Badger State Bank v. TaylorBadger State Bank v. Taylor
¶ 1. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court
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for Grant County, Robert E VanDeHey, Judge.
1
The circuit court granted summary judgment to Roger Taylor, Rodney Taylor, and Economy Feed Mill (collectively the Taylors), dismissing Badger State Bank's complaint alleging that the Taylors were the recipients of fraudulent transfers within the meaning of the Wisconsin Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, specifically,
¶ 2. The issue presented is whether a transfer constitutes a fraudulent transfer under
¶ 3. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of the Taylors, concluding that the Bank had established all of the elements required by
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¶ 4. We hold, as did the court of appeals, that the Bank has met all the requirements of
HH
¶ 5. For purposes of the cross motions for summary judgment, the relevant facts are not in dispute. Ronald (Al) Vogt was the president and principal shareholder of Vogt's Ag-Tech West, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation. Ag-Tech was in the business of selling agricultural pesticides, fertilizer, and spraying services.
¶ 6. Badger State Bank made business loans to Ag-Tech. To secure its loans, the Bank held a perfected security interest in Ag-Tech's assets, specifically Ag-Tech's accounts receivable. Ag-Tech was indebted to the Bank at all times material to this action in the approximate amount of $446,000.
¶ 7. Roger and Rodney Taylor did business as Economy Feed Mill, an operation that sold livestock feed.
¶ 8. Ag-Tech sold pesticides, fertilizer, and spraying services to the Taylors for their feed business. The Taylors sold feed to A&T Livestock, LLC, a Wisconsin limited liability company organized under chapter 183 of the Wisconsin Statutes. A&T Livestock raised and sold hogs. Al Vogt was a member of A&T Livestock.
¶ 9. At the time of the transfer at issue in this case, the Taylors owed Ag-Tech $12,489, and A&T Livestock owed the Taylors $17,890. In a memo dated August 9, 2001, Al Vogt and the Taylors agreed to *317 cancel the accounts receivable, whereby Ag-Tech's account receivable from the Taylors would be forgiven in exchange for the Taylors forgiving their account receivable from A&T Livestock. Since the difference between the two accounts receivable was over $5,000, A1 Vogt also paid, by check from Ag-Tech's account, an additional $2,350 to the Taylors in partial payment toward A&T Livestock's remaining debt to the Taylors.
¶ 10. The Bank sued the Taylors to set aside the cancellation of Ag-Tech's account receivable and cash payment as fraudulent transfers under
¶ 11. On cross motions for summaiy judgment, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Taylors. The circuit court determined that the Taylors were not dealing with corporate entities; they were dealing with A1 Vogt personally. Thus, A1 Vogt was not the Bank's debtor, the circuit court concluded, and the asset transferred (the Taylors' áccount receivable) was not an asset of Ag-Tech. Accordingly, the circuit court denied the Bank's motion for summary judgment, granted the Taylors' motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the Bank's complaint. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and order of the circuit court.
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¶ 12. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court applies the standards set forth in
¶ 13. The interpretation of a statute and the application of a statute to undisputed facts are ordinarily questions of law that this court determines independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, benefiting from their analyses. 7
III
¶ 14. A creditor pursuing a claim under
¶ 15. Wisconsin Stat.
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the *319 transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at the time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
¶ 16. It is undisputed that Ag-Teeh was a "debtor" 8 of the "creditor" Bank. 9 It is further undisputed that the Bank's claim arose before the transfer was made. Further, because Ag-Tech's "debt" 10 exceeded its "assets," 11 Ag-Tech was "insolvent" 12 under the Act. The parties agree that A1 Vogt was not a debtor of the Bank.
¶ 17. Two requirements of
¶ 18. First, the Taylors argue that the asset, the account receivable, was not an asset of Ag-Tech within
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the meaning of
¶ 19. Second, from the Taylors' perspective, the transfer between Al Vogt and the Taylors was for reasonably equivalent value because Al Vogt cancelled the $12,489 they owed him, while they cancelled the $17,890 Al Vogt owed them. 14
*321 ¶ 20. The Taylors argue that they were doing business with A1 Vogt personally, as a sole proprietor, and at no time did business with the corporation, Ag-Tech. They maintain that they did not know A1 Vogt was acting as an agent or employee of any corporate entity. According to the Taylors, A1 Vogt never, either orally or through his correspondence, indicated that either Ag-Tech or A&T Livestock were separate legal entities from himself. None of the invoices and checks in the record from Ag-Tech included the word "Inc." in describing Ag-Tech so that a third party would know a corporate entity was involved.
