State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
Timothy J. McKenna, for Defendant-Appellant.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Rudy Williams appeals his conviction for trafficking in marijuana. According to Williams, there is no evidence that he possessed the marijuana that officers recovered from an SUV. We hold that the state established Williams’s constructive possession of the marijuana where evidence showed that officers found items consistent with drug trafficking on Williams’s person and a large quantity of marijuana inside the vehicle driven by Williams, which was readily accessible from the driver’s seat.
{¶2} Williams also argues that a review of the record demonstrates that his sentence is inconsistent with the principles and purposes of felony sentencing. But we lack authority under
I. Facts and Procedure
{¶3} The state charged Williams with trafficking between 200 to 1,000 grams of marijuana in the vicinity of a school or juvenile in violation of
{¶4} At trial, Hamilton County Probation Department electronic-monitoring-unit (“EMU“) employee Nick Minnich explained that he was assigned to supervise Williams, who was “out on bond on another charge.” Minnich testified that he and other officers visited Williams’s residence in August 2021. Officers watched as Williams parked an SUV in the driveway. The officers’ search of the SUV returned two bags of marijuana from the rear floorboard and a digital scale. The parties stipulated that the two bags held 448 and 201.5 grams of marijuana.
{¶6} The jury found Williams guilty of both possessing and trafficking in marijuana. Following his sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a 12-month term of incarceration for marijuana trafficking and merged the marijuana-possession count into the trafficking count. The trial court ordered that 12-month sentence to run consecutively to his sentences “IN CASES B-2100707, B-2106556, AND B-2205500.”
{¶7} Williams appeals in three assignments of error.
II. Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
{¶8} Williams argues his first two assignments of error together, asserting that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction and that his conviction was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Williams concedes that the police recovered marijuana from the SUV he was driving. But he claims that the state failed to prove that he possessed the marijuana.
{¶9} A sufficiency challenge requires a review of “‘the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” State v. Marshall, 191 Ohio App.3d 444, 2010-Ohio-5160, 946 N.E.2d 762, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. To reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence, we must view “the evidence in a light most
{¶10} A manifest-weight challenge tests “the credibility of the evidence presented.” State v. Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020282, 2003-Ohio-1185, ¶ 5. To reverse a conviction as against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must review the record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any evidentiary conflicts, and conclude that the jury “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 7.
The evidence established Williams’s constructive possession of the marijuana
{¶11}
{¶12} Under
{¶13} At issue here is whether the evidence established that Williams constructively possessed the marijuana. To establish constructive possession, there must be evidence of a defendant’s “knowledge of an illegal substance or goods and the ability to exercise dominion or control over the substance or the premises on which the substance is found.” State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98183 and 98184, 2013-Ohio-484, ¶ 18. Further, “ownership need not be proven to establish constructive possession.” State v. Curry, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25384, 2013-Ohio-5454, ¶ 18, citing State v. Fry, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23211, 2007-Ohio-3240, ¶ 47.
{¶14} While a defendant’s mere presence alone will not establish constructive possession, a defendant’s “proximity to the object may constitute some evidence of constructive possession.” State v. Kingsland, 177 Ohio App.3d 655, 2008-Ohio-4148, 895 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). Presence, “coupled with another factor or factors probative of dominion or control over the contraband, may establish constructive possession.” Id.; see State v. Devaughn, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180586, 2020-Ohio-651, ¶ 33.
{¶15} For instance, a driver’s knowledge of controlled substances in a vehicle may be inferred “where police recovered drugs from the floor behind the driver’s seat.” Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-020282, 2003-Ohio-1185, at ¶ 11; see State v. Trembly, 137 Ohio App.3d 134, 141, 738 N.E.2d 93 (8th Dist.2000) (“the crack cocaine
{¶16} EMU officers watched Williams, who was the only person in the vehicle, park and exit from the SUV. Minnich testified that Williams had been ticketed twice while behind the wheel of that SUV. After Williams exited from the SUV, they searched the vehicle and recovered a digital scale, a small bag of marijuana, and “two bags of marijuana on the backseat floor within arm‘s reach of the driver‘s side.” Williams stipulated that those bags held a total of 649.5 grams of marijuana. EMU officers searched Williams and recovered two cell phones and $800 in small denominations. Minnich, drawing on his training and experience, explained that digital scales are used to “measure out narcotics,” and that both multiple cell phones and large amounts of currency in small denominations are indicative of drug trafficking.
{¶17} Williams’s repeated use of the car establishes his dominion and control over the vehicle where the marijuana was discovered. The jury could reasonably infer Williams’s awareness of the marijuana’s presence. First, the marijuana was easily accessible by Williams as he drove the SUV. Second, the jury could infer Williams’s awareness of the marijuana based on his carrying multiple cell phones and a large quantity of cash in small denominations, which are consistent with drug trafficking.
{¶18} Williams emphasizes the absence of any cell phone data or DNA test results connecting him to the marijuana to argue that we should vacate or reverse his conviction, relying on our opinion in Devaughn, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180586, 2020-Ohio-651. In Devaughn, the state failed to establish Darris Devaughn‘s
In this case, the car where the drugs were found was not registered to Devaughn. There was no testimony that he had ever driven the car or possessed the keys to the car. The officers who saw Devaughn lean into the car did not testify, so the record contains no evidence regarding how far he leaned into the car, how long he leaned into the car, or whether he made any furtive movements while leaning into the car. The state did not present any DNA or fingerprint evidence connecting him to the center console where the drugs were found or connecting him to the drugs and scale that were found in the console. Finally, the state did not present any evidence that Devaughn placed any items into the car or removed any items from the car.
Id. at ¶ 35.
{¶19} But the evidence in Devaughn is readily distinguishable from the evidence in this case. Williams drove the SUV several times, the marijuana sat on the rear floorboard within an arm‘s reach of the driver’s seat, and officers found evidence of drug trafficking on Williams’s person. Thus, unlike in Devaughn, forensic testing is not critical to establish Williams’s constructive possession of the marijuana.
{¶20} In sum, the readily-accessible marijuana near the driver’s seat in the SUV driven by Williams combined with other evidence of drug-related activity found on Williams’s person established his constructive possession over the marijuana. And following an independent review of the record, we hold that Williams’s conviction is
Williams’s sentence was within the statutory range
{¶21} In his third assignment of error, Williams maintains that the trial court erred by imposing a 12-month sentence, because, as he argues, the record does not support the trial court‘s findings. In Williams’s view, a review of the record under
{¶22}
{¶23} Under
{¶24} Williams does not argue that the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing under
III. Conclusion
{¶25} We overrule Williams’s three assignments of error and affirm his conviction.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.