THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE.
No. 2022-1053
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
April 18, 2024
2024-Ohio-1433
FISCHER, J.
Submitted September 26, 2023. APPEAL
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1433.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1433
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1433.]
Criminal law—Juvenile law—Stare decisis—State v. Burns reaffirmed based on stare decisis—Under Burns, defendant was properly charged with and convicted of tampering with evidence in adult court, because that charge was rooted in the acts for which defendant was bound over from juvenile court—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded for consideration of remaining assignments of error.
FISCHER, J.
{1} We accepted this discretionary appeal brought by appellant, the state of Ohio, to determine whether appellee, Timothy Williams, who was a juvenile when he committed the offense at issue, could be indicted for and convicted of that offense in adult court when a charge for the offense was never considered by the juvenile court. We reaffirm our holding in State v. Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801, 11-13, and hold that a defendant who was a juvenile when he committed an offense may be charged for and convicted of that offense in adult court even though a charge for the offense was not brought in juvenile court and considered in a bindover proceeding, if the charge is rooted in the same acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and remand the matter to that court for it to resolve any remaining assignments of error.
I. BACKGROUND
{2} Timothy Williams, then 16 years old, rang the doorbell of the home of Everett and Leslie Lawson, pretending to have been injured in a car accident. Everett saw Williams through a window and called 9-1-1. Leslie heard Williams‘s cries for help. Worried about the injured young man, Leslie opened the front door. Williams then shot Leslie twice, killing her instantly.
{3} Williams was charged in the Hamilton County juvenile court as a delinquent child for conduct that if committed by an adult would constitute murder in violation of
{4} At Williams‘s hearing on the mandatory bindover of his case to adult court, the state presented testimony of three witnesses to establish probable cause that Williams had committed the charged offenses. The first witness to testify, Grace Jacobs, testified that while she was at Autumn Haugabrook‘s home in the early-morning hours on the day of the murder,
{5} Forest Park Police Department Detective Jeff Carnine testified that Everett had told him that a young male wearing a red hoodie had shot Leslie. Police found three spent 9 mm shell casings near the front door where Leslie had been shot. During their investigation, police discovered that around the time of the offenses, Grace‘s vehicle was spotted by a city license-plate reader about a minute after Williams‘s cellphone connected with a cellphone tower in the same vicinity, suggesting that Williams‘s cellphone was in Grace‘s vehicle when the call was made and corroborating Grace‘s testimony that Williams and Heard borrowed her vehicle shortly before the offenses occurred. Detective Carnine interviewed Williams, who claimed without provocation that he lost his red hoodie on the night of the murder.
{6} Vincent Thompson testified that Williams sold him a “dirty” 9 mm gun two days after the murder. Thompson met Williams at Autumn‘s home to purchase the gun. Thompson also testified that Williams told him that the “gun was hot” because “[Williams had] put in some work with the gun” with Heard.
{7} The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Williams committed all the offenses and specifications charged in the juvenile complaint and transferred the case to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas (or, “the adult court“). A grand jury then indicted Williams for murder and felonious assault and the accompanying firearm specifications regarding the same acts that had been charged in the juvenile-court complaint. But the grand jury also indicted Williams for tampering with evidence in violation of
{8} Williams eventually pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter in violation of
{9} Williams appealed his tampering-with-evidence conviction to the First District, arguing that his statutory and constitutional rights were violated when he was indicted for and convicted of tampering with evidence, because that charge had not been transferred from the juvenile court to the adult court. See 2022-Ohio-2022, ¶¶ 7. While that appeal was pending, this court released its decision in State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297. In Smith, we held that “a juvenile court may transfer a case or a matter to adult court, but the adult court‘s jurisdiction is limited to the acts charged for which probable cause was found.” Id. at 29.
{10} The First District, relying on our decision in Smith, held that the adult court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the tampering-with-evidence charge because the juvenile court had not found
{11} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted the following proposition of law for review:
The holding in Smith is limited to circumstances where a juvenile court explicitly found there was no probable cause for a charge filed therein.
