STATE OF OHIO v. DWIGHT R. VAUGHN
CASE NO. CA2014-05-012
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO FAYETTE COUNTY
3/9/2015
[Cite as State v. Vaughn, 2015-Ohio-828.]
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 13CRI00288
Steven H. Eckstein, 1208 Bramble Avenue, Washington, C.H., Ohio 43160, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
S. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Dwight R. Vaughn, appeals from the decision of the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On September 6, 2013, the Fayette County Sheriff‘s Office received several anonymous tips from callers reporting an active methamphetamine lab at Vaughn‘s home
{¶ 3} After receiving these anonymous tips, Gene Ivers, the Chief Probation Officer with the Washington Court House Municipal Court, as well as several deputies with the Fayette County Sheriff‘s Office, conducted a search of Vaughn‘s home. During this search, the deputies discovered evidence of an active “one pot” methamphetamine lab within the home. Vaughn was also seen exiting the house when the deputies arrived at the scene. Vaughn was subsequently arrested and charged with, among other crimes, illegal manufacture of drugs in violation of
{¶ 4} On March 14, 2014, Vaughn filed a motion to suppress, which, after holding a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied. In so holding, the trial court found the “search was reasonable and lawful search of a probationer‘s residence by his probation officer and not otherwise constitutionally infirm.” The matter then proceeded to a jury trial. Vaughn was ultimately found guilty and sentenced to serve a mandatory five-year prison term and ordered to pay a mandatory $7,500 fine.
{¶ 5} Vaughn now appeals from the trial court‘s decision denying his motion to suppress, raising a single assignment of error for review.
{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT‘S PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
{¶ 7} In his single assignment of error, Vaughn argues the trial court erred by denying
{¶ 8} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Gray, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-176, 2012-Ohio-4769, ¶ 15, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence in order to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-11-235, 2013-Ohio-4865, ¶ 14; State v. Eyer, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2007-06-071, 2008-Ohio-1193, ¶ 8. In turn, when reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court is bound to accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Durham, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-03-023, 2013-Ohio-4764, ¶ 14; State v. Oatis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-03-074, 2005-Ohio-6038, ¶ 10. “An appellate court, however, independently reviews the trial court‘s legal conclusions based on those facts and determines, without deference to the trial court‘s decision, whether as a matter of law, the facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard.” State v. Cochran, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2006-10-023, 2007-Ohio-3353, ¶ 12.
{¶ 9} On appeal, Vaughn argues the search of his home was improper because the search was “done without the necessary reasonable grounds required by
{¶ 10} Nevertheless, even if he had not waived this issue, after a thorough review of the record, we find Vaughn‘s argument to be without merit. As noted above, it is undisputed that Vaughn was on probation resulting from a misdemeanor conviction in the Washington Court House Municipal Court. It is also undisputed that as a condition of his probation, Vaughn was required to submit to random searches of his person, motor vehicle, and home by his probation officer or other law enforcement officials. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in State v. Benton, 82 Ohio St.3d 316 (1998), “[a] warrantless search performed pursuant to a condition of [probation] requiring a [probationer] to submit to random searches of his or her person, motor vehicle, or place of residence by a [probation] officer at any time is constitutional.” Id. at 321. Therefore, “[o]nce a probationer has agreed to the warrantless search of his residence as a condition of supervision,” as is the case here, “evidence from such a search cannot be suppressed as being the result of an illegal search or as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.‘” State v. McBeath, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23929, 2010-Ohio-3653, ¶ 21; see, e.g., State v. Burns, 4th Dist. Highland No. 11CA14, 2012-Ohio-1529 (affirming a trial court‘s decision denying appellant‘s motion to suppress where “the search was conducted pursuant to appellant‘s consent obtained as a condition of his probation“).
{¶ 11} In addition to the consent exception, another well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement occurs within the context of a so-called “probation search.” State v. Norman, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-02-033, 2014-Ohio-5084, ¶ 28. The General Assembly has enacted valid regulations governing probationers and probation searches for misdemeanor offenders through the passage of
During the period of a misdemeanor offender‘s community
control sanction * * *, authorized probation officers who are engaged within the scope of their supervisory duties or responsibilities may search, with or without a warrant, the person of the offender, [or] the place of residence of the offender * * * if the probation officers have reasonable grounds to believe that the offender is not abiding by the law or otherwise is not complying with the conditions of the misdemeanor offender‘s community control.
{¶ 12} “Thus, a warrantless search, pursuant to
{¶ 13} Relying on these principles, Vaughn argues the search of his home was improper as the state failed to establish reasonable grounds to justify the search when it was based solely upon a single tip from an anonymous caller. However, as noted above, Vaughn consented to the search of his home as a condition of his probation. Moreover, contrary to Vaughn‘s claim otherwise, the sheriff‘s office did not receive a single tip, but rather, multiple calls reporting an active methamphetamine lab within Vaughn‘s home. At least one of these calls provided the sheriff‘s office with Vaughn‘s name and address. The address was then verified by deputies as same address Vaughn provided to his probation officer. Vaughn was also seen exiting the house when the deputies arrived.
{¶ 15} Judgment affirmed.
RINGLAND and HENDRICKSON, JJ., concur.