STATE of Utah, Appellee, v. John Edward YOUNG IV, Appellant.
No. 20140332-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 27, 2015.
2015 UT App 286
Scott F. Garrett and Candace N. Reid, for Appellee.
Judge JOHN A. PEARCE authored this Memorandum Decision, in which Judges STEPHEN L. ROTH and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.
Memorandum Decision
PEARCE, Judge:
¶ 1 John Edward Young IV appeals from his convictions for failing to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer, reckless driving, and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. We affirm.
¶ 2 On the afternoon of August 30, 2013, a Southern Utah University police officer, Officer Townsend, responded to a report of a disorderly student on campus.1 When Townsend arrived at the scene of the disturbance, he observed the campus police chief speaking with Young. Believing that the chief had the situation under control, Townsend returned to his office. Shortly thereafter, Townsend received another report of a disorderly, and possibly intoxicated, individual on campus whose description matched Young‘s. Townsend saw Young walking in a parking lot and headed toward him. Townsend briefly lost sight of Young but soon discovered him sitting in the driver seat of a car, apparently asleep.
¶ 4 Townsend called for additional officers. When those officers arrived and stopped Young, he smelled of alcohol. Young admitted that he had been drinking alcohol and had consumed prescription anti-anxiety medication. Young failed field sobriety tests, and a breath test revealed that he had an alcohol concentration of .114 grams, in excess of Utah‘s legal limit of .08 grams. See
¶ 5 The State charged Young with failing to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer, reckless driving, and driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. The charges were tried to the bench, and the district court convicted Young on all charges.
¶ 6 On appeal, Young argues that insufficient evidence existed to convict him of either failure to stop or reckless driving. When we review a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm the district court‘s judgment unless it is “against the clear weight of the evidence” or we otherwise reach “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v. Bingham, 2015 UT App 103, ¶ 8, 348 P.3d 730 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 7 Young first argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for failing to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer.
A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor who flees from or otherwise attempts to elude a law enforcement officer: (1) after the officer has issued a verbal or visual command to stop; (2) for the purpose of avoiding arrest; and (3) by any means other than a violation of
Section 41-6a-210 regarding failure to stop a vehicle at the command of a law enforcement officer.
¶ 8 Young argues that Townsend‘s testimony was inconsistent as to exactly when Townsend instructed Young to stop. Young posits that this inconsistency gives rise to a reasonable doubt that Young fled “after” Townsend issued a verbal or visual command to stop. See
¶ 9 Young also argues that if his car was in motion at the time Townsend instructed him to stop, he cannot be convicted of violating
¶ 10 One reasonable interpretation of Townsend‘s testimony is that he commanded Young to stop before Young placed his vehicle in motion. However, even if there is some question as to the exact timing of the command to stop, we are not persuaded that
¶ 11 Young further argues that there was insufficient evidence for the district court to find that Young fled from Townsend “for the purpose of avoiding arrest.”
¶ 12 Young relies on our recent decision in Salt Lake City v. Gallegos, 2015 UT App 78, 347 P.3d 842, for the proposition that
¶ 13 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court‘s findings that Young fled after Townsend commanded him to stop and that Young did so for the purpose of avoiding arrest. We therefore affirm Young‘s conviction for failing to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer.
¶ 14 Young also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convic-
¶ 15 Townsend testified that Young drove through the parking lot at what “seemed like a high rate of speed,” “at least” twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. Townsend further testified that there were cars in the parking lot, as well as several people walking in the lot, as Young drove through it. Compounding the danger to persons and property, Young was under the influence of alcohol. Under these circumstances, the district court‘s finding that Young drove in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is not “against the clear weight of the evidence” nor does it leave us with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v. Bingham, 2015 UT App 103, ¶ 8, 348 P.3d 730 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we affirm Young‘s conviction of reckless driving.
¶ 16 Young also argues that his trial counsel provided him with constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to pursue a motion to suppress evidence. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether [the] defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” Layton City v. Carr, 2014 UT App 227, ¶ 6, 336 P.3d 587 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both ‘that counsel‘s performance was deficient’ and ‘that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.‘” State v. Hare, 2015 UT App 179, ¶ 17, 355 P.3d 1071 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).
¶ 17 Young argues that his counsel should have sought the suppression of evidence because Townsend detained—or at least attempted to detain—Young without “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” See State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 925 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, Townsend approached Young, who was sitting in his car, to investigate a report of disorderly conduct involving a possibly intoxicated person matching Young‘s description. See generally
¶ 18 Even if Townsend did not initially have reasonable suspicion to detain Young, Young‘s subsequent illegal acts of fleeing from Townsend and driving recklessly through the parking lot provided an independent justification for the officers to detain and arrest Young. This case is indistinguishable in key respects from State v. Lorenzo, 2015 UT App 189, 358 P.3d 330, wherein this court rejected a similar argument of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. ¶¶ 18-22. In Lorenzo, a police officer detained the defendant, allegedly without reasonable suspicion, after which the defendant “[led] police on a dangerous, high-speed chase on the freeway and through residential and business districts.” Id. ¶ 22. We affirmed the defendant‘s resulting convictions, which included reckless driving, explaining,
The legality of the initial stop ... does not control this issue. A prior illegality by officers does not affect the subsequent arrest of a defendant where there is an intervening illegal act by the suspect. Thus, notwithstanding a strong causal con-
nection in fact between lawless police conduct and a defendant‘s response, if the defendant‘s response is itself a new, distinct crime, then the police constitutionally may arrest the defendant for that crime. A contrary rule would virtually immunize a defendant from prosecution for all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient causal connection to the police misconduct.
Id. ¶ 21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 19 Here, as in Lorenzo, Young‘s convictions “stemmed from his actions after he fled the scene of the stop.” See id. ¶ 22. Young‘s reckless flight from Townsend justified his subsequent arrest, regardless of any initial illegality, and Young has not identified any inculpatory evidence obtained solely from his detention by Townsend prior to his flight. For these reasons, a motion to suppress based on a lack of reasonable suspicion would have been futile. Young‘s counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to pursue such a motion. See Carr, 2014 UT App 227, ¶ 19, 336 P.3d 587 (“[C]ounsel‘s performance at trial is not deficient if counsel refrains from making futile objections, motions, or requests.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 20 Young also argues that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance by failing to seek to suppress statements Young made after he was placed into police custody, asserting that such statements were the product of custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Leaving aside the question of whether the circumstances of this case present a Miranda violation, Young cannot show prejudice arising from his counsel‘s failure to seek suppression on Miranda grounds.
¶ 21 “A defendant suffers prejudice when, absent the deficiencies of counsel‘s performance, there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant would have received a more favorable result at trial.” State v. Hards, 2015 UT App 42, ¶ 18, 345 P.3d 769. Here, the only statements that Young alleges the Miranda violation yielded are his admissions to the arresting officers that he had been drinking and that he had consumed a prescription anti-anxiety medication. These statements were inculpatory on the issue of Young‘s impairment, but there existed ample additional evidence of Young‘s impairment—most notably, the breath test result indicating an alcohol concentration of .114 grams.3 Young has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable trial result if his counsel would have sought to suppress Young‘s statements, and Young therefore cannot establish that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
¶ 22 Sufficient evidence existed to support Young‘s convictions for failing to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer and reckless driving. Young has also failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore affirm Young‘s convictions.
JOHN A. PEARCE
JUDGE