See 168 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2022-Ohio-3909, 197 N.E.3d 587. We sua sponte held the matter for our decision in Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801. 168 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2022-Ohio-3909, 197 N.E.3d 587. After we decided Burns, we ordered briefing. 168 Ohio St.3d 1488, 2022-Ohio-4704, 200 N.E.3d 275. The case is now ripe for decision.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. The mandatory-bindover process
{12} In Ohio, the juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving juveniles alleged to have committed acts that would constitute criminal offenses if committed by an adult. See
{13} In Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, this court was tasked with determining whether the entirety of “the case” in which an act charged was found by the juvenile court to be supported by probable cause or only “the act charged” for which the court found probable cause transfers from the juvenile court to the adult court. Id. at 24-25. This court explained that the adult court has jurisdiction “over only the specific act or acts transferred, i.e., those acts supported by probable cause,” id. at 32, and recognized that
{14} Soon after Smith was decided, this court was “asked to decide whether the state must prove in juvenile court that there is probable cause to believe that a
B. Stare decisis demands that we follow Burns
{15} In this case, the state argues that Ohio‘s adult courts have jurisdiction over charges first brought in adult court that are “rooted in” acts for which the juvenile court found probable cause. The state argues that Williams‘s tampering-with-evidence charge is firmly “rooted in” the murder of Leslie and not a different course of conduct or event that was not properly bound over by the juvenile court. The state encourages this court to simply apply Burns, arguing that Williams offers no persuasive reason to disregard Burns.
{16} Williams argues that Burns was wrongly decided and that we should overrule it and strictly apply Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297. According to Williams, under Smith, only charges for which the juvenile court made an explicit finding of probable cause may be bound over to adult court. Williams maintains that Burns is not grounded in statutory law or caselaw.
{17} We reaffirm our decision in Burns, based on the principles of stare decisis. “Stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system.” Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989). It “compels a court to recognize and follow an established legal decision in subsequent cases in which the same question of law is at issue.” State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 28. While stare decisis can be applied with varying force, we have described precedent that “involves statutory interpretation * * * as more sacrosanct than the common-law precedents.” Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 539 N.E.2d 103 (1989). Precedent that involves statutory interpretation “is owed greater stare decisis effect than other sources of law, because the legislature can always amend a statute in light of a court‘s construction.” State v. Wilson, 170 Ohio St.3d 12, 2022-Ohio-3202, 208 N.E.3d 761, ¶ 51 (DeWine, J., dissenting); see also New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 164, 2019-Ohio-2851, 133 N.E.3d 482, ¶ 19 (stare decisis applies to statutory interpretation because the legislature can amend a statute if it disagrees with the court‘s interpretation); State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 33 (lead opinion), quoting Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 23 (” ‘stare decisis applies to rulings rendered in regard to specific statutes’ “). Because Burns used statutory interpretation to conclude that under
{18} Additionally, Williams has not presented a compelling reason why we should overrule Burns.
{19} While the “rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint” limitation from Burns is not found in the language of
{20} Moreover, since this court decided Burns, the General Assembly has amended the statutes providing for discretionary and mandatory bindovers to adult court. See 2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288 (“S.B. 288“), effective April 4, 2023. Those amendments do not affect the bindover in this case, which predated the amendments under S.B. 288, but they support the conclusion that we need not overrule Burns. Any further conclusions we make regarding pre-April 4, 2023 bindover proceedings will apply to a shrinking number of cases and could create unnecessary competing approaches to considering pre- and post-April 4, 2023 bindovers. The General Assembly effectively codified our decision in Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, and it did not amend the language in
{21} For these reasons, stare decisis demands that we apply Burns in this case.
C. The tampering-with-evidence charge is rooted in acts that the juvenile court bound over to the adult court
{22} In this case, we must determine whether the tampering-with-evidence
{23} “[A] case transferred from a juvenile court may result in new indicted charges in the adult court when the new charges are rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint but were not specifically named in the individual acts transferred.” Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801, at ¶ 13. This includes new indicted charges that arise from a course of conduct or an event that has been properly bound over by the juvenile court. Id. In Burns, we determined that certain indicted charges that were not in the juvenile-court complaint were rooted in the acts that were bound over by the juvenile court because the indicted charges were based on conduct that was in the juvenile complaint. Id.
