STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Adverse Party, v. DOUGLAS C. WRIGHT, Defendant-Relator.
(CC 23CR33399) (SC S070878)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
July 2, 2026
375 Or 383
En Banc
Argued and submitted November 19, 2024.
Zachary J. Stern, Zachary J. Stern, P.C., Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for defendant-relator.
Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the answering brief for plaintiff-adverse party. Also on the answering brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, filed the supplemental brief for plaintiff-adverse party. Also on the supplemental brief was Dan Rayfield, Attorney General.
Rosalind M. Lee, Rosalind Manson Lee LLC, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Also on the brief were Amy Potter and Daniel C. Silberman.
DUNCAN, J.
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed.
This mandamus case arises out of a criminal case in which relator is the defendant. In that case, relator moved to compel the state to provide him copies of discovery materials without cost. The circuit court denied that motion, and relator initiated this case seeking mandamus relief, contending that (1) the state cannot charge criminal defendants for copies of discovery materials, and (2) even if it can, it cannot withhold the copies pending payment. We issued an alternative writ. However, as we will explain, relator‘s primary argument in this court is based on the current version of a statutory provision,
I. PROCEDURAL FACTS
As mentioned, in the underlying criminal case, relator filed a motion to compel the state to provide him copies of discovery materials without cost, and the circuit court denied that motion. Relator then petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus, and we issued an alternative writ directing the circuit court either to (1) vacate its order denying relator‘s motion and enter an order compelling the state to provide relator discovery without cost or (2) show cause for not doing so.
After we issued the alternative writ, the state provided relator copies of the discovery materials without cost. The state then filed a motion asking the circuit court to vacate its order denying relator‘s motion to compel, and the circuit court granted that motion. Thereafter, the state filed a motion asking this court to dismiss this mandamus case, asserting that it was moot and that we should not exercise our discretion to adjudicate it pursuant to
II. ANALYSIS
In our analysis, we first address the requirements for mandamus relief and for adjudication under
A. Mandamus
This case is the type in which mandamus relief can be appropriate because it involves a challenge to the denial of a form of discovery—specifically, the provision of copies of discovery materials—that is intended to provide systemic benefits, the loss of which might not factor into reversible error on appeal. See State ex rel Anderson v. Miller, 320 Or 316, 321, 882 P2d 1109 (1994) (holding that the requirements for mandamus were satisfied where the relator was challenging a circuit court‘s denial of videotaped depositions, apparently “as a matter of course“).
B. Adjudication under ORS 14.175
Although this case is moot, it is justiciable under
When a case is moot but justiciable under
C. Applicability of Current Definition of “Disclose” in ORS 135.805(2)
Relator‘s primary argument is that the state has a statutory obligation to provide copies of discovery materials to criminal defendants. Relator made that argument in the circuit court, citing
In his initial briefing in this court, relator renewed his statutory argument, again citing
In its initial briefing in this court, the state agreed that, under the current version of
Thus, in their initial briefing in this court, both parties proceeded as if the current version of
The effective date of SB 751 was January 1, 2022. Or Laws 2021, ch 409;
Because section 3 states that SB 751‘s amendments apply to offenses alleged to have occurred on or after the bill‘s effective date and relator‘s indictment charges him with crimes committed before that date, we asked the parties to file supplemental briefing regarding the applicability of the current version of
In his supplemental brief, relator argues that the current version of
The state reads section 3 differently. According to the state, the applicability of SB 751‘s amendments does not depend on the date that a crime is alleged; instead, it depends on the date that the offense is alleged to have occurred. Thus, according to the state, the relevant date is the alleged crime commission date.
The parties’ dispute about whether the relevant date is the charging date or the alleged crime commission date presents a question of statutory interpretation, which
In section 3, the word “offenses” is modified by the phrase “alleged to have occurred on or after the effective date of [this Act].” That phrase refers to how an offense is “alleged,” that is, how it is charged. Thus, the phrase indicates that whether SB 751‘s amendments apply to an offense depends on how the offense is described in the charging instrument; if the offense is described as having occurred on a date that is the same or later than SB 751‘s effective date, then the amendments apply.
