State v. WatsonState v. Watson
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas
Trial Court No. 2019 CR 00601
O P I N I O N
Judgment: Affirmed.
Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Shelley M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Michael P. Ciccone, 4822 Market Street, Suite 230, P.O. Box 4865, Youngstown, OH 44512 (For Defendant-Appellant).
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Crystal Watson, appeals her prison sentence imposed by the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas after she was found guilty by a jury for aggravated possession of drugs, resisting arrest, illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia, and illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility.
{¶2} Ms. Watson contends that the trial court acted contrary to law by not fully evaluating the purposes and principles of felony sentencing pursuant to
{¶3} After a review of the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court’s sentence of imprisonment. The trial court explicitly stated both at the sentencing hearing and in the judgment entry that it considered the principles and purposes of
{¶4} Finding Ms. Watson’s sole assignment of error to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶5} Ms. Watson was indicted by a grand jury on four counts: (1) aggravated possession of drugs, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of
{¶6} Ms. Watson’s charges arose from an incident in which she refused to leave her parents’ property when they were out of town. An employee of Ms. Watson’s father, Randy Brooks (“Mr. Brooks”), was watching the house and called the Ashtabula County Sheriff’s Department (“ACSD”). When Ms. Watson was unable to reach her parents, the sergeant asked her to leave. Ms. Watson refused and began to argue. When told she was being arrested for trespassing, she resisted arrest by struggling and pulling away. Methamphetamine and a glass pipe were discovered on her person during the routine inventory search upon her arrival to the jail. At some point, the ACSD contacted Mr. Brooks, who confirmed that Ms. Watson was not allowed on her parents’ premises and that she had been evicted for drug use.
{¶7} Although Ms. Watson had appointed counsel, she filed approximately 12 pro se motions and letters to the court throughout the history of the case, including a pro se notice of appeal before she was sentenced. Each time, the trial court denied her motion or letter in a judgment entry, which stated that a trial court cannot properly consider a defendant’s pro se motion when that defendant is represented by counsel and counsel does not join in the pro se motion. The case was tried to a jury, and Ms. Watson was found guilty on all counts.
{¶8} At the sentencing hearing, after Ms. Watson’s attorney spoke on her behalf, the court engaged Ms. Watson in a colloquy, questioning her filing of so many pro se motions despite the fact that she was aware they would be denied since she was
{¶9} At both the hearing and in its sentencing entry, the court stated that it “considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement, as well the principles and purposes of sentencing under
{¶10} After finding that count one (aggravated possession drugs) merged with count four (illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility), the trial court sentenced Ms. Watson to 45 days in jail on count two (resisting arrest) to run concurrent to 30 days in jail on count three (illegal use or
{¶11} Ms. Watson timely appealed, raising one assignment of error:
{¶12} “The trial court acted contrary to law by not fully evaluating all factors required when considering the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and when it took into consideration Defendant-Appellant’s procedural mechanisms and her pending undisposed cases for purposes of sentencing.”
Sentencing Standard of Review
{¶13} In her sole assignment of error, Ms. Watson contends the trial court acted contrary to law by failing to give due weight to all of the factors required pursuant to
{¶14} Thus, we apply the standard of review for felony sentences, which is governed by
{¶15} “The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
{¶16} “The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s standard of review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
{¶18} “(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.”
{¶19} “‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶20} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently clarified in State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, that contrary to the “dicta” in Marcum,
{¶21} Thus, our review of Ms. Watson’s argument that the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of
R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12
{¶22}
{¶23}
{¶24} To “achieve those purposes,” the court “shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.” Id.
{¶25}
{¶26} Ms. Watson specifically argues that the trial court improperly considered pending felonies and her repeated filing of pro se motions as a basis for finding her not amenable to community control. She also contends the trial court failed to consider her lack of prior felony convictions, her successful completion of a 36-hour twice weekly class through the Lake Area Recovery Center, and her continued involvement with rehabilitative services.
{¶27} A review of the sentencing hearing transcript and judgment entry, however, reveals that the trial court explicitly stated it considered the principles and purposes of sentencing pursuant to
{¶28} The trial court possesses broad discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing within the statutory guidelines. State v. Phifer, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0010, 2020-Ohio-4694, ¶ 52;
{¶29} Moreover, the fact that Ms. Watson had pending felony charges that arose during the pendency of this case is directly related to “deterring the offender * * * from future crime” factor pursuant
{¶30} Further, we cannot say the trial court erred in noting that Ms. Watson repeatedly failed to follow the instructions of the court, the officers who arrested her, and the corporal who requested that she relinquish any drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in her possession before the court went on to consider the purposes and principles of
{¶32} Finding Ms. Watson’s assignment of error to be without merit, the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.