STATE OF OHIO v. RALPHIA WRIGHT
No. 110307
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
October 28, 2021
2021-Ohio-3818
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 28, 2021
Criminаl Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-20-648518-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronnie Ducoff, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Noelle A. Powell, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
{¶ 1} Ralphia Wright (“Wright“) appeals her conviction for attempted endangering children in violation of
{¶ 2} On August 13, 2020, Wright was indicted on one count of endangering children in violation of
{¶ 3} Wright initially entered a plea of not guilty. Following discovery, she reached a plea agreement with the state. At the plea hearing held on January 4, 2021, the parties acknowledged that pursuant to the plea agreement “the State of Ohio has amended [Count 1 to] attempted endangering children, a felony of the fourth degree.” Before аccepting a plea, the trial court informed Wright of the constitutional rights she was waiving and determined that she understood the nature of the charge, the maximum penalty involved, and the effect of the guilty plea. The trial court determined that the plea was being made by Wright knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Defense counsel and the assistant prosecutor agreed that the trial court complied with
{¶ 4} A sentencing hearing wаs held on January 25, 2021. The facts set forth on the record reflect that Wright and the infant child‘s father had a shared custody arrangement, and the child spent time
{¶ 5} The state discussed the symptoms the child disрlayed over the course of the weekend and maintained that “with all those symptoms, medical attention should have been sought way before Sunday afternoon * * *.” Defense counsel discussed mitigating factors and argued that there was no indication Wright had caused the physical injuries over the two-and-a-half-month time span and that she should not be punished for causing those injuries.
{¶ 6} The trial court expressed its concern with the fact that the injuries had occurred “over the entirety of this very, very short time span in this baby‘s life she suffered multiple, serious injuries that to any baby would require and you would seek treatment.” The court clarified that neither the state nor the court was suggesting that Wright caused the injuries over the time span, but rather, given the fact that multiple serious injuries occurred over a two-and-a-half-month period of time, “the only time that somebody finally called for EMS was at this point in the weekend when she‘s exhibiting seizures” that medical treatment was sought. The court also stated it did not appear “that it was just a weekend in which this child was denied care.”
{¶ 7} Defense counsel responded that there was nothing to show the injuries were displayed in а significant way before Wright sought medical treatment for the child. Wright expressed to the court that “once I noticed those signs, I took her [to the hospital]” and that she believed she “was doing a good thing by taking her [child] to the hospital.” Wright expressed that she loved all her children. She had no prior record of abusing her children and had only a minor misdemeanor in her criminal history.
{¶ 8} The trial court heard from the parties and indicated it had reviewed the presentence investigation report and sentencing memorandum filed by the state. It also considered the purposеs and principles of sentencing and the sentencing factors under
{¶ 9} Wright timely filed this appeal. She raises fivе assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 11} Wright was indicted on one count of endangering children in violation of
THE COURT: Ms. Wright, then how do you plead to amended Count 1, endangering children -- attempted endangering children, a felony of the fourth degree?
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
{¶ 12} Wright argues that she did not plead to an offense of violence because there was no mention on the record of the furthermore clause that appeared in the indictment and she was never asked to enter a plea to the furthermore clause. As a result, she claims that the crime to which she entered a guilty plea can only constitute a misdemeanor of the first degree under
{¶ 13} In support of her argument, Wright cites this court‘s decisions in State v. Cargill, 2013-Ohio-2689, 991 N.E.2d 1217 (8th Dist.), and State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103677, 2016-Ohio-3178. In Cargill, the defendant pled guilty to a charge of failure to comply in violation of
{¶ 14} Here, the indicted charge included a furthermore clause and the only amendment to the indictment was to add the attempt to the indicted charge, making it a violation of
{¶ 15} Pursuant to
{¶ 16} Wright enterеd a guilty plea, thereby admitting to the indicted charge as amended to attempted endangering children in violation of
{¶ 17} Pursuant to
{¶ 18} Under her second assignment of error, Wright claims the trial court erred by imposing a prison sentence rather than a community control sanction under
{¶ 19} Wright entered a plea of guilty to an amended charge of attempted endangering children for having attempted to “recklessly [create] a substantial risk to the health or safety of” the child “by violating a duty of care, protection, or support” and furthermore “the violation resulted in serious physical harm” to the child. The trial court sentenced Wright to a ten-month prison term. Even if we assume for purposes of our analysis that the offense is not “an offense of violence” as defined under
{¶ 20}
(b) The court has discretion to impose a prison term upon an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth degree that is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying assault offense if any of the following apply:
* * *
(ii) If the offense is a qualifying assault offense, the offender caused serious physical harm to another person while committing the offense, and, if the offense is not a qualifying assault offense, the offender caused physical harm to another person while committing the offense.
{¶ 21} By pleading guilty in this case, Wright admitted she violated a duty of care, protection, or suppоrt and the violation resulted in serious physical harm to the child. The trial court had the discretion to impose a prison term pursuant to
{¶ 22} Under her third assignment of error, Wright claims the trial court erred by imposing mandatory postrelease control. The record reflects that the trial court imposed a ten-month prison term and three years of mandatory postrelease control under former
{¶ 23} The version of
Any sentence to a prison term for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(1) or (3) of this section shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control of up to three years after the offender‘s release from imprisonment, if the parole board, in accordance with division (D) of this section, determines that a period of post-release control is necessary for that offender.
