State v. WyattState v. Wyatt
Fred S. Miller, Baden & Jones Bldg., 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
RINGLAND, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Donald Wyatt, appeals from his conviction in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for murder. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶2} Appellant was charged with murder in violation of
{¶3} Appellant now appeals from his conviсtion, raising three assignments of error for review. For ease of discussion, appellant‘s second and third assignments of error will be addressed out of order.
{¶4} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶5} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO PRESENT ‘OTHER ACTS’ EVIDENCE TO THE JURY.”
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting the state to introduce “other acts” evidence regarding the couple‘s “previous arguments” and “threats” he made towards his wife. We disagree.
{¶7} The admissibility of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Jones, Butler App. No. CA2006-11-298, 2008-Ohio-865, ¶10, citing State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, paragraph two of the syllabus. Absent an abuse of discretion, as well as a showing that the appellant suffered material prejudice, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court‘s ruling as to the admissibility of evidence. State v. Martin (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 122, 129. An abuse of discretion implies that the court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, and nоt merely an error of law or judgment. State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, ¶130. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. State v. Yeager, Summit App. No. 21510, 2005-Ohio-4932, ¶29.
{¶8} Pursuant to
{¶9} In this case, during appellant‘s opening statement, appellant‘s trial counsel claimed the evidence would show appellant unintentionally shot his wife in the back of the head.1 Thereafter, during its case-in-chief, the state called Brooklin Goins, Rhоnda‘s daughter and appellant‘s step-daughter, who testified, over appellant‘s objection, that appellant “brought out” the gun used to kill her mother “in many of the fights that [her mother and appellant] had.” Specifically, Goins testified that appellant and her mother would “start arguing really bad to where they‘re screaming at each other, and he gets [the gun] and holds onto it.” Goins also testified that she saw appellant strike her mother, “pull her down to the ground,” and “head butt her really hard.”
{¶10} The state also called Janice Jordan, Rhonda‘s mother, who testified, again over appellant‘s objection, that appellant threatened to kill her daughter approximately two weeks before the shooting. According to Jordan, during an argument regarding the couple‘s finances, appellant said, “You‘re not getting my house. I‘ll kill you first,” and later “kind of
{¶11} As can be seen, by claiming during opening argument that he unintentionally shot his wife in the back of the head, appellant “created the issue of whether he shot [her] accidentally or intentionally, and made it a subject of ‘genuine controversy’ for the jury.” State v. Muncey (Feb. 8, 1999), Madison App. No. CA98-03-013, at 9. In turn, as this court has stated previously, “[w]hen the issue at trial is whether the defendant accidentally or intеntionally caused the harm to the victim,” such as the case here, “then other acts of violence between the defendant and the victim are relevant which tend to prove that the present incident was not accidental.” State v. Phillips (Sept. 24, 2001), Preble App. No. CA2001-01-002, at 8; see, also, State v. Carnes (Mar. 18, 2002), Clermont App. No. CA2001-02-018, 2002-Ohio-1311, State v. Benson, Cuyahoga App. No. 87655, 2007-Ohio-830, ¶93; State v. White (Oct. 25, 1996), Gallia App. No. 95CA08, 1996 WL 614190, *4.
{¶12} In addition, “prior threats to commit a criminal act” are admissible where such evidence is directly related to prove the absence of mistake or accident. State v. Rice, Butler App. No. CA2003-01-015, 2004-Ohio-697, ¶19-20, citing State v. Sargent (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 557, 568. Therefore, because the “other acts” evidence was admissible to prove, at a minimum, that the shooting was not, as appellant claimed, an accident, the trial court did not err in its decision permitting the state to introduce such evidence at trial. See, e.g., Muncey at 9-10 (trial court did not err by permitting the state to introduce evidence of prior domestiс violence incidents during husband‘s attempted murder trial where he claimed he accidentally shot his wife). Accordingly, appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶14} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHEN IT ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION OF HIS HOSPITAL RECORDS INTO EVIDENCE.”
{¶15} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting the state to introduce his medical records. We disagree.
