State v. WatsonState v. Watson
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Chris Brigdon, Thornville, Ohio, for Appellant.
Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecutor, and Jayme Hartley Fountain, Assistant Pickaway County Prosecutor, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} Quincy Watson, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs and one count of illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a detention facility or institution, both third-degree felony offenses. On appeal, Watson raises a single assignment of error contending that the proportionality of his sentence was inconsistent with the principles set forth in
FACTS
{¶2} On May 4, 2023, Watson was indicted on nine felony counts as follows:
Count One: Complicity to aggravated trafficking in drugs with specification in violation of
Count Two: Complicity to aggravated trafficking in drugs with specification in violation of
Count Three: Complicity to illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a detention facility or institution in violation of
Count Four: Engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of
Count Five: Complicity to trafficking in marihuana in violation of
Count Six: Complicity to trafficking in marihuana in violation of
Count Seven: Complicity to illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a detention
Count Eight: Complicity to aggravated trafficking in drugs with specification in violation of
Count Nine: Complicity to aggravated trafficking in drugs with specification in violation of
Watson initially entered pleas of not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded towards trial.
{¶3} Thereafter, Watson entered into plea negotiations with the State that resulted in him entering guilty pleas to an amended Count Two of the indictment, as well as Count Three of the indictment, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. More specifically, the trial court permitted Count Two of the indictment to be amended to charge Watson with complicity to aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of
{¶4} Watson was sentenced on October 25, 2023. Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court referenced its receipt and review of the pre-sentence investigation report that had been prepared. The report detailed the scheme in which Watson played a role whereby several inmates and nurses at the Pickaway Correctional Institution conspired together, in conjunction with Watson and several other people that were not incarcerated, to illegally convey drugs into the correctional facility. The pre-sentence investigation report also detailed Watson’s prior conviction for involuntary manslaughter and attendant prison sentence, as well as a long list of infractions committed while he was in prison for that offense.2 The trial court heard sentencing arguments by both Watson and the State. Defense counsel requested that Watson be sentenced to probation only, citing Watson’s limited role in the illegal conveyance scheme. The State argued that Watson
{¶5} The trial court ultimately sentenced Watson to 36-month prison terms on each count, to be served consecutively. Prior to imposing sentence, the following exchange took place between the court and Watson:
THE DEFENDANT: * * * I take full responsibility, you know, on the part that I played, you know, in this situation. Like I say, since I’ve been out, I’ve been trying to restore my life all the time I did from a juvenile, and I wish to continue to grow in his work and rebuild my life. Like I said, I take full responsibility.
THE COURT: Well, you received a substantial break in this case, Mr. Watson. As indicated by your attorney, when the State, for whatever reason, elected to reduce this from nine charges to two.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: So that’s the consideration. You got that from them, not me. When I look at what was going on down here, you know, when you send people to prison you anticipate they’re going to do their time and not continue to be active in crimes. And then you get in there and start this stuff. Not in my county.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: You know, I didn’t put those prisons in Pickaway County, but I have to deal with them. This just goes too far.
{¶6} The court then went on to impose the sentences, stating as follows:
The court has considered the record and the presentence report as prepared as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under
R.C. 2929.11 , and has balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors underR.C. 2929.12 , and finds the appropriate sentence in this case is thirty-six months on each of these, and that they be consecutive.
{¶7} The court further made the necessary consecutive-sentencing findings, including that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the offender, that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and the danger he posed to the public, and that the offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime. A sentencing entry was filed on October 27, 2023, and it is from that order that Watson filed his appeal, setting forth a single assignment of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. THE PROPORTIONALITY OF THE SENTENCE WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH [SIC]
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Watson contends that the proportionality of his sentence was inconsistent with the principles set forth in
{¶9} The State contends, on the other hand, that Watson’s sentences were not contrary to law because the trial court clearly considered the
Standard of Review
{¶10}
The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court‘s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶11} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Legal Analysis
{¶12} As set forth above, Watson contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court was inconsistent with the principles and purposes of felony sentencing as set forth under
{¶12}
(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public
from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both. (B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.
* * *
{¶13}
Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider the factors set forth in [divisions (B) through (F)] of this section * * * and, in addition, may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.
{¶14} ” ‘Because both
{¶15} Watson does not argue that the trial court failed to reference
{¶16} First, we must be mindful that ” ‘
”
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is notsupported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 .” Id. at ¶ 22, citing Jones at ¶ 31, 39. If we were to infer a sentence was contrary to law and vacate it merely because we did not believe the sentencing factors supported it, we would in effect be vacating a sentence based on our view that it is not supported by the record underR.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 .
{¶17} Further, this Court held in State v. Daniels that “a trial court’s statement in its sentencing entry that it considered the applicable statutory factors is sufficient to fulfill the court’s obligations under
{¶18} Here, the trial court stated, both at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry that it had considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing under
{¶19} Second, we also reject Watson’s argument that the sentences imposed by the trial court were inconsistent and disproportionate to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar crimes. This court recently considered a similar argument in State v. Goff, 2023-Ohio-4823, 232 N.E.3d 870 (4th Dist.). As observed in Goff, ”
” ‘ “[A]ny review must begin with the defendant producing a record for the trial court‘s consideration before the final sentence is imposed. As courts have long concluded, a defendant must raise [the consistency-in-sentencing] issue before the trial court and present some evidence, however minimal, in order to provide a starting point for analysis and to preserve the issue for appeal.” ’ ”
(Citations omitted.) Goff at ¶ 47, quoting Taylor at ¶ 29, quoting Adams at ¶ 46, in turn quoting Montanez-Roldon at ¶ 14.
{¶20} In Goff, trial counsel presented sentencing recommendations to the trial court in advance of sentencing. Here, no sentencing memorandums were provided to the trial court for consideration, nor were any consistency-in-sentencing arguments raised at the trial court level. Thus, Watson has failed to preserve this argument for appellate review.
{¶21} Finally, we note that here, a joint sentencing recommendation was not part of Watson’s plea agreement and thus, there was no joint sentencing recommendation provided to the trial court. Watson argued for probation, while the State appears to have argued for concurrent 24-month prison terms on each count. However, even if there had been a joint sentencing recommendation, “a ‘trial court is not bound by a [sentencing] recommendation.’ ” State v. Howard, 2017-Ohio-9392, 103 N.E.3d 108, ¶ 58 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Bailey, 5th Dist. Knox No. 05-CA-13, 2005-Ohio-5329, ¶ 15. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence exceeding that sought by the State.
{¶22} Accordingly, having found no merit in any of the arguments raised under Watson’s sole assignment of error, it is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Wilkin, J., concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.