¶ 21. They argue therefore that, as between the Taylors and Al Vogt, A1 Vogt personally owned the account receivable, not Ag-Tech, and A1 Vogt, not Ag-Tech, was the transferor. Under the Taylors' view of the facts, A1 Vogt was not the Bank's debtor under
¶ 22. The fallacy in this argument is that the Taylors are looking at the transactions as involving only two parties (the Taylors and A1 Vogt), rather than as involving three or four parties (the Taylors, A1 Vogt, Ag-Tech, and A&T Livestock). By treating the transactions as involving only two parties, the Taylors ignore principles of agency law and
¶ 23. Here, Al Vogt, as the president and sole shareholder of Ag-Tech, was the agent of Ag-Tech. 16 Under agency law Ag-Tech was either a partially disclosed principal 17 or an undisclosed principal. 18
¶ 24. Al Vogt was acting on behalf of Ag-Tech when he engaged in the transactions that eventually led to the Taylors owing Ag-Tech money. 19 The goods Al Vogt sold to the Taylors belonged to Ag-Tech, as did the account receivable resulting from the sale. Ag-Tech *323 apparently acquiesced in and performed the transactions Al Vogt arranged with the Taylors. 20
¶ 25. An undisclosed or partially disclosed principal, like Ag-Tech, becomes a party to a transaction between the agent (Al Vogt) and the third party (the Taylors) even if the third party (the Taylors) is unaware of the name or existence of the principal. 21 Thus, had the Taylors defaulted in paying Al Vogt, Ag-Tech could have sued the Taylors for the funds they owed the corporation. Likewise, had Al Vogt (or Ag-Tech) failed to perform under the sales agreements, the Taylors could have sued either Al Vogt, or Ag-Tech, or both.
¶ 26. We must also examine the cancellation of the account receivable under agency law. Had the Taylors paid Al Vogt to cancel the account receivable, Ag-Tech (the principal) could not have recovered pay
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ment from the Taylors. A1 Vogt would have been Ag-Tech's agent in accepting the payment, and payment to the agent would be payment to the principal. Wisconsin Stat.
¶ 27. In sum, when the transactions between A1 Vogt and the Taylors are properly viewed as three- or four-party transactions under agency law and
¶ 28. The next question, then, is whether Ag-Tech received reasonably equivalent value for the transfer under
¶ 29. The Taylors argued that by collapsing the two distinct legal entities (Ag-Tech and A&T Livestock) into one (A1 Vogt), the approximately $15,000 they received from Ag-Tech was compensated for by the *325 almost $18,000 they cancelled as owing them from A&T Livestock. The Taylors' argument makes sense if Ag-Tech, A&T Livestock, and A1 Vogt were all one legal entity. They were not. The record reflects three entities existed: Ag-Tech, A&T Livestock, and A1 Vogt.
¶ 30. From the perspective of the creditor Bank, when A1 Vogt cancelled Ag-Tech's account receivable, Ag-Tech was insolvent and received nothing in return for the cancellation. It was A&T Livestock that benefited from the transaction, not Ag-Tech. 24 Therefore, canceling the two accounts receivable, while of value to the Taylors, did not inure to the benefit of Ag-Tech at all.
¶ 31. We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that Ag-Tech did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the loss of its cash and account receivable.
¶ 32. Having resolved the two disputed statutory requirements against the Taylors, namely, whether the account receivable was an asset of the debtor Ag-Tech that was transferred by Ag-Tech, and whether Ag-Tech received reasonably equivalent value, we conclude that the transfer satisfied the requirements of
IV
¶ 33. The Taylors claim to be similar to bona fide purchasers for value; that is, they claim to be parties who entered into a transaction in good faith and for value. In sum, the Taylors ask the court to interpret
¶ 34. The Taylors derive this transferee-oriented interpretation by examining the entire Wisconsin Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
¶ 35. The Taylors point out that
¶ 36. The Taylors would like to be able to use the defenses provided in
¶ 37. We agree with the Bank and the court of appeals that we must examine the requirements of a claim under
¶ 38.
