text of
¶ 57. First, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of
¶ 58. Second and related to the first point, the court of appeals concluded that “the date on which the confirming order is entered would not be tied, either by statute or by practical realities, to the actual situations of the vendor and vendee.” The transfer of equitable title should depend, according to the court of appeals, on what is happening between the parties, not on when an order is presented to the court and when a court may sign and enter it. We disagree with the court of appeals. It is not always clear what is happening between the parties. Take the instant case, for example. Three different dates of passage of equitable title are possible: October 7, November 17, and December 1. For anyone interested in clear title, determining where title rests during the confusion created by the parties’ actions may
¶ 59. The court of appeals’ final consideration is that although under its interpretation of
¶ 60. We agree with the court of appeals that the second and final sentence of
¶ 61. For the reasons set forth, we hold that under
V
¶ 62. We now turn to the instant case and apply
¶ 63. Although the facts are undisputed for purposes of a motion for summary judgment, we must examine the circuit court judgments and orders closely. There are inconsistencies in the proceedings, some of which were on the record in the circuit court and others of which were not.
¶ 64. The first hearing on the strict foreclosure action took place on September 7, 1999. According to the transcript of the proceedings, the court ordered the remedy of specific performance, not strict foreclosure, and set a redemption date of October 7, 1999. It held that if the Steiner Corporation did not redeem before that time, the property would be sold at a sheriff‘s sale.
¶ 65. The Steiner Corporation did not redeem in the 30-day redemption period set to expire on October 7, 1999, nor was the property sold by sheriff‘s sale. Therefore, the remedy of specific performance was not effectuated. Instead, the parties returned to court on October 19, 1999. At the October 19, 1999 hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment of strict foreclosure, ordering (retroactively) October 7, 1999, as the redemption date.
¶ 66. The date of October 7, 1999 is inconsistent with
¶ 67. Another hearing on the matter was held on December 1, 1999, and resulted in a document entitled “Final Judgment.” That document confirmed the October 19, 1999 order “in all respects” and stated “all right, title and interest of [the land contract vendees] . . . shall cease to exist.”
¶ 68. The court of appeals concluded that “the only reasonable explanation” for the discrepancies of the redemption dates in the documents of this matter “is that the period of redemption described in the December 1 final judgment is a mistake.” According to the court of appeals, the parties agreed to change the remedy to strict foreclosure after September 7 and before the judgment entered on October 19 but agreed to use the same 30-day redemption period established by the court on September 7 for a sale. Under this reasoning the redemption period expired on October 7, 1999.39 There is no support in the record for the court of appeals’ explanation of the discrepancy.
¶ 69. Regardless of possible explanations for the numerous conflicting dates, we conclude under our interpretation of
¶ 70. The parties disagree whether Robert Steiner was an agent of Steiner Corporation at the time of the accident. If he was, his allegedly negligent actions (leaving the well uncovered) would be imputed to the Corporation and WAMIC would, according to plaintiffs, be required to indemnify him for Patricia‘s injuries.
¶ 71. The injury is alleged to have occurred as follows:
¶ 72. Robert Steiner, despite having sold his interest in the land, continued to perform maintenance at the resort, including draining water from the cabins in preparation for winter. The procedure, which Robert was following on October 15, 1999, was to drain the water from the cabins into dry wells. Covering each dry well was a removable wood cover, under which was a piece of Styrofoam. The wood cover protected the well should a car or other large object traverse it; the Styrofoam cover underneath was meant to keep the water from freezing. Robert Steiner had removed the wood coverings from some of the dry wells, but not the Styrofoam coverings.
¶ 73. Patricia Steiner, concerned about her husband, approached a dry well to see if he had fallen in. She noticed that the Styrofoam covering was still in place, but when she turned away from the well she slipped and fell into the dry well.
¶ 74. Robert Steiner heard Patricia Steiner‘s cries for help and found her wedged into the bottom of a dry well. She sustained a variety of personal injuries.
¶ 75. Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals addressed Robert Steiner‘s possible status as an agent of the Steiner Corporation. Likewise, we will not address that issue here.
¶ 76. In summary, we hold that equitable title remains with a land contract vendee until a circuit court enters a final order, following the expiration of the redemption period for strict foreclosure, confirming the land contract vendee‘s failure to redeem. As a result, in the present case equitable title did not pass from the Steiner Corporation (the land contract vendee) to the land contract vendors until December 1, 1999, when an order confirming the nonredemption was entered. Accordingly, the Corporation had equitable title to the property under the land contract on October 15, 1999, the date of the plaintiffs’ injuries, and the Corporation and WAMIC, its insurer, may be subject to liability for the plaintiffs’ injuries.
¶ 77. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause remanded.
¶ 78. JON P. WILCOX, J. (dissenting). I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that “under
¶ 79. This position is in accordance with the common law governing land contracts, which, contrary to the majority‘s assertion, majority op., ¶ 46, was quite clear. The common law governing the passage of title for land contracts was shaped primarily by two cases: St. Joseph‘s Hospital v. Maternity Hospital, 224 Wis. 422, 273 N.W. 791 (1937), and Exchange Corporation of Wisconsin v. Kuntz, 56 Wis. 2d 555, 202 N.W.2d 393 (1972).