{¶16} As noted above, the admissibility of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jones, 2008-Ohio-865 at ¶10. Absent an abuse of discretion, as well as a showing that the appellant suffered material prejudice, an appellate court will not disturb a trial court‘s ruling as to the admissibility of evidence. Martin, 19 Ohio St.3d at 129.
{¶17} Initially, appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting the state to introduce appellant‘s medical records because it “did not timely notify [him] of its intention to offer the records into evidenсe” as required by
{¶18}
{¶19} In this case, on Friday, July 2, 2010, a mere ten days before the start of trial, appellant filed a “Motion to Order the Release and Production of Medical Records” requesting the trial court to “order Atrium Medical Center to release any and all medical records and notes with regard to [his] treatment that was received on February 22, 2010 to February 25, 2010.” The trial court subsequently issued the requested order on Tuesday, July 6. Two days later, on Thursday, July 8, appellant‘s trial counsel, indicating their intent to submit appellant‘s medical records as part of his defеnse, delivered the records to the state. Thereafter, according to the trial transcript, “just as soon as [the state] obtained a copy from defense counsel of those records,” the state informed appellant‘s trial counsel that it also intended to use the records at trial.
{¶20} After a thorough review of the record, we cannot say appellant suffered material prеjudice from the state‘s failure to deliver a copy of appellant‘s medical records to his trial counsel at least five days before the start of trial.3 As noted above, appellant‘s trial counsel obtained appellant‘s medical records no later than Thursday, July 8, four days before the start of trial, and promptly informed the state of their intention to use the records at trial. Thеrefore, because appellant‘s trial counsel had already obtained a copy of appellant‘s medical records, and because they also intended to submit the records as part of appellant‘s defense at trial, appellant‘s trial counsel was most certainly aware of their contents.
{¶21} Nevertheless, appellant, while acknowledging that he was nоt prejudiced “from the fact that [he] was not aware of what was contained in the records,” argues that he was prejudiced due to “his inability to cross-examine the personnel at the hospital, given the lack
{¶22} Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by permitting the state to introduce appellant‘s medical records as such admission violated his “patient-physician privilege.” Appellant, however, did not object to the admission of his medical record on this basis. Therefore, as to this issue, appellant has waived all but plain error on appeal. See State v. Blevins, 152 Ohio App.3d 39, 2003-Ohio-1264, ¶21; State v. Wagers, Preble App. No. CA2009-06-018, 2010-Ohio-2311, ¶48.
{¶23} Pursuant to
{¶24} After a thorough review of the record, it is apparent that appellant voluntarily disclosed his medical records to the state in anticipation of submitting them as part of his defense at trial. By voluntarily disclosing his medical records to the state, appellant has
{¶25} In light of the foregoing, because we find no error in the trial court‘s decision admitting appellant‘s medical records at trial, appellant‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶26} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶27} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHEN IT REFUSED TO PROVIDE CERTAIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS.”
{¶28} In his second assignment of error, appellant initially argues that the trial court erred in its decision refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide. We disagree.
{¶29} Jury instructions are matters left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Harry, Butler App. No. CA2008-01-013, 2008-Ohio-6380, ¶35, citing State v. Guster
{¶30} A jury instruction on a lesser included offense is required only where the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction on the lesser included offense. State v. Carroll, Clermont App. Nos. CA2007-02-030, CA2007-03-041, 2007-Ohio-7075, ¶136, citing State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 600, 2000-Ohio-172. An instruction is not warranted, however, simply because the defendant offers “some evidence” to establish the lesser included offense. Gray, 2011-Ohio-666, ¶23, citing State v. Shane (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632-633. Instead, there must be “sufficient evidence” to “allow a jury to reasonably reject the greater offense and find the defendant guilty on a lesser included (or inferior-degree) offense.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Anderson, Butler App. No. CA2005-06-156, 2006-Ohio-2714, ¶11, quoting Shane at 632-633. In making this determination, the trial court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Braylock, Lucas App. No. L-08-1433, 2010-Ohio-4722, ¶33, citing State v. Smith (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 323, 331.