{24} The juvenile complaint against Williams focuses on the murder and felonious-assault charges, alleging that Williams shot Leslie with a 9 mm handgun. The complaint does not mention a tampering-with-evidence charge or Williams‘s sale of a gun two days after the murder. However, the evidence presented at the probable-cause hearing supports a finding that the murder and the tampering-with-evidence acts were connected, because it showed that the tampering-with-evidence charge stemmed from Williams‘s actions to avoid prosecution by getting rid of the murder weapon.
{25} Williams shot Leslie with a 9 mm gun on April 2, 2020, killing her. Two days later, Williams and Thompson discussed Williams‘s selling to Thompson a “dirty” 9 mm gun. After Williams sold the gun to Thompson, Williams asked Thompson what he had done with the gun, because the “gun was hot.” Williams later explained to Thompson that he had “put in some work with the gun” with Heard and hoped that Thompson did not have it anymore. This evidence demonstrates that the tampering-with-evidence charge arose from the murder that was the basis of the juvenile complaint, because it shows that Williams sold the 9 mm gun that was used to commit the murder.
III. CONCLUSION
{26} Applying Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801, we hold that Williams was properly charged with and convicted of tampering with evidence in adult court, because the charge was rooted in the acts for which he was bound over from juvenile court. We reverse the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for it to address any remaining assignments of error.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, C.J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by DEWINE and WELBAUM, JJ.
JEFFREY M. WELBAUM, J., of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting for DETERS, J.
KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in judgment only.
{27} “[S]tare decisis isn‘t supposed to be the art of methodically ignoring what everyone knows to be true.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1405, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020). And although stare decisis is most compelling when precedent involves statutory construction, Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 539 N.E.2d 103 (1989), it has never been an ” ‘inexorable command,’ ” id., quoting Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238, 44 S.Ct. 302, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Instead, “stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable.” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940).
{28} When a court, under the guise of statutory construction, changes the meaning of what the legislature enacted, the court goes beyond the judicial power “to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and encroaches on the legislative power to write what the law is and amend the law. And when a court adheres to an act of statutory misinterpretation by applying stare decisis, the court “perpetuates a usurpation of the legislative power,” Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 718, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 204 L.Ed.2d 322 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). If a court palpably misinterprets a statute, then stare decisis does not stand in the way of correcting that error; rather, it is the duty of the court to overturn bad precedent when necessary to give effect to the written law that the legislature enacted.
{29} When it comes to our decisions in State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, and State v. Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801, we know what the law is and what it is not.
{30} Former
{31} Yet in Smith, this court held that the adult court to which the case is transferred lacks jurisdiction over charges for which the juvenile court found no probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed them. Smith at ¶ 44. And in Burns, this court said that the adult court does have jurisdiction over charges that were not alleged in the juvenile complaint, but only if those charges are “rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint.” Burns at ¶ 13.
{32} Neither of the jurisdictional limitations from Smith and Burns can reasonably be drawn from the plain language of the bindover statutes. And because Smith and Burns so palpably depart from—and in fact distort—the unambiguous statutory text, stare decisis is not an obstacle to correcting the erroneous conclusions in those cases. I would overrule Smith and Burns today.
{33} Although the majority leaves Smith and Burns standing, it nonetheless reaches the right result. Once the juvenile court transferred appellee Timothy Williams‘s case to the adult court, Williams could be indicted for and convicted of the offense of tampering with evidence even though the acts constituting that offense were not alleged in the juvenile complaint.
I. Jurisdiction of Juvenile and Adult Courts Over Cases Involving Juveniles
{35} “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23. ” ‘A court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.’ ” Id., quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. “Rather, the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id. ” ‘Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an action and the parties to it, * * * the right to hear and determine is perfect; and the decision of every question thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred * * *.’ ” (Ellipses added in Pizza.) Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford, 62 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 582 N.E.2d 992 (1992), quoting Sheldon‘s Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 499 (1854).
{36} Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.” We have recognized that the General Assembly has “exclusive authority * * * to allocate certain subject matters to the exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the courts of common pleas.” State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 2.