¶ 39. The usual motive for transfers without reasonably equivalent value in exchange is to hinder creditors, and in fact such transfers ordinarily do hinder creditors. 31 But such intent is difficult to prove, and the drafters of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act included provisions addressing transactions that might be considered wrongful toward creditors even if a debtor's intent to hinder, delay, or defraud is not proven. 32 The focus in "constructive fraud" shifts from a subjective intent to an objective result. 33 Proof of "constructive fraud" simply entails proof of the requirements of the statute.
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¶ 40. The Taylors' argument that
¶ 41. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act reflects a strong desire to protect creditors and to allow for the smooth functioning of our credit-based society. 36 It is a creditor-protection statute. 37 Without such protection for creditors, "[creditors would generally be unwilling to assume the risk of the debtor's fraudulent transfers." 38
¶ 42. In accordance with the objectives of the *331 drafters of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis of the bill creating chapter 242 describes the goal of proscribing constructive fraud as follows: The bill "creates a class of transfers of property by debtors that is fraudulent to creditors and provides defrauded creditors with remedies. This class of transfers could generally have the effect of depriving creditors of assets that would otherwise be available to satisfy debts when the debtor becomes insolvent or is about to become insolvent." 39
¶ 43. Both the language of chapter 242 and the policies motivating the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act are couched in terms of creditor protection. The purpose and scope of chapter 242 can therefore properly be understood only if viewed from the perspective of the creditor (the Bank), not the transferee (the Taylors).
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From the creditor's perspective, the present case falls squarely into
¶ 44. The circuit court erred as a matter of law by focusing on the transferee's point of view. The transferee's subjective state of mind does not play a role in resolving the present case under
¶ 45. For the reasons set forth, we hold, as did the court of appeals, that the Bank has met all the require
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ments of
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Notes
Badger State Bank v. Taylor,
All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.
Badger State Bank,
/d.
.Hubbard v. Messer,
. Id
State v. Cole,
" 'Debtor' means a person who is liable on a claim."
" 'Creditor' means a person who has a claim."
" 'Debt' means liability on a claim."
" 'Asset' means property of a debtor ...."
"A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation."
" 'Transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease and creation of a lien or other encumbrance."
The Taylors proffered another way of calculating "reasonably equivalent value" for the first time in their Reply Brief and at oral argument. The Taylors assert that by wiping out each other's debt, Ag-Tech, A&T Livestock, and the Taylors were all able to stay in business. The "reasonably equivalent value," according to the Taylors, is this ability to remain in business. They cite
Image Worldwide, Ltd. v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co.,
Even if we ignore that the Taylors' new argument was waived because it was not presented anywhere in the circuit court, the court of appeals, or its main brief to this court, Image Worldwide does not compel the result the Taylors seek. Applying Illinois law based on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Image Worldwide involved "reasonably equivalent value" within the context of "transfers" amongst corporate affiliates. The Seventh Circuit noted that indirect benefits could be considered as part of valuation, but only when the cross-stream guarantees (a transaction) strengthened the corporate group as a whole. Ultimately, however, the Seventh Circuit did label the transfer fraudulent and voided it because the transaction did not strengthen the corporate group. It was represented at oral *321 argument that both Ag-Tech and A&T Livestock went out of business soon after these transactions.
Wisconsin Stat. §242.10 reads: "Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, *322 insolvency or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement this chapter" (emphasis added).
See Diederich v. Wis. Wood Prods., Inc.,
When a third party is aware that the agent is acting on behalf of a principal, but unaware of the identity of the principal, that principal is "partially disclosed." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4(2) (1959). This section is quoted with approval in
Benjamin Plumbing, Inc. v. Barnes,
An undisclosed principal exists when the third party has no notice that the agent is acting on behalf of a principal. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4(3) (1959).
See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 307(l)(a) (1959) ("[Ujntil the existence of the principal is known, the agent has power to rescind, perform, and receive performance of the contract and to modify it with binding effect, if the contract or conveyance, as modified, is within his agency powers.").
See Johnson v. Associated Seed Growers, Inc.,
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 cmt. d; § 186, cmt. (1959).
