State v. WigginsState v. Wiggins
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Judges Baime
The opinion of the court was delivered by BAIME, J.A.D.
A jury found defendant guilty of possession of cocaine (
On appeal, defendant contends (1) his motion for a new trial was improperly denied, (2) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the hearing on his motion for a new trial, (3) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence, (4) his custodial statements were involuntary and should have been excluded, (5) his prior convictions were remote and should not have been admitted for impeachment purposes, (6) the trial court erred by refusing to sever the count charging possession of a firearm by a person convicted of robbery, (7) the prosecutor‘s delay in supplying him with a certificate of operability respecting the firearm found in his possession denied him a fair trial, (8) “other crimes” evidence was erroneously admitted, (9) his automobile was improperly seized, and (10) the sеntences imposed were manifestly excessive. We agree that the trial court erred by compelling defendant to represent himself in his motion for a new trial. Defendant‘s remaining arguments (points three through ten) clearly lack merit.
I.
The facts were hotly disputed at trial. The State‘s evidence disclosed that on November 17, 1992, police officers from Atlantic City and Galloway Township obtained a warrant from a Superior Court judge to search the premises located at 617 County Boulevard in Galloway. The residence at that location belonged to defendant‘s parents. In addition to authorizing a search for “[a]ny controlled dangerous substance,” the warrant specifically authorized the search of “Leroy Doe” and “Peanut Doe.”
The warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit submitted by Detective Brett Foster of the Atlantic City police. In that affidavit, Foster related that during the week of November 3 to November 9, 1992, he had received information from an informant, whose reliability had been demonstrated in the past, that narcotics were being sold at the residence by “two black males in their 40‘s
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on the evening of November 17, the officers executed the warrant. As they approached the driveway, they observed defendant and two other people attempting to leave in a 1977 Cadillac. Several officers stopped the vehicle, ordered the occupants to exit, and searched them. The search of defendant‘s person yielded two packagеs of cocaine from one of his pants pockets.
While the vehicle‘s occupants were being searched, a second group of officers forcibly entered the house.1 The occupants in the house included defendant‘s elderly parents, several children, and Isaac. Once inside, the police handcuffed the adult malеs and directed all of the occupants into the living room. Defendant and the other two suspects seized outside were also brought into the house and confined to the living room. As soon as all were present, one of the detectives verbally informed the occupants of their Miranda2 rights.
The police then proceeded to question Isaac in one of the bedrooms. Following that interrogation, the officers brought
Defendant was then returned to the living room, and the police conducted a thorough search of the house. In one of the bedrooms, they found a yellow pad which was subsequently identified through expert testimony as a drug ledger. In a second bedroom, the police recovered a quantity of empty glassine baggies used for packaging drugs and a loaded .45 caliber Ruger handgun hidden under a mattress. After unloading the weapon, one of the officers took it into the living room and asked the occupants about its ownership. Defendant initially denied ownership of the gun. When no one else claimed it, however, the officer threatened to arrest all of the occupants and charge them with unlawful possession of a handgun. At that point, defendant acknowledged that the gun was his. Defendant admitted he had no permit for the weapon and claimed to have purchased it recently from a Hispanic male in Atlantic City for two bags of heroin. Testimony at trial revеaled that the weapon had been stolen in August 1992 from an apartment in Paterson, New Jersey.
Defendant‘s witnesses at trial, including his parents, nephew, and a close friend, claimed that the police never informed the occupants of the house of their Miranda rights. In addition, they contended that defendant was never taken into a bedroom for individual quеstioning.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied being informed of his rights and making any inculpatory statements concerning the drugs. He also claimed the police had no warrant when they entered the premises and had planted the cocaine recovered from his person while he was outside the house. He further asserted the police found the empty glassine baggies in an abandoned vehicle in the backyard. Defendant disclaimed any
II.
We first consider defendant‘s argument that he was unconstitutionаlly compelled to represent himself at the hearing on his motion for a new trial. Following the guilty verdict, defendant drafted a motion for a new trial and filed it with the court. The motion raised twenty-two claims of error, including several allegations that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. At the hearing, defense counsel informed thе court that he could not represent defendant on the motion because the efficacy of his legal representation had been challenged. The trial judge then asked defendant if he wished to proceed on the motion pro se. Defendant replied that he wanted to be represented by counsel, although not necessarily by the attorney who had represented him throughout the trial. After being informed by his attorney that no one from the Public Defender‘s Office would agree to represent him under the circumstances, defendant asked the court to “hear the motion on the basis of the... record that [was] before [it] ...” The judge then proceeded to deny each of defendant‘s claims. At no time did the court explain to defendant the implications of proceeding pro se or attempt to determine if defendant understood those implications. We conclude that defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel.
