State of Ohio v. Skyler Walker
Court of Appeals No. L-22-1032, L-22-1033
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICTW LUCAS COUNTY
January 18, 2023
2023-Ohio-140
Trial Court No. CR0202101997, CR0202101835
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, Brenda J. Madjalani and Lorrie J. Rendle, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.
MAYLE, J.
*****
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} In these consolidated appeals, the defendant-appellant, Skyler Walker, pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) and was convicted of abducting and feloniously assaulting his girlfriend. The Lucas County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Walker to serve a consecutive sentence, totaling a minimum of eight and one-half (8.5) years to a maximum of eleven and one-
II. Background
{¶ 2} Walker was indicted in two separate cases, both involving the same victim, and the cases were heard together.
{¶ 3} In case No. CR-21-1835, the state alleged that Walker assaulted his girlfriend, B.C., and held her captive for several days. After her escape, B.C. was treated at a hospital for a brain bleed. On June 10, 2021, Walker was indicted on charges of felonious assault with a repeat violent offender specification and abduction. At his arraignment, Walker was appointed counsel and pled not guilty. He was released on bond and ordered to wear an electronic monitor and to have no contact with B.C.
{¶ 4} While out on bond, Walker removed his transmitter and absconded. He then assaulted B.C. again, this time causing her permanent physical, neurological, and psychological injuries. On July 7, 2021, Walker was indicted on a second charge of felonious assault (case No. CR-21-1997). Walker was appointed the same counsel as the first case and pled not guilty.
{¶ 5} Trial was set for November 29, 2021. On that date, the parties entered into an agreement whereby Walker entered a guilty plea, pursuant to Alford. In case No. CR-21-1835, Walker pled to abduction, in violation of
{¶ 6} The sentencing hearing was held on January 20, 2022, during which the court heard from Walker and his counsel, as well as the victim who asked that Walker receive the maximum sentence. The court also reviewed a victim impact statement, letters from both affected families, the PSI, and a December 29, 2021 report from Dr. Wynkoop at the Court Diagnostic and Treatment Center. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced Walker to serve 30 months in prison for the abduction offense and an indefinite term of a minimum of six years to a maximum of nine years for the felonious assault offense. The court ordered that the terms be served consecutively to one another, for a total sentence of a minimum of eight and one-half (8.5) years to a maximum of eleven and one-half (11.5) years in prison. Walker appealed and raises two assignments of error for our review:
First Assignment of Error: The trial court did not make the proper findings pursuant to
R.C. 2929.14(C) , prior to imposing a consecutive sentence.Second Assignment of Error: Appellant received ineffective assistance of Counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 10 of the Ohio Constitution .
III. Analysis
A. The trial court made all required findings before imposing consecutive sentences.
{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Walker argues that the trial court failed to make “the proper findings” before imposing consecutive sentences.
{¶ 8} We review a challenge to a felony sentence under
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court‘s findings under division (B) or (D) of section
2929.13 , division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section2929.14 , or division (I) of section2929.20 of the Revised Code , whichever, if any, is relevant;(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 10} When a trial court exercises that discretion under
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section
2929.16 ,2929.17 , or2929.18 of the Revised Code , or was under post-release control for a prior offense.(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct. (c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{¶ 11} In other words, to impose consecutive sentences, the court must find that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger that the offender poses to the public; and that (3)
{¶ 12} Here, the trial court made all of the required findings under
Now this court is ordering that those sentences be served consecutive with one another, and I‘m finding that consecutive sentences are necessary, both to protect the public in light of the prior history of this defendant, which I have recounted, as well as to punish him for his conduct, and the permanent injuries inflicted upon the victim. I‘m finding that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct, as well as the danger that he poses to the public.
I‘m further finding that these two multiple offenses were committed as part of a course of conduct that was continuing, that the harm caused by these two offenses was so great and unusual that no single sentence would adequately reflect the seriousness of his conduct and the trauma inflicted on the victim.
Further I find that his criminal history demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by this defendant. (1/20/2022 Tr. at 18-19).
{¶ 13} Thus, although the court was only required to find that one of the factors set forth in Section (C)(4)(a) though (c) applied, it found that two were applicable, specifically, Subsections (b) and (c). The trial court‘s findings are also reflected in the February 16, 2022 sentencing entries.
{¶ 14} Moreover, although the sentencing court “has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings,” it did so in this case. Bonnell at syllabus; see also Kubat at ¶ 33.
{¶ 15} Notably, although Walker claims that the court failed to “make[] the proper findings,” he fails to describe what exactly the trial court failed to do. And, based upon our review, we reach the opposite conclusion. As set forth above, we find that the trial court made all factual findings required by
{¶ 16} “[O]nce the trial court makes the factual findings required by [the statute] an appellate court may overturn the imposition of consecutive sentences only if it finds,
{¶ 17} Walker concedes that his sentence is not contrary to law. And, although he repeats several of the same arguments that he made at sentencing—i.e., Walker blames his criminal behavior on his “well documented” mental illness, insisting that he is in need of “beneficial mental healthcare treatment,” and claiming that the likelihood of receiving such treatment in prison is “nil“—he makes no effort to articulate (let alone demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence) why the record does not support the any of the
{¶ 18} We therefore find Walker‘s first assignment of error not well-taken.
B. Walker received effective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 19} To establish ineffective assistance, Walker must show (1) deficient performance, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, the proceeding‘s result would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. Trial counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance. Id.
