State v. WillisState v. Willis
Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
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MAYLE, P.J.
{¶ 1} On September 27, 2016, appellant, Christopher Willis, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of three misdеmeanors: one count of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and two counts of assault. The trial court sentenced him to 180 days
{¶ 2} Willis appealed his convictions, and we affirmed the trial court‘s decision. State v. Willis, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-16-048, 2017-Ohio-8924.
{¶ 3} On February 28, 2018, Willis moved to reopen his appeal under
Appellant‘s guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing when the trial court failed to inform appellant of the effect of his plea in violation of
Crim.R. 11(E) .
{¶ 4} We granted thе motion to reopen and now consider the merits of this new assignment of error under
{¶ 5} For the following reasons, we find that Willis‘s new assignment of error is not well-taken and his previous appellate counsel was not ineffective, and we therefore confirm our prior judgment under
I. Facts
{¶ 6} In our prior decision, we summarized the facts underlying Willis‘s convictions. The only facts that are relevant to the assignment of error before us now are those relating to the plea hearing:
During the plea hearing, the court asked the prosecutor and defense counsel what agreement they had reached and confirmed with Willis that
the terms conformed to his understanding of the plea agreement. After the state told the court the factual bаsis for the guilty pleas, the court asked “And, Mr. Willis, is that what happened?” Willis replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” The court and defense counsel then engaged in the following exchange: THE COURT: And, again, based upon those facts your plea to Counts 1 and 2 as amеnded is?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Guilty, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And as to Count 4?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Guilty, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. We would accept those pleas and based upon the set of facts find the defendant guilty at this time of Assault in Counts 1 and 2, and OVI in Count 4. Willis at ¶ 5.
{¶ 7} Willis argues that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court did not inform him of the effеct of his plea as required by
{¶ 8} Initially, we note that Willis cites the Ohio Traffic Rules in relation to his guilty plea. Only the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to his case, however. The traffic rules apply only to “traffic cases.”
{¶ 9} Under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). Criminal Rule 11 outlines the procedures the trial court must follow to ensure that a defendant‘s plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Jones, 116
{¶ 10} A trial court‘s
{¶ 11} Under
{¶ 12} Here, it is undisputed that the trial court did not literally comply with
{¶ 13} When a trial court does not literally comply with
{¶ 14} For nonconstitutional rights, the trial court must substаntially comply with
{¶ 15} In this case, the record shоws that the trial court did not tell Willis (either orally or in writing) that his guilty plea was a complete admission of his guilt. The court, therefore, completely failed to comply with
{¶ 16} But, there is a narrow exception to the general rule in instances where the trial court failed to inform the defendant of the effect of a guilty plea. In Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, at ¶ 14, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that a trial court‘s failure to inform the defendant of the effect of a guilty plea, specifically, is subject to а unique analysis because “[a] plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt.” (Emphasis sic.) That is, when a defendant affirmatively indicates that he or she is “guilty” of the charge, it is—necessarily and patently—a complete admission of guilt. In other wоrds, “a complete admission of guilt” is more than just the effect of a guilty plea; it is the very nature of a guilty plea. For that reason, “a defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt. In such сircumstances, a court‘s failure to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by
{¶ 18} But, the analysis is also somewhat different here because we begin with a presumption that Willis was not prejudiced by the trial court‘s actions, and Willis bears the burden of overcoming this presumption and demonstrating рrejudice. To determine
{¶ 19} On appeal, Willis argues that he would nоt have pleaded guilty if he had known that he was forfeiting the right to challenge, on appeal, the trial court‘s denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. In support, he relies upon his prior appellate counsel‘s assignment of error relating to the trial court‘s decision on his motion to dismiss, which we found was not well-taken in light of his guilty plea. Willis, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-16-048, 2017-Ohio-8924, at ¶ 7. But the mere fact that his appellate counsel subsequently attempted to assert a nonviable assignment of error does not in any wаy demonstrate that Willis, at the time of the plea hearing, did not subjectively understand that his guilty plea was a “complete admission of guilt“—which, again, we presume to be the case.
{¶ 20} Moreover, upon review of the record, we find that the transcript of the plea hearing indicates that Willis affirmatively confirmed his understanding of his plea agreement with the state. And, before he entered his guilty plea, Willis agreed that the state‘s recitation of facts was “what happened.” Most importantly, Willis did not assert at the plea hearing that he intended to challenge the trial court‘s denial of his motion to dismiss on appeal. See Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, at ¶ 53-54 (where the appellant, following a guilty plea, alleged that he was not aware that
{¶ 21} Thus, based on the totality of circumstances, we find that Willis does not overcome the presumption that, because he did not assert his actual innocence at the plea hearing, he subjectively understood that his guilty plea was a “complete admission of guilt.” We find his assignment of error not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 22} Based on the foregoing, we find that Willis was not prejudiced by the trial court‘s failure to inform him of the effect of his guilty plea pursuant to
{¶ 23} Willis is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
Judgment confirmed.
A certified coрy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, P.J.
JUDGE
CONCUR.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: httр://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.