That straightforward reading of section 3 is consistent with how the phrase “alleged to have occurred” is commonly used. As cases from both this court and the Court of Appeals illustrate, courts use the phrase when referring to a crime‘s alleged commission date, not its charging date. See, e.g., State v. Wimber, 315 Or 103, 110 n 15, 843 P2d 424 (1992) (“[W]here the conduct constituting the offense is alleged to have taken place over a period of time, the indictment need not state the date of each instance of the conduct, but may state inclusive dates between which the conduct is alleged to have occurred.” (Internal citation omitted.)); see also State v. Ribas, 374 Or 750, 772, 583 P3d 1019 (2026) (“The only remaining question is whether the state is allowed to prove a charge alleged to have occurred ‘on or about’ a certain date with evidence that the defendant committed the offense on a date other than the exact date specified.” (Emphasis in original.)); State v. Haynes, 352 Or 321, 322, 284 P3d 473 (2012) (“Defendant is charged with committing a murder that is alleged to have occurred on the evening of May 6, 1994.“); State v. Johnson, 311 Or App 111, 116, 489 P3d 1046 (2021) (the defendant “was charged with 11 counts of first-degree sexual abuse alleged to have occurred from about February 1 to April 1“); State v. Fujimoto, 266 Or App 353, 354-55, 338 P3d 180 (2014) (“Defendant was charged with nine counts of first-degree theft * ** alleged to have
Moreover, to construe section 3 as relator does would require us to essentially delete some of its text, so that it would read as follows: The “amendments * * * by sections 1 and 2 of this 2021 Act apply to offenses alleged to have occurred on or after the effective date of [the Act].” Doing so would be contrary to how we construe statutes because, as a general rule, we assume that “the legislature did not intend any portion of its enactments to be meaningless surplusage.” State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or 745, 755, 359 P3d 232 (2015); see also
Nevertheless, relator argues that we should hold that the relevant date is the charging date. Relator bases his argument in part on the word “alleged” in the phrase “alleged to have occurred.” Relying on dictionary definitions, he asserts that the words “allege,” “alleged,” and “allegation” “relate to formal accusations contained in an accusatory instrument.” In addition, based on statutes and case law, he asserts that both the legislature and this court use the words “allege” and “allegation” to refer to the contents of an accusatory instrument. Given the meaning of “allege” and its variations, he argues that
“an offense ‘alleged to have occurred’ on or after SB 751‘s effective date refers to the date in which the formal allegation is made upon the filing [of] an accusatory instrument. Because the state never ‘alleged’ relator committed any offense until after SB 751‘s effective date, the current definition of ‘disclose’ in
ORS 135.805(2) controls.”
We agree with relator that “allege” and its variations are often used to refer to the contents of a charging instrument. But that fact supports the straightforward reading of section 3 described above, in which the word “alleged” is used to refer to an allegation in the charging instrument, specifically, the alleged crime commission date.
In addition to his argument based on the word “alleged,” relator makes an argument based on other applicability provisions. He asserts that the legislature routinely makes changes to sentencing statutes applicable to offenses “committed on or after” the effective date of an act, and he contends that the fact that section 3 applies to offenses “alleged to have occurred on or after” SB 751‘s effective date indicates that the legislature did not intend the applicability of SB 751‘s amendments to depend on the date the offenses were committed, but rather on when they were alleged. (Emphases added.) As we understand it, relator‘s argument is that, if the legislature had wanted to limit the applicability of SB 751‘s amendments to offenses occurring on or after the bill‘s effective date, it would have provided that the amendments apply to offenses “committed on or after” that date, as it has done for amendments to sentencing statutes.
We do not draw the same conclusion from the sentencing statutes’ applicability provisions as relator does. Instead, we conclude that the likely reason the legislature used the phrase “alleged to have occurred” in section 3 is because SB 751 concerns discovery, most of which occurs before or during trial and, therefore, before a determination is made regarding whether an offense has been committed. In that context, referring to offenses “alleged to have occurred,” as opposed to “committed,” is appropriate.
As for legislative history, the parties have not provided, and we have not located, any legislative history regarding section 3. The legislative history of SB 751 does not appear to contain any explanation, comments, or questions about section 3.
Relator argues that, when construing section 3, we should look to the legislative history regarding the substantive changes sections 1 and 2 made to the discovery statutes. He asserts that those changes—which amended the definition of “disclose” and expanded the state‘s discovery obligations—were intended to improve the consistency and efficiency of discovery practices. Citing Video Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 751, March 24, 2021, 1:11:30-1:35:00 (statements from representatives of the Innocence Project, the Forensic Justice Project, Metropolitan
We understand relator‘s point; having a single set of discovery statutes apply to all crimes would improve consistency and efficiency. But, as discussed above, a straightforward reading of the text of section 3 indicates that the legislature chose to make SB 751‘s amendments applicable only to crimes whose alleged crime commission date is on or after the bill‘s effective date. The legislature had to make a choice about the applicability of the amendments and, as it often does, it based that choice on the crime‘s alleged commission date, as opposed to its charging date.4
Relator also points out that, if SB 751‘s amendments do not apply to all crimes charged on or after the bill‘s effective date, then different versions of the discovery statutes will apply to different crimes depending on their alleged commission dates. That is true, but that is not an uncommon result when the legislature amends criminal statutes. Moreover, the number of cases that involve the prior versions of the statutes will decrease over time. Thus, the fact that different versions of the discovery statutes will apply to different alleged crimes does not dissuade us from reading the text of section 3 in the straightforward way described above, which gives effect to all the terms that the legislature chose to use.
In sum, based on the text of section 3, we conclude that SB 751‘s amendments to the discovery statutes apply to offenses with alleged crime commission dates on or after the bill‘s effective date, January 1, 2022. Because the alleged crime commission dates in relator‘s indictment all predate that date, the amendments do not apply to relator‘s criminal case. That means that the amended definition of
In this mandamus case, relator‘s primary argument is based on the current version of
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed.