STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, - vs - BRITTANY L. WIELAND, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NOS. CA2015-04-036 CA2015-08-067
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO CLERMONT COUNTY
1/25/2016
2016-Ohio-261
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT Case No. 2014 TRC 19584
Matthew T. Ernst, 212 West 8th Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendant-appellant
RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Brittany L. Wieland, appeals her conviction and sentence in the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas for operating a motor vehicle under the influence (OVI). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On November 5, 2014, Wieland was charged with a red light violation and OVI in violation of
{¶ 3} The results of the urine test were reported to the state on November 24, 2014. On March 5, 2015, Wieland was charged with OVI in violation of
{¶ 4} Wieland now appeals, raising a single assignment of error for review.
{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO DISMISS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS.
{¶ 7} Wieland argues in her sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in not granting her motion to dismiss because her right to a speedy trial was violated when the charge of OVI pursuant to
{¶ 8} Appellate review of speedy-trial issues involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Riley, 162 Ohio App.3d 730, 2005-Ohio-4337, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). The appellate court must defer to the trial court‘s findings of fact if those findings are supported by competent, credible evidence, but the appellate court must independently review whether the trial court properly applied the law to those facts. Id.
{¶ 9} A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Ramey, 132 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 14. “States have the authority to prescribe reasonable periods in which a trial must be held that are consistent with constitutional requirements.” Id. Ohio has exercised this authority by enacting
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} Wieland argues that the charges filed on March 5, 2015 were based upon facts known at the time the original charges were filed, and thus the speedy trial clock began to run on November 5, 2014. If the speedy trial clock began at that point, then 90 days would have passed before the charge on March 5, 2015. Wieland would then be entitled to a dismissal of that offense.
{¶ 12} We find that the trial court correctly ruled that the speedy trial clock did not begin until March 5, 2015. The charge filed on that date was based on new facts that were not available at the time of the original charges. While the original charges were filed on November 5, 2014, the state did not obtain the facts necessary to file the charge pursuant to
{¶ 13} In similar circumstances, this court has previously found that lab reports confirming the chemical makeup of a substance constitute new facts not available to the state at the time of the original arrest regardless of an officer‘s belief as to whether a pill was a controlled substance. State v. Schuster, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2015-05-040 and CA2015-05-041, 2015-Ohio-4818. The same analysis applies in our finding that lab reports confirming the blood alcohol level of an offender constitute new facts not available to the state at the time of the original arrest regardless of an officer‘s belief as to an offender‘s intoxication.
{¶ 14} Thus, the speedy trial clock on the charge of OVI pursuant to
{¶ 15} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, J., concurs.
PIPER, P.J., concurs separately.
PIPER, P.J., concurring separately.
{¶ 16} While I concur with the judgment, I write separately to encourage the state to file new charges as soon as reasonably possible upon the receipt of new information. Inherent in one‘s speedy trial rights lies the responsibility of the state and law enforcement to perform their professional duties in a timely manner so as to promote and protect the efficient administration of justice. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court, “the speedy-trial provision is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.” State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68 (1989).
{¶ 17} Law enforcement knew the lab results as of November 24, 2014. Yet the state waited over three months to file the new charge. Neither the public nor the law considers these rights any less significant because the new charges to be filed are misdemeanors.
{¶ 18} Ohio law is clear that an unreasonable delay between the commission of an offense and the bringing of charges can, under certain circumstances, constitute a violation of due process of law guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. State v. Oberding, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-09-101, 2012-Ohio-3047, ¶ 31. The state cannot, of its own accord, suspend statutory or constitutional speedy trial rights indefinitely while waiting for investigatory results necessary to bring new charges. However, a reasonable time necessary to obtain results and act upon the new information must be accorded the state. Just as a trial court cannot toll a defendant‘s speedy trial rights indefinitely, and must instead respond to motions within a reasonable time, the state should bring new charges within a reasonable time after obtaining investigatory results so as to avoid unnecessary delays. State v. Ford, 180 Ohio App.3d 636, 639, 2009-Ohio-146 (1st Dist.).
{¶ 19} Regarding the case sub judice, the circumstances indicate that the state had the lab results for approximately three months before bringing the new charge. While some may argue this length of time unreasonable for the filing of a new misdemeanor charge, it is not so excessive as to be unreasonable and cause a violation of Weiland‘s speedy trial rights. Still, I write separately to encourage the state to file new charges as soon as reasonably possible after necessary investigatory information has been obtained in order to abide by the spirit of speedy trial rights guaranteed to all.