{37} The General Assembly exercised that authority when it vested in the juvenile courts “exclusive original jurisdiction,”
{38} Effective April 4, 2023, the General Assembly amended the statutes providing for discretionary and mandatory bindovers to adult court. See 2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288. Those amendments do not impact the bindover in this case, which predated the amendments enacted by S.B. 288.
{39} At the time Williams committed his offenses in this case and at the time of the bindover, the version of
After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child for committing an act that would be aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder if committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer the case if * * * [t]he child was sixteen or seventeen years
of age at the time of the act charged and there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged.
(Emphasis added.) Former
{40} Former
{41} So once a juvenile‘s case was transferred to adult court, the adult court was the proper forum for that case and had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, including charges that were not alleged in the juvenile-court complaint. Any error in the adult court‘s adjudication of the case after the transfer involved an error in the exercise of jurisdiction in the particular case, not a defect in the court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction.
II. Smith and Burns
{42} We addressed the bindover statutes recently in Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, and Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801. In Smith, this court stated that “a juvenile court may transfer a case or a matter to adult court, but the adult court‘s jurisdiction is limited to the acts charged for which probable cause was found.” Smith at ¶ 29. We held that “[i]n the absence of a juvenile court‘s finding probable cause * * *, no adult court has jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile court.” Id. at 44.
{43} But in Burns, this court backtracked from its holding in Smith and clarified that “an adult court is not necessarily limited to considering only the specific acts bound over from the juvenile court.” Burns at ¶ 12. Rather, “a case transferred from a juvenile court may result in new indicted charges in the adult court when the new charges are rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint but were not specifically named in the individual acts transferred.” Id. at 13. This court concluded in Burns that the absence of probable-cause findings by the juvenile court did not preclude the adult court from exercising jurisdiction over charges that are based on conduct that was alleged in the juvenile-court complaint, id.; however, this court held that the adult court cannot exercise jurisdiction over charges if they were included in the juvenile complaint but were found by the juvenile court not to be supported by probable cause, id. at 9-10.
{44} The problem is that this court departed from the plain language of the then-applicable bindover statutes when it held in Smith and reiterated in Burns that a juvenile court‘s finding that a charge is not supported by probable cause is a jurisdictional
{45} I recognize that “the doctrine of stare decisis dictates adherence to prior judicial decisions,” Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, at ¶ 38. And it has been said that stare decisis is most compelling when, as here, the precedent involves statutory construction; courts often justify their “extraordinary reluctance to overturn statute-based precedents” by citing the legislature‘s prerogative “to correct erroneous interpretations of legislative intent,” Rocky River, 43 Ohio St.3d at 6, 539 N.E.2d 103.
{46} Yet, stare decisis is ultimately a judicial policy that “is an exception to textualism (as it is to any theory of interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 414 (2012). Its “function ‘is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.’ ” Id. at 413, quoting Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 139 (1997). And it “reflects a judgment ‘that “in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.” ’ ” Knick v. Scott, Pennsylvania, 588 U.S. 180, 202, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019), quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
{47} The precondition for application of this judicial policy born not of logic but of necessity, then, is that the precedent misinterpreted the statutory text and got the law wrong—“stare decisis has consequence only to the extent it sustains incorrect decisions; correct judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up,” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, L.L.C., 576 U.S. 446, 455, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 192 L.Ed.2d 463 (2015). But “[the judicial power] is the power ‘to say what the law is,’ not the power to change it.” James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2451, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. That is, a court lacks the power to rewrite a statute through statutory misinterpretation.
{48} For this reason, even when precedent involves statutory construction, application of stare decisis is not an ” ‘inexorable command,’ ” Rocky River, 43 Ohio St.3d at 6, quoting W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. at 238. A clearly erroneous interpretation of a statute should not remain the law simply because it was earlier in time. Instead, “[a] demonstrably incorrect judicial decision * * * is tantamount to making law, and adhering to it * * * perpetuates a usurpation of the legislative power.” (Emphasis sic.) Gamble, 587 U.S. at 718 (Thomas, J., concurring). In such a case, the court should correct the error.