{¶ 20} In his second assignment of error, Walker claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a competency evaluation and for failing to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI“). Competency refers to a defendant‘s
{¶ 21}
{¶ 22} The test for determining legal competency is “whether the defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.‘” State v. Lawson, 165 Ohio St.3d 445, 2021-Ohio-3566, 179 N.E.3d 1216, ¶ 49
{¶ 23} Here, Walker points to no “indicia of incompetency,” other than his “mental health issues,” specifically his “bipolar disorder.” But, “[a] trial court may not find a defendant incompetent to stand trial or plead guilty solely because he suffers from a mental illness or a learning or intellectual disability.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Garber, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-21-018, 2022-Ohio-3770, ¶ 12. A defendant suffering from an emotional, mental, or learning disability “may still possess the ability to understand the charges and proceedings against him or her and be able to assist in his or her defense.” Id. “The test for competency focuses entirely on the defendant‘s ability to understand the meaning of the proceedings against him and his ability to assist in his own defense, which can be satisfied regardless of the defendant‘s mental status or IQ.” Id. In
{¶ 24} Moreover, Walker points to no evidence from the record to even arguably suggest that he was incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings or to assist in his defense. And, upon our review, we find the very opposite to be true. That is, the record establishes that Walker was not only able to, he actually did participate in his own defense.
{¶ 25} For example, at a September 30, 2021 pretrial, Walker told the court that he “want[ed] all the evidence on the table,” specifically the “toxicology report” which, he claimed, would show that the victim was highly intoxicated at the time of the alleged assault(s) and also the “inaccuracy of * * * her statements.” Walker also asserted his intention not to waive his right to a speedy trial, and he expressed concern that the filing of unnecessary motions by his trial counsel might “stall” the process and delay him from his “three kids [at home].” Walker then instructed his counsel “on the record” to file “no motions * * * unless it‘s a motion [for] dismissal due to lack of evidence.” Walker added that, while he might not have a law license, he did have “common sense.” Walker‘s comments indicate a rational, informed thought process.
{¶ 27} Similarly, Walker fails to show prejudice resulting from trial counsel‘s failure to request a competency exam before entering a plea. To show prejudice, Walker must show that there is a reasonable probability that an evaluation “would have revealed that he was incompetent to stand trial.” Lawson at ¶ 104, citing Alexander v. Dugger, 841 F.2d 371, 375 (11th Cir.1988). Here, Walker fails to present any such evidence, including any opinion from Dr. Wynkoop—who evaluated him after, but in close proximity to, the plea hearing. It is reasonable to conclude that Dr. Wynkoop explored the issue of Walker‘s competency. See, e.g., State v. Davenport, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106143, 2018-Ohio-2933, ¶ 28. Given the absence of an opinion from Dr. Wynkoop that
{¶ 28} Finally, we turn to Walker‘s argument that his counsel was deficient for failing to enter an NGRI plea on his behalf.
{¶ 29} “A person is ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ relative to a charge of an offense only if the person proves [by a preponderance of the evidence] that at the time of the commission of the offense, the person did not know, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the person‘s acts.”
{¶ 30} Where facts and circumstances indicate that an NGRI plea would have had a reasonable probability of success, it is ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to enter the plea. (Citation omitted.) State v. Anaya, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-06-1375, 2008-Ohio-1853, ¶ 29. Where, however, facts indicate that counsel was pursuing a reasonable strategy in not so pleading, or where the likelihood of success for the plea is low, the decision is not unreasonable. Id., citing State v. Twyman, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19086, 2002-Ohio-3558 (defendant had mental health disorder but no reasonable probability he would have been acquitted by reason of insanity); State v. Martin, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2003-06-065, CA2003-06-066, 2004-Ohio-702 (same); State v. Robinson, 6th Dist. No. L-03-1307, 2005-Ohio-5266, ¶ 33 (psychological evaluations and
{¶ 31} Here, Walker argues that trial counsel should have entered an NGRI plea because counsel was aware that he committed “inexplicably violent” offenses while he was “off his [mental health] medication” and “doing street drugs.”
{¶ 32} Walker‘s intoxication and drug use is not enough to demonstrate that he failed to recognize the wrongfulness of his actions. See State v. Gilmore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103479, 2016-Ohio-4697, ¶ 10 (the defendant knew the wrongfulness of her actions even though the defendant “admitted to being a daily cocaine abuser” and “also admitted to smoking the drug K2 prior to committing the offense“). Walker‘s voluntary consumption and abuse of drugs “neither excuses his heinous crime nor supports his argument that an NGRI plea would have been successful.” Davenport at ¶ 35.
{¶ 33} Moreover, while the record establishes that Walker had long-standing mental health problems, it does not show that he was unable to understand the difference between right and wrong. It is not enough that Walker had been diagnosed with a mental health condition. Rather, he must demonstrate that his mental defect somehow caused him to be unaware that it was wrong to feloniously assault and abduct the victim. State v. May, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070290, 2008-Ohio-1731, ¶ 7. In this case, there is simply no evidence to that effect.
{¶ 35} Additionally, Walker cannot show prejudice because there is no evidence in the record—including any opinion from Dr. Wynkoop—that, if counsel had pursued an NGRI plea, that he would have been found not guilty. “The failure to do a futile act cannot be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor could such a failure be prejudicial.” Id. at ¶ 23.
{¶ 36} Because an NGRI plea did not have a reasonable probability of success, trial counsel‘s failure to pursue an NGRI plea was reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 37} For all these reasons, Walker‘s second assignment of error is found not well-taken.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 38} The first assignment of error is not well-taken because the trial court made the proper findings under
{¶ 40} Accordingly, the February 16, 2022 judgments of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed. Pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.