STATE OF OHIO v. JORDAN R. YOUNG
Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-18
Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-1029
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY
March 20, 2020
2020-Ohio-1044
STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
JORDAN R. YOUNG Defendant-Appellant
(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 20th day of March, 2020.
MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Greene County Prosecutor‘s Office, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
KAREN S. MILLER, Atty. Reg. No. 0071853, P.O. Box 341274, Beavercreek, Ohio 45434 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
TUCKER, P.J.
{¶ 2} This court has reviewed the record and concludes that Young‘s assertions lack merit. Consequently, the trial court‘s judgment is affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 3} On October 9, 2018, Nick Price drove from Marysville to Fairborn in order to meet Young and purchase marijuana from him. Price, who was with two friends, met Young outside of an apartment in Fairborn. Young told Price his friends could not enter the apartment and would have to wait outside. Price followed Young into an apartment, where they both took seats. Another man, later identified as DeAndre DaCosta, came out of the kitchen armed with a gun. DaCosta ordered Price to empty his pockets. When Price did not comply, DaCosta hit him in the head with the butt of the gun, and DaCosta hit Price in the head with the gun several more times. He also placed Price in a chokehold. A woman, subsequently identified as Courtney Bell, entered the room and attempted to reach into Price‘s pockets. Price kicked her away, at which point DaCosta dropped the gun. As Price and DaCosta began to wrestle with each other, Young left the apartment through the backdoor. Another man, identified as Christopher Lyons, entered through the back door. Lyons entered the fray and attempted to choke Price.
{¶ 4} Following an investigation, Young was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery in violation of
{¶ 5} Young appeals.
II. Indictment
{¶ 6} The first assignment of error states as follows:
MR. YOUNG‘S RIGHT TO * * * DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS CONVICTED OF COMPLICITY FOR WHICH HE WAS NOT INDICTED AND HAD NO NOTICE THAT THE CHARGE COULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AFTER THE [COURT] DISMISSED COUNT 2 (CONSPIRACY) OF THE INDICTMENT UPON A
RULE 29 MOTION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL.
{¶ 7} Young argues that, because the indictment failed to explicitly indict on complicity, he lacked notice that the trial court could instruct the jury on complicity to commit aggravated robbery.
{¶ 8} The complicity statute, codified at
{¶ 9} Based upon the foregoing, we find Young‘s argument without merit. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶ 10} The second assignment of error asserted by Young states:
ASSUMING THE CHARGE OF COMPLICITY WAS PROPERLY BEFORE
THE JURY, THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT MR. YOUNG OF COMPLICITY TO AGGRAVATED ROBBERY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
{¶ 11} Young argues the State failed to present evidence sufficient to prove he aided and abetted in the offense of aggravated robbery. The essence of his argument centers on the claim that he was merely present during, but not involved with, the offense.
{¶ 12} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In such situations, we apply the test from State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), which states:
An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Citation omitted). Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 13} Aggravated robbery is proscribed by
{¶ 14} Young is correct that his mere presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to establish complicit conduct. State v. Arrington, 64 Ohio App.3d 654, 582 N.E.2d 649 (1990). Instead, the accused must have taken “a role in causing the commission of the offense.” State v. Sims, 10 Ohio App.3d 56, 59, 460 N.E.2d 672 (8th Dist.1983). “To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to
{¶ 15} There is evidence in this record that Price observed Young‘s Snapchat account, which contained a video indicating Young had marijuana to sell.2 Price contacted Young on the Snapchat account to inquire about the price for the marijuana and to arrange a time to meet for the purchase thereof. Initially, the two decided Young would travel to Marysville to meet Price. However, Young later indicated he did not have a way to travel to Marysville, so it was decided that Price would travel to Fairborn.
{¶ 17} Another co-defendant, Autumn Reynolds, testified at trial. According to Reynolds, she went to Bell‘s apartment in order to get a cigarette. Upon entering the apartment, she found Bell in the bedroom with DaCosta, Young and a third man she did not recognize. Reynolds had a pistol hidden in her clothes and she claimed it “slipped out.” Reynolds testified Young asked if the pistol was hers and stated that it “would be good to use.” Tr. p. 246. Reynolds testified DaCosta and Young discussed taking the gun from her. She testified that she gave the gun to DaCosta because she felt
{¶ 18} This evidence demonstrated that Young set up a buy for $1,650 even though he possibly did not have as much marijuana as he claimed. He also secured Price‘s presence at Bell‘s apartment and personally ensured that Price was not accompanied by his friends into the apartment. Just prior to the offense, Young stated that Reynold‘s gun would be useful in the commission of the aggravated robbery.
{¶ 19} Upon consideration of the entire record of the proceedings in the trial court and the evidence as summarized above, we conclude there was sufficient evidence presented from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Young aided and abetted DaCosta, and the other co-defendants, in the commission of the aggravated robbery.
{¶ 20} The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 21} Young‘s third assignment of error is as follows:
ASSUMING MR. YOUNG WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF COMPLICITY, HIS TEN YEAR MANDATORY SENTENCE WAS EXCESSIVE AND DID NOT COMPLY WITH
O.R.C. SECTION 2929.12 AND2929.13 . FURTHERMORE, MR. YOUNG CONTENDS THAT THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OFO.R.C. 2929.13 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SPECIFIED IN THE INDICTMENT SO AS TO PUT HIM ON NOTICE THAT IF CONVICTED, HIS PRISON SENTENCE WOULD BE MANDATORY.
{¶ 22} Young argues his sentence is contrary to law. He also argues the sentence was excessive in light of the sentences imposed upon the co-defendants. He further argues the sentence was illegal because the indictment did not notify him that a prison sentence would be mandatory.
{¶ 23}
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} Young‘s ten-year sentence is within the statutory range of three to eleven years as provided by
{¶ 26} Turning to the claim the sentence is excessive when compared to that of his co-defendants, we note the record before us is silent as to the circumstances regarding those sentences. Here the trial court specifically noted Young had been convicted of aggravated robbery in 2017 for conduct that was almost identical to the facts
{¶ 27} Finally, Young contends the sentence is contrary to law because the indictment did not notify him that he would be subjected to a mandatory prison sentence if convicted.5 Young has not cited, and we have not found, any authority to support this argument.
{¶ 28} “The purposes of an indictment are to give an accused adequate notice of the charge, and enable an accused to protect himself or herself from any future prosecutions for the same incident.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 853 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 7.
{¶ 29} Based upon the foregoing, we conclude this argument lacks merit and overrule the third assignment of error.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 30} All of Young‘s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Marcy A. Vonderwell
Karen S. Miller
Hon. Stephen Wolaver