See also Benjamin Plumbing, Inc. v. Barnes,
See also Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co.,
The Bank is concerned only with the transfer from Ag-Tech to the Taylors. They are not concerned about the A&T Livestock account receivable. Nothing in this opinion prevents them from seeking their almost $18,000 from A&T Livestock.
"Reasonably equivalent value" is not defined in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. "Value" is defined as follows: 'Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied...."
A1 Vogt was an agent of A&T Livestock, as well as of Ag-Tech. Under
Wisconsin Stat. 242.04(l)(a) reads as follows: "A transfer made or obligations [sic] incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (a) With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor
Section 242.04(l)(a)(l) requires proof of the debtor's intent, whereas § 242.05(1) does not.
Wisconsin Stat.
Another statute providing a defense is
Frederick Tung, Limited Liability and Creditors' Rights: The Limits of Risk Shifting to Creditors, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 547, 562-63 (2000).
Although the court of appeals supported its decision by asserting that
*328 The Taylors distinguish Wirtz on its facts and law. Regarding the facts, in Wirtz (unlike in the present case) the transferees were aware that the transferor was the debtor of another and that the transfer would hinder the transferor's creditors. In Wirtz, the legal issue was whether the transferees must participate in the fraudulent intent for the transfer to be fraudulent. Intent is not an issue in the present case.
Peter A. Alces, Generic Fraud and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 743, 743 (1987) ("But the bad man [in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] to which I allude is not necessarily bad, except perhaps from the perspective of an all-assets secured creditor.").
The Nostalgia Network, Inc. v. Lockwood,
See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 269 (1999); Tung, supra note 28, at 563; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 830-32 (1985); Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 1165, 1166-67 (1995).
Tung, supra note 28, at 562-63; Louis J. Verner, Transfers in Fraud of Creditors Under the Uniform Acts and the Bankruptcy Code, 92 Com. L.J. 218, 233-37 (1987).
See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 266 (Supp. 2004).
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act replaced the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, which was adopted by the Conference in 1918 and enacted in Wisconsin in 1919. See Analysis of 1987 S.B. 115, available at the Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin.
The sources of the Uniform Act date back to English and European law. Fraudulent conveyance law in the United States has its roots in the 1570 Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which prohibited a wide array of fraudulent conveyances. Verner, supra note 33, at 219. However, the concept of voiding fraudulent conveyance has much earlier roots, both in England and on the European Continent. See Verner, supra note 33, at 218. Fraudulent conveyances were prohibited as early as 1215 through a provision of the Magna Carta. Id. at 218 & n.l (citing the Magna Carta c. 32: "No freeman henceforth shall give or sell more of his land, but so that of the residue of the lands, the lord of the fee may have the service due him, which belongs to the free."). In Europe the concept can be traced to the Justinian Code: "Again, if any one has transferred his property to another in fraud of his creditors, upon judgment to that effect by the chief provincial magistrate, the creditors of the transferor may seize his property, avoid the transfer and recover the things transferred...." Max Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 Va. L. Rev. 109, 109 (1931) (quoting the Institutes of Justinian (Justinian Code)). See also Unif Fraudulent Transfer Act prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 268 (1999).
Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 531, 534 (1987) ("If an economic system employing credit is to function efficiently, creditors must be able to enforce obligations assumed by or imposed on their debtors. The law of fraudulent and preferential transfers consists of rules that have developed to enable creditors to enforce the duty of a debtor to be fair to all creditors."); see also Uniform Law Commissioners, Why State Should Adopt the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, available online at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_ why/uniformacts-why-ufta.asp ("Credit is essential to the economic life of this country.... Credit remains available so long as those who extend it are given assurances about their rights at default. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides assurances to creditors that help make credit available to all of us.").
Christian C. Day et al., Riding the Rapids: Financing the Leveraged Transaction Without Getting Wet, 41 Syracuse L. Rev. 661, 700 (1990) ("The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is the latest stage in a long evolution which has sought to protect creditors from the fraudulent transfer of property by debtors."); H. Bruce Bernstein, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Conveyances: Yet Another Update, 7 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 315, 316 (1998) ("This ancient creditor protection device [the avoidance of a fraudulent transfer] has found its way into the law of the United States in four basic ways ... (iii) the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act....").
Tung, supra note 28, at 563-64.
Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1987 S.B. 115. The prefatory note (analysis) is distributed to all legislators.
See
Kirkland v.
Risso,