State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
Pamela C. Childers, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.
Michael M. Ater, Ross County Prosecutor, and Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Assistant Prosecutor, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
McFarland, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Pernell E. Williams, appeals the decision of the Ross County Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of aggravated possession of drugs. Williams argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. His argument is unwarranted. During the incident in question, the officer properly detained and patted-down Williams under the authority of Terry v. Ohio. Further, the doctrine of “plain feel” gave the officer the necessary probable cause to conduct the subsequent
I. Facts
{¶2} In June 2009, State Highway Patrol Trooper Nick Lewis, conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Williams. In addition to Williams, two other mеn were in the car, a Mr. Donahoe and a Mr. Murphy.1 Lewis called for backup, including a canine unit which arrived shortly thereafter. While checking Murphy‘s Michigan ID card, Lewis placed him in his patrol car, but he allowed Williams and Donahoe to remain in their vehicle. Once the canine unit and other officers arrived at the scene, the canine officer conducted a drug check around the vehicle. The canine subsequently alerted to the presence of drugs.
{¶3} After the positive drug alert, officers removed Donahoe and Williams from their vehicle. During his pat-down of Williams, Trooper Lewis felt the рresence of a small, round object between Williams’ buttocks. Lewis believed it was a package containing drugs, but due to safety concerns he did not remove the object at that time. Lewis then placed Williams in restraints and put him in his cruiser.
{¶4} Lewis then searched Murphy, and discovered a baggie containing white powder. After finding the baggie, Lewis handcuffed
{¶5} Williams was subsequently indicted under
II. Assignment of Error
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION FOURTEEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
III. Standard of Review
{¶6} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶8. In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questiоns of fact and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972, citing State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583. Accordingly, in our review, we are bound to accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Guysinger (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 594, 621 N.E.2d 726. Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deferenсe to the trial court‘s conclusion, whether
IV. Legal Analysis
{¶7} We first note that the legality of the initial traffic stop is not in dispute and is not an issue in the current matter. Rather, Williams’ assignment of error is based on two arguments 1) there were no articulable facts to justify Lewis’ pat-down of Williams; 2) even if the pat-down was warranted, Lewis did nоt have probable cause as a result of that pat-down to arrest Williams. For the following reasons, we disagree.
{¶8} The
{¶9} In Terry v. Ohio, (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, the Supreme Court ruled that one exception to the Fоurth Amendment warrant
{¶10} Additionally, to pat-down an individual during a Terry stop, the officer must have reason to believe the individual is armed. ” * * * [T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dаngerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue
{¶11} In the instant matter, and despite Williams’ arguments to the contrary, we find that Trooper Lewis’ pat-down constituted a valid application of the Terry doctrine. As already noted, a canine unit was called to the scene and alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. Ohio courts have determined that such canine checks of the exterior of a vehicle do not constitute a search within the meaning of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 12 Dist. No. CA2009-08-014, 2010-Ohio-1523, at ¶22. Accordingly, before conducting a canine check, there need not be a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Further, it is well established that once a canine has positively alerted to the scent of drugs in the vehicle, police have probable cause to search it. See, e.g., State v. Dewitt, 2nd Dist. No. 23735, 2010-Ohio 6476, at ¶45; State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. No. CA2009-12-307, 2010-Ohio-5808, at ¶58.
{¶13} We also find that Lewis’ subsequent pat-down of Williams was fully justified under Terry. Ohio courts have recognized that people involved in illegal drug activity are often armed and officers have a right to pat-down those people for their protection. “The right to frisk is virtually automatic when individuals are suspected of committing a crime, like drug trafficking, for which they are likely to be armed.” Evans at 413. Accordingly, we find that both Williams’ detention and pat-down were properly conducted under the authority of Terry v. Ohio. We now turn to the second part of our analysis, whether or not Lewis had probable cause for Williams’ arrest.
{¶14} As previously stated, when Lewis patted-dоwn Williams, he discovered a suspicious object in the rear of his pants. “Although Terry limits the scope of the search to weapons, the discovery of other contraband during a Terry search will not necessarily preclude its admissibility.” State v. Hansard, 4th Dist. No. 07CA3177, 2008-Ohio-3349, at ¶30. The United
{¶15} We have approved the application of the “plаin feel” doctrine in circumstances very similar to the case sub judice. In State v. Hansard, supra, a police officer made a vehicle stop, removed the defendant, and patted him down for safety reasons. During the pat down, the officer located a tennis ball-sized object on the inside of the defendant‘s thigh. The оfficer removed the object which proved to be packets of crack cocaine. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to remove the object and arrest him. In overruling the defendant‘s argument, we determined that the nature of the object as
{¶16} We further stated in Hansard that determining probable cause involves a legal conclusion and, thus, requires de novo review. Id. at ¶35. Additionally, we stated there is probable cause for a search when an officer has a reasonable suspicion “that is sufficiently strong to warrant a prudent person in believing that thе place to be searched contains evidence of a crime.” Id., citing State v. Williams, 11th Dist. No. 2003-T-0071, 2004-Ohio-6337, at ¶16. Finally, in determining probable cause, courts must “look to the totality of the facts and circumstances, including a police officer‘s specialized knowledge.” Hansard at ¶35, citing State v. Jones, 4th Dist. No. 03CA61, 2004-Ohio-7280, at ¶40.
{¶17} In the case sub judice, though the trial court found that Lewis unquestionably had the right to pat-down Williams, it did not think that locating the object during the pat-down established probable cause. The court stated, “Based solely upon the feel of the hard object, this Court
{¶18} It was immediately apparent to Lewis that the object was contraband from more than just the “feel of the hard object.” The first and most obvious indicator was that the canine had alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle while Williams was still inside. As such, Lewis had a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs were in the vicinity. Next was the physiсal characteristics and the location of the object itself. At the suppression hearing, Lewis stated that it was a hard, golf ball-like object located between Williams’ buttocks. When asked about his opinion as to what the object was, Lewis testified that “I believed it was some form of narcotic, аn illegal drug. * * * Based on my experience. I‘ve had several stops that have went that way where I found something in the rear of someone‘s pants, and it‘s always been an illegal drug.” Thus, Lewis’ specialized knowledge also enabled him to form a reasonable suspicion as to the nature of the object.
{¶19} Lewis did not remove the object at the time of its discovery due to safety concerns. “I prefer that the defendant, or the subject at the time
{¶20} The crux of Williams’ argument is that, despite Lewis’ testimony to the contrary, Williams was placed under arrest the moment he was handcuffed and placed in back of the cruiser. Williams argues that because Lewis lacked probable cause at that point, the drug evidence must be suppressed. However, we do not find it necessary to determine the exact moment of Williams’ arrest. Even assuming that Williams is correct and he was functionally under arrest immediately following the pat-down, our “plain feel” analysis related above demonstrates that Lewis did, in fact, have the necessary probable cause.
V. Conclusion
{¶21} After reviewing the record below, we find that Trooper Lewis was justified in detaining and patting down Williams under the authority of Terry v. Ohio. Further, under these particular facts and circumstances, it was immediately apparent that the object Lewis discovered during the pat-down was contraband. As such, there was probable cause for the search, and the trial court‘s decision to overrule Williams’ motion to suppress was correct. Accordingly, we overrule Williams’ sole assignment of error.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the Appellee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds therе were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpоse of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will tеrminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Harsha, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY:
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the datе of filing with the clerk.