¶ 80. The issue in St. Joseph‘s Hospital was whether a circuit court had power in a strict foreclosure action to extend the period of redemption before that period expired. St. Joseph‘s Hosp., 224 Wis. at 424-425. In addressing this issue, the court stated:
A judgment of strict foreclosure of a land contract does not produce absolute finality. In such judgments, a subsequent order barring the defendant‘s interest and claims for want of redemption is essential in order to declare and quiet title in the plaintiff, and a writ for removing the defendant from the premises is contemplated in case it becomes necessary. Proceedings at the foot of the judgment are a matter of course in these cases and the litigation is not at an end until they are taken. It would seem, a priori, that until the final order contemplated, an order making the judgment absolute, has been entered, anything discretionary might properly be done by the court that has material bearing upon the equities of the parties respecting the order finally ending the litigation between them. Independent of a statute providing for extension in strict foreclosure cases of the period of redemption from judgments not become absolute, a court as a court of
equity would unquestionably have power to extend in effect the period of redemption provided for in its judgment if such extension were required by equity and good conscience.
¶ 81. This language from St. Joseph‘s Hospital can be read in one of two ways. First, it could be interpreted as holding that equitable title in a land contract does not pass at the end of the redemption period in a strict foreclosure action, but requires a final order confirming that title had passed because the court retains the power to extend the redemption period until a final order is entered confirming a judgment of strict foreclosure. However, such a broad ruling would seem unnecessary in light of the facts in St. Joseph‘s Hospital because there, the challenged circuit court order was an order extending the period of redemption on a land contract before the original period of redemption had expired. Id. at 424. Thus, St. Joseph‘s Hospital could be read as simply providing that in an action for strict foreclosure, a court retains the equitable power to extend the period of redemption before a final order is issued, assuming the redemption period has not yet run.
¶ 82. Whatever confusion existed as to the scope of the holding in St. Joseph‘s Hospital was put to rest in Exchange Corporation, which explained and clarified the meaning of the above passage from St. Joseph‘s Hospital. In Exchange Corporation, 56 Wis. 2d at 562, when discussing strict foreclosure judgments, this court held:
A strict foreclosure judgment is of such a nature that the court must be considered as having the power to control the judgment even beyond a term of court to the extent the period of redemption may be extended on
equitable grounds if an application for extension is made prior to the expiration of the period; the judgment did not reserve this power for it becomes final or absolute only upon the expiration of the period of redemption. Such a judgment may be considered as an interlocutory judgment which automatically becomes final upon the expiration of the period of redemption without any further motion or decree making it absolute. If the record is to reflect the fact the vendee did not redeem, an order may be entered finding the vendee did not meet the conditions; sometimes an affidavit of such fact is filed. But if the order is used, it would normally not confirm the title but merely reaffirm the legal title in the vendor. It is possible for a court to reserve power to extend the period of redemption even after the original period of redemption has expired, in which case it would have power to extend time even without the vendee‘s application prior to expiration of the original period. If the court does reserve this power, a subsequent order would seem necessary to finally terminate any possible rights in the vendee; but this would be an unusual case.
Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added). In so holding the court expressly stated: “Broader dicta in the St. Joseph‘s Hospital Case to the effect the court of equity has inherent jurisdiction after the expiration of the period of redemption without reserving such power is disapproved.” Id. at 562 (emphasis added). Thus, Exchange Corporation explained that a narrow reading of St. Joseph‘s Hospital was correct and it disapproved any dicta suggesting a broader holding that title in a land contract passes only upon the circuit court entering a final order indicating that title has passed.
¶ 83. The following rules governing the passage of title on land contracts in strict foreclosure actions are apparent from Exchange Corporation. First, “the period of redemption may be extended on equitable grounds if an application for extension is made prior to the expira
¶ 84. With these common-law rules in mind, I now turn and examine
If a court finds that the purchaser under a land contract is obligated to make certain payments under that land contract, that the purchaser has failed to make the required payments and that the vendor is entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure, the court shall set a redemption period of at least 7 working days from the date of the judgment hearing or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of the judgment order. No judgment of strict foreclosure is final until the court enters an order after the expiration of the redemp
tion period confirming that no redemption has occurred and making the judgment of strict foreclosure absolute.
¶ 85. I am not persuaded by the majority‘s discussion of legislative history that the last sentence of
¶ 86. At the time 1995 Wis. Act 250 was enacted, the law governing the passage of title and need for a final order was that as explained by Exchange Corporation, which clarified the holding of St. Joseph‘s Hospital. Nothing in the legislative history of 1995 Wis. Act 250 evinces an intent to overrule Exchange Corporation. Quite the opposite, the goal was to codify “existing case law requirements.” While the intent of the legislation was to require a final order, it is Exchange Corporation that sets forth the effect of such an order.
¶ 87. As such, I would interpret the last sentence of
¶ 88. Finally, even if the last sentence of
¶ 89. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 90. I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this dissent.
Notes
If a court finds that the purchaser under a land contract is obligated to make certain payments under that land contract, that the purchaser has failed to make the required payments and that the vendor is entitled to a judgment of strict foreclosure, the court shall set a redemption period of at least 7 working days from the date of the judgment hearing or, if there is no hearing, from the date of the entry of the judgment order. No judgment of strict foreclosure is final until the court enters an order after the expiration of the redemption period confirming that no redemption has occurred and making the judgment of strict foreclosure absolute.
Goodland, supra note 10, at A-91.
For a similar form of confirmation of judgment suggested in 2004, see Grenig & Fishbach, supra note 10, Form 8-12 at 324.
See also Grenig & Fishbach, supra note 10, § 8.53 at 298. The circuit court enters the order confirming the judgment upon an affidavit of nonredemption; the order should be recorded in the office of the register of deeds in the county where the land is located.