Both the federal and State constitutions guarantee the right to an attorney in a criminal case.
Perhaps of lesser practical significance in the constellation of constitutional values is the right of self-representation. To be sure, this right has deep roots in the common law. See State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344, 357, 635 A.2d 562 (App.Div.) (citing 3 Halsbury‘s Laws of England § 1141 at 624-25 (4th ed. 1973)), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 468, 640 A.2d 850 (1994). The notion of compulsory counsel was foreign to the founders of the Constitution, and “those who wrote the Bill of Rights [] surely ... understood the inestimable worth of free choice.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 581 (1975). The fact remains, however, that an accused who serves as his own lawyer relinquishes the traditional benefits derived from professional representation by an attorney and inherent in the concept of a fair trial. State v. Gallagher, 274 N.J. Super. 285, 295, 644 A.2d 103 (App.Div. 1994). Although a defendant‘s choice to represent himself “must be honored out of `that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law[,]\‘” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1064, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 363 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)), our experience indicates that in most criminal prosecutions defendants can better defend with an attorney‘s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.
In light of the importance of counsel in our “accusatorial system[,]” Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216, “the courts `indulge [in] every reasonable presumption against the waiver\’ of this constitutional right.” State v. Gallagher, 274 N.J. Super. at 295, 644 A.2d 103 (quoting State v. Guerin, 208 N.J. Super. 527, 533, 506 A.2d 743 (App.Div. 1986)). Our Supreme Court has “`imposed the most rigorous [requirements] on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant, and the procedures that must be observed, before permitting him to waive his right to [an attorney].\‘” State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. at 510, 608 A.2d 317 (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d 261, 276 (1988)). We recognize that most of our decisions on the subject relate to a purported waiver prior to thе commencement of the trial. See, e.g., State v. Roth, 289 N.J. Super. 152, 673 A.2d 285 (App.Div. 1996); State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344, 635 A.2d 562; State v. Slattery, 239 N.J. Super. 534, 571 A.2d 1314; State v. Kordower, 229 N.J. Super. 566, 552 A.2d 218 (App.Div. 1989); State v. Lach, 213 N.J. Super. 466, 517 A.2d 882 (App.Div. 1986); State v. Guerin, 208 N.J. Super. 527, 506 A.2d 743; State v. Cole, 204 N.J. Super. 618, 499 A.2d 1030 (App.Div. 1985); State v. Abbondanzo, 201 N.J. Super. 181, 492 A.2d 1077 (App.Div. 1985). Consequently, the types of information and warnings that must be conveyed to a defendant as prerequisites for a knowing and intelligent waiver, as described in our decisions, have been tailored in recognition of that fact. See State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. at 359, 635 A.2d 562.
To that extent, the precise issue here, which involves a purported waiver of the right to сounsel for the purpose of arguing a motion for a new trial following a jury‘s verdict, is one of first impression. We recognize that the burdens facing a defendant at this late stage of the proceedings might not be as
The trial court did not follow this course. No attempt was made to determine whether defendant understood the implications of waiving his right to an attorney. In essence, defendant was told that if he pursued his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel he would be required to argue his motion himself without the benefit of an attorney. Defendant was placed in the untenable position of asserting one constitutional right at the expense of another.
We nevertheless recognize the trial court‘s dilemma. Defendant‘s attack upon the competence of his trial attorney left the lawyer facing an irreconcilable conflict of interest, at least respecting the Sixth Amendment claim. The problem was accentuated by the Public Defender‘s rule that a client does not have the right to choose which staff or poоl attorney is to represent him. We do not criticize that rule. Indeed, unreasonable and unsupported attempts by disgruntled defendants to discharge their Public Defender lawyers come to us with numbing frequency. The Sixth Amendment and our Constitution guarantee that an individual charged with a crime has the right to an attorney. Our organic law does not command, however, that he be given the attorney of his choice. See State v. Kordower, 229 N.J. Super. at 576, 552 A.2d 218. Nor does it require that his legal representation be changed
We suspect that the issue presented by this case may be of a recurrent nature. We thus recommend that in the future the trial court should sever the defendant‘s claims of ineffective assistance, preserving them for post-conviction relief proceedings in which a different attorney can be assigned under
III.
The Attorney General argues that a remand is unnecessary because all of the twenty-two contentions advanced in defendant‘s
We emphasize the limited contours of the remand hearing we have ordered. At the outset of this opinion, we listed defendant‘s additional arguments and found that they lacked merit and did not require further discussion.
The matter is remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.