364 P.3d 55
Utah Ct. App.2015Background
- On Aug. 30, 2013, Officer Townsend responded to reports of a disorderly, possibly intoxicated student; he located John Young sitting asleep in the driver’s seat of a car on campus.
- Townsend approached, asked Young to exit and to turn off the engine; Young put the car in reverse and drove away, circling through a parking lot with pedestrians and other cars present at ~25–30 mph.
- Additional officers stopped Young; he smelled of alcohol, admitted drinking and taking anti‑anxiety medication, performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and registered a .114 breath alcohol concentration.
- The State charged Young with failing to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer (UTAH CODE § 76‑8‑305.5), reckless driving (willful/wanton disregard), and DUI.
- After a bench trial the court convicted Young on all counts; Young appealed arguing insufficiency of evidence on the failure‑to‑stop and reckless‑driving counts and ineffective assistance of counsel for not moving to suppress.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Young) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for failure to stop after officer’s command | Officer gave a command to stop before Young fled; Young knowingly fled to avoid arrest | Officer’s testimony about timing of the command was inconsistent; therefore State failed to prove flight ‘‘after’’ the command and failed to prove intent to avoid arrest | Affirmed: testimony supported that Townsend commanded Young before he drove off; intoxication and context supported inference Young fled to avoid arrest |
| Whether §76‑8‑305.5(3) (exclusion for certain vehicle failures to stop) precludes conviction if car was moving when command was made | Section 76‑8‑305.5 applies; Young still liable because the State need not negate excluded conduct as a separate element | If vehicle was already in motion when commanded, the conduct falls under §41‑6a‑210 and thus cannot support §76‑8‑305.5 | Rejected Young’s argument: precedent shows statute’s exclusion does not require the State to disprove the excluded act; conviction stands |
| Sufficiency of evidence for reckless driving (willful/wanton disregard) | Driving at 25–30 mph among cars and pedestrians while intoxicated satisfies willful/wanton disregard | Speed and circling in a parking lot did not amount to willful/wanton disregard | Affirmed: officer’s observations of speed, presence of pedestrians/vehicles, and intoxication supported reckless‑driving finding |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to move to suppress (stop/detention and Miranda statements) | Any suppression motion would be futile because officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate and Young’s subsequent flight/reckless driving independently justified arrest; Miranda suppression, even if successful, wouldn’t change outcome given breath test | Counsel should have moved to suppress as initial detention lacked reasonable suspicion and statements were Miranda custodial | Rejected: counsel not deficient because suppression would have been futile (reasonable suspicion existed and/or Young’s independent criminal acts intervened); no prejudice from failing to suppress post‑arrest admissions because breath test and other evidence supported conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 441 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (statutory exclusion language does not necessarily create a separate element requiring proof of absence of the excluded conduct)
- State v. Lorenzo, 358 P.3d 330 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (a suspect’s intervening criminal acts can validate subsequent arrest despite prior police illegality)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires Miranda warnings)