{¶31} In this case, appellant claimed the shooting that resulted in his wife‘s death was purely accidental. “Accident,” while not an affirmative defense, “is that which is unintentional and unwilled and implies a lack of criminal culpability.” State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 20; State v. Thomas, Butler App. No. CA2008-08-197, 2009-Ohio-4261, ¶24, quoting State v. Ross (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 262, 276; State v. Barnd (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 254, 260. “Reckless conduct goes beyond what is considered to be an accident.” State v. Easley, Franklin App. No. 07AP-578, 2008-Ohio-468, ¶60. In turn, by claiming the shooting was
{¶32} Regardless, after a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide. The only evidence even remotely supporting the theory thаt appellant acted recklessly was his own testimony indicating a “sudden movement” caused the gun to discharge when he went to hug his wife while he held it by his side with his finger on the trigger and the hammer pulled back.5 The state, however, introduced evidence indicating the gun, which contained internal mechanisms requiring the trigger to be “pulled completely to the rear” with at least 3.1 to 4.6 pounds of pressure before it would fire, was discharged no further than four inches from the back of Rhonda‘s head. The state also introduced evidence indicating the gun did not have any abnormalities that would allow it to discharge on its own.
{¶33} As this court has stated previously, “even where the defendant offers some evidence through his own testimony supporting a lesser-included offense, he is still not entitled to an instruction on that offense if the totality of the evidence does not reasonably support an acquittal on the greater offense and a conviction on the lesser offense.” State v. Anderson, 2006-Ohio-2714, ¶13, quoting State v. Neely, 161 Ohio App.3d 99, 2005-Ohio-2342, ¶46. In this case, given the totality of this evidence, we cannot say that the jury could have reasonably rejected the murder charge only to accept
{¶34} Next, also under his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on accident. We disagree.
{¶35} A trial court must give the jury all instructions that are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and fulfill its duty as the fact finder. State v. Curtis, Butler App. No. CA2008-01-008, 2009-Ohio-192, ¶68, citing State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 206, 210. The decision to give or not give a jury instruction, howеver, generally lies within the trial court‘s sound discretion. State v. Campbell, Butler App. No. CA2009-01-002, 2009-Ohio-6044, ¶57.
{¶36} In this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury that in order to find appellant guilty of murder it was required to find appellant “purposely caused the death of Rhonda Wyatt.” See
{¶37} As can be seen, the trial court‘s instructions clearly informed the jury that before finding appellant guilty of murder that it was required to find appellant acted “intentionally and not accidentally.” This instruction, therefore, accurately “advise[d] the jury that if it [found] that the shooting was the result of an ‘accident,’ then the act could not have been done intentionally.” See State v. Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 291, 2000-Ohio-164 (finding no
{¶38} In addition, based on a thorough review of the record, we find a separate and distinct instruction regarding the dеfense of accident “would not have added anything to the general instruction.” State v. Horton, Stark App. No. 2007-CA-00085, 2007-Ohio-6469, ¶104; State v. Taylor, Richland App. No. 2005-CA-0112, 2006-Ohio-4064, ¶44; State v. Glagola, Stark App. No. 2003CA00006, 2003-Ohio-6018, ¶26; see, also, State v. Martin (Dec. 24, 1996), Franklin App. Nos. 96APA04-450, 96APA04-459, 1996 WL 737576, *13. “Accident is an argument that supports a conclusion that the state has failed to prove the intent element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson at ¶59, citing State v. Atterberry (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 443, 447. In essence, “the defense claim of accident simply ‘constitutes a denial or contradiction of evidence offered by the prosecution to prove an intent to kill.‘” Stallings at 291, 2000-Ohio-164, quoting Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d at 20. Therefore, “[i]f the jury had credited appellant‘s argument” claiming the shooting was purely accidental, the jury “would have been required to find [appellant] not guilty of murder pursuant to the court‘s instructions.” Manbevers, 1994 WL 529966 at *6; State v. Staats, Summit App. No. 15706, 1994 WL 122266, *5; see, also, Sunderman at ¶27-28.
{¶39} As noted by the Tenth District Court of Appeals, “[t]here are circumstances where the jury receives instructions that sufficiently allow it to consider the аccident defense
{¶40} In light of the foregoing, because we find no error in the trial court‘s decision refusing to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide or as to the defense of accident, appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶41} Judgment affirmed.
POWELL, P.J., and HUTZEL, J., concur.