* * *
(Emphasis added.) 2
{¶ 24} Because
{¶ 25}
(B) Each sentencе to a prison term, other than a term of life imprisonment, for a felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is an offense of violence and is not a felony sex offense shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control imposed by the parole board after the offender‘s release from imprisonment. This division applies with respect to all prison terms of a type described in this division, including a term of any such type that is a risk reduction sentence. If a court imposes a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division on or after July 11, 2006, the failure of a sentencing court to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(d) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code of this requirement or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal a statement that the offender‘s sentence includes this requirement does not negate, limit, or otherwise affect the mandatory period of supervision that is required for the offender under this division. This division applies with respect to all prison terms of a type
described in this division, including a non-life felony indefinite prison term. Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(d) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding post-release control or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence pursuant to division (D)(1) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code a statement regarding post-release control. Unlеss reduced by the parole board pursuant to division (D) of this section when authorized under that division, a period of post-release control required by this division for an offender shall be of one of the following periods:
(1) For a felony sex offense, five years;
(2) For a felony of the first degree that is not a felony sex offense, up to five years, but not less than two years;
(3) For a felony of the second degree that is not a felony sex offense, up to three years, but not less than eighteen months;
(4) For a felony of the third degree that is an offense of violence and is not a felony sex offense, up to thrеe years, but not less than one year.
(C) Any sentence to a prison term for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(1) or (4) of this section shall include a requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control of up to two years after the offender‘s release from imprisonment, if the parole board, in accordance with division (D) of this section, determines that a period of post-release control is necessary for that offender. This division applies with respect to all prison terms of a type described in this division, including a term of any such type that is a risk reduction sentence. Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in this division and failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(2)(e) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding post-release control or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence pursuant to division (D)(2) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code a statement regarding post-release control. Pursuant to an agreement entered into under section 2967.29 of the Revised Code, a court of common pleas or parole board may
impose sanctions or conditions on an offender who is placed on post-release control under this division.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} As the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained, regardless of the mandatory or discretionary nature of postrelease control, “pursuant to
prisoner‘s release from imprisonment that includes one or more post-release control sanctions imposed undеr section 2967.28 of the Revised Code.‘” Id. at 508, quoting
{¶ 28} We recognize that the trial court did impose postrelease control as part of Wright‘s sentence in this case. However, the trial court erred by imposing mandatory rather than discretionary postrelease control. Accordingly, we vacate thе postrelease control portion of the sentence and remand for a resentencing hearing limited to the proper imposition of discretionary postrelease control pursuant to
{¶ 29} Under her fourth assignment of error, Wright claims she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial
{¶ 30} Wright concedes that her trial attorney strenuously argued against a prison sentence and repeatedly reminded the court that she was not accused of causing the injuries to the child over the course of the two-and-a-half-month time span. Hеr argument is that her trial attorney should have raised the statutory challenges she has raised on appeal. Having determined that Wright was properly convicted of a felony of the fourth degree and that a prison sentence could be imposed, we are unable to find defense counsel‘s performance was deficient in this regard. Further, because the trial court‘s error in imposing mandatory postrelease control can be corrected on remand, we are unable to find any prejudice to Wright. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 31} Under her fifth assignment of error, Wright claims that her sentence is contrary to law because it is based on unindicted conduct.
{¶ 32} By entering a guilty plea, Wright admitted to the charge of attempted endangering children, with a furthermore clause that the “violation resulted in serious physical harm” to her child. In sentencing Wright for the fourth-degree felony charge, the trial court found a prison term to be consistent with the purposes and principles of felony sentencing under
{¶ 33} In considering the seriousness of the offense, the trial court commented upon the extent of the injuries the child had sustained over a relаtively short time span and recognized some of those injuries were old. However, the trial court was not implying that Wright caused the injuries over that time span; rather, the court clarified that neither the state nor the court was suggesting that Wright caused the injuries. Ultimately, despite the extent of the child‘s injuries and the symptoms the child displayed over the course of an entire weekend, Wright did not call EMS until that Sunday afternoon. As recognized by the trial court, given the fact that multiple serious injuries occurred over a two-month period of time, “the only time that somebody finally called for EMS was at this point in the weekend when she‘s exhibiting seizures * * *.”
{¶ 34} Additionally, in considering the likelihood of recidivism and the need to protect the public, the trial court was free to consider Wright‘s criminal history. The trial court was made aware of a prior minor misdemeanor offense for disorderly conduct that involved another one of Wright‘s children, who was found by a bus
{¶ 35} Upon our review of the record, we are unable to clearly and convincingly find that the sentence is contrary to law. The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 36} In conclusion, we vacate the postrelease control portion of the sentence and remand for a resentencing hearing limited to the proper imposition of discretionary postrelease control pursuant to current
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share costs herein taxed.
The сourt finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCURS;
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE OPINION
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURRING:
{¶ 1} While I respectfully concur with the majority, I write separately to express how troubled I am by this case, particularly the fact that no one has been held responsible for the abuse that was inflicted on the helpless infant victim in this matter. As notеd by the majority, the infant was just over two months old at the time that she was finally brought to the hospital and her past injuries were discovered. At that point in her short life, she had suffered injuries that would incapacitate an adult.
{¶ 2} At the time of Wright‘s sentencing, the victim was approximately 16 months old. During this hearing, the state informed the court of the baby‘s current physical condition. She had only been able to eat through a feeding tube, which had recently been removed, and soft foods were being incorporated into her diet. At a time when she should have been an active toddler, the bаby was not even crawling and was unable to sit unsupported.
{¶ 3} This baby suffered appalling abuse during the most vulnerable part of her life and now has delays in development and will deal with lifelong repercussions. While the state noted that the cause of her injuries was not able to be determined, it is heartbreaking that no one has been held responsible for the life-altering abuse endured by this baby.