{49} In seeking to uphold the judicial policies that counsel in favor of retaining a case as precedent notwithstanding the fact that the case was wrongly decided, this court established the test in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256. That test provides that a prior decision of this court
{50} I am not convinced that the Galatis test properly balances the competing priorities—textual versus pragmatic—that come into play when deciding to retain precedent. And applying that test might cause this court to uphold a decision that clearly usurped the legislature‘s authority to write the law, simply because this court‘s misconstruction of a statute is “workab[le],” id.
{51} But it is not necessary to map out the precise contours of stare decisis now. This is a criminal case, and this court has overruled criminal-law precedent in the past without being controlled by the Galatis test. See State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 30; id. at ¶ 85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment only) (citing cases). As I have explained:
The protection of individual liberty, which is at stake in a criminal proceeding, should never depend on a party‘s ability to prove that the three prongs of the Galatis test have been met. We should not uphold a wrongly decided case simply because a criminal defendant is unable to establish that an erroneous holding has become unworkable and no one (or some undefined number of people) has relied on it. Our precedent in criminal cases can chill the behavior of law-abiding Ohioans while sometimes literally rising to a matter of life or death. If a decision in a criminal case is wrong, it should be overruled without resort to a binding test.
Id. at 86 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment only). Therefore, to overrule Smith and Burns, it is enough to show that they were wrongly decided.
{52} Smith‘s holding that an adult court lacks jurisdiction over charges for which the juvenile court found no probable cause misstated the law. Former
{53} “Case” means a “civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 266 (11th Ed.2019). “The word ‘action’ has typically been understood to refer to the entire legal proceeding, regardless of how many claims or charges are included in the proceeding. This understanding is consistent with common parlance. When we say that
{54} Contrary to this court‘s contention in Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, at ¶ 44, former
{55} Smith‘s holding, which was reaffirmed in Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801, at ¶ 10, that an adult court cannot exercise jurisdiction over charges that have been bound over from juvenile court for which the juvenile court made a finding of no probable cause is simply wrong, and because it is wrong, it should be overruled.
{56} The language in Burns stating that “a case transferred from a juvenile court may result in new indicted charges in the adult court when the new charges are rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint but were not specifically named in the individual acts transferred,” id. at ¶ 13, rewrites the law. Although this court in Burns purported to rely on former
{57} Rather, former
{58} But even if it were not enough that the criminal-law precedent established in Smith and Burns is wrong, the traditional considerations for deciding whether to abandon precedent weigh heavily in favor of overruling those cases. These considerations include the age of the precedent,
{59} Smith and Burns are recent decisions that have not had time to receive general acceptance by society, and “[t]he freshness of error not only deprives it of the respect to which long-established practice is entitled, but also counsels that the opportunity of correction be seized at once, before state and federal laws and practices have been adjusted to embody it,” South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Overruling Smith and Burns now and simply following the plain language of the bindover statutes would provide a more workable, bright-line rule that would not require judgment calls regarding whether an adult-court charge is sufficiently rooted in the acts alleged in the juvenile complaint so as to give the adult court jurisdiction. And because this court‘s holdings in Smith and Burns can amount to jurisdictional bars, if prosecutors and adult-court judges determine incorrectly that charges may be prosecuted in adult court, the consequence is that all the time and resources put into any adult-court proceedings on those charges are wasted. Lastly, overruling Smith and Burns would not affect any reliance interests. No juvenile would base his or her decision to commit offenses on the possibility that a juvenile-court judge would find no probable cause regarding the offenses or that a prosecutor would allege in the juvenile complaint some but not all of the offenses for which the state would seek to prosecute the juvenile as an adult.
{60} Consequently, I would overrule Smith and Burns.
III. Applying the Correct Law to the Facts of This Case
{61} Applying former
{62} Consequently, the court of appeals erred in holding that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to convict Williams of tampering with evidence.
IV. Conclusion
{63} Under the bindover statutes in effect prior to the amendments in 2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288, when a juvenile‘s case was transferred from juvenile court for prosecution in adult court, the adult court had subject-matter jurisdiction to
{64} For these reasons, I concur in this court‘s judgment reversing the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and remanding this matter to that court for it to review any assignments of error that it did not consider in the first instance.
DEWINE and WELBAUM, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General; and Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Lauren Hammersmith and Victoria Ferry, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellee.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. Van and Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor‘s Office.