THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. USKERT, APPELLEE.
No. 98-217
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
June 2, 1999
85 Ohio St.3d 593 | 1999-Ohio-289
Submitted January 27, 1999. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashland County, No. 97-COA-01219.
The reinstatement fee of former
{¶ 1} On March 6, 1997, following a traffic accident, the defendant-appellee, Scott J. Uskert, was arrested and charged with violations of
{¶ 2} On March 11, 1997, at defendant‘s administrative license suspension hearing, he entered an initial plea of not guilty. On March 21, 1997, defendant‘s petition for occupational driving privileges was granted effective March 28, 1997. On April 14, 1997, defendant entered a plea of no contest, and it appears from the record that the
{¶ 3} On April 22, 1997, defendant filed a motion appealing the constitutionality of the reinstatement fee provision of former
{¶ 4} This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, Christopher S. Cook, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard P. Wolfe, Ashland City Law Director, for appellant.
Joseph P. Kearns, Jr., for appellee.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.
OPINION
{¶ 5} The issue presented to this court is whether the reinstatement fee paid to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles at the conclusion of an administrative license suspension (“ALS“) in the amount of $250, pursuant to former
{¶ 6} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
{¶ 7} As this court recognized recently, “the Double Jeopardy Clause of each Constitution prohibits (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 432, 668 N.E.2d at 441, citing United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496.
{¶ 8} We considered the double jeopardy implications of the ALS in Gustafson. We held that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
{¶ 9} We noted, however, that “the need for administrative remedial suspension ends at the point where a criminal conviction of drunk driving is obtained, at which time a court has authority to judicially impose a license suspension in accordance with law and the individual circumstances of the defendant before it.” Id. at 441, 668 N.E.2d at 447. Thus, we held that “[b]ecause an administrative license suspension loses its remedial character upon judicial adjudication and sentencing for violation of
{¶ 10} The statute in effect at the time of the defendant‘s suspension, former
“(1) A showing by the person that the person had proof of financial responsibility, a policy of liability insurance in effect that meets the minimum standards set forth in section 4509.51 of the Revised Code, or proof, to the satisfaction of the registrar, that the person is able to respond in damages in an amount at least equal to the minimum amounts specified in section 4509.51 of the Revised Code.
“(2) Payment by the person of a license reinstatement fee of two hundred and fifty dollars to the bureau of motor vehicles, which fee shall be deposited in the state treasury * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Former
R.C. 4511.191(L) , effective October 17, 1996, 146 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9967.1
I. Reinstatement fee does not “continue” the ALS
{¶ 11} In this case, the court of appeals based its decision on the premise that the $250 reinstatement fee, “if not paid, would operate to continue the administrative license suspension,” in violation of our holdings in Gustafson. (Emphasis added.) We disagree.
{¶ 13} The suspension ends regardless of whether the driver satisfies the two conditions of
{¶ 14} Further, as noted by the same dissent, one who drives after the termination of the ALS, but who has not paid his or her reinstatement fee, is in violation of
{¶ 15} The appellate court went on to find that “[i]f the reinstatement fee remains enforceable, then the administrative license suspension does not terminate until payment of the fee. Thus, presumably, unless the trial court vacates both the administrative license suspension and the reinstatement fee upon conviction, then the administrative license suspension may survive appellant‘s conviction.”
II. Double Jeopardy Analysis
{¶ 17} We must begin any analysis of a statute by pointing to the well-settled rule that an Act of the General Assembly is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 458, 668 N.E.2d 457, 462; Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163. Further, challenged legislation will not be invalidated unless the challenger establishes the unconstitutional nature of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d at 458, 668 N.E.2d at 462.
{¶ 18} In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal trial will be precluded by double jeopardy after a civil sanction has been imposed when the civil sanction was “overwhelmingly disproportionate” to the damages caused to the state by the defendant‘s wrongful conduct. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502.
{¶ 19} However, in 1997, the United States Supreme Court largely “disavow[ed] the method of analysis” used in Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 501, and reaffirmed the previously established rule exemplified in United States v. Ward (1980), 448 U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641-2643, 65 L.Ed.2d 742, 749. Hudson v. United States (1997), 522 U.S. 93, 96, 118 S.Ct. 488, 491, 139 L.Ed.2d 450, 457.
{¶ 20} In disavowing Halper, the Supreme Court returned to a two-part test that requires the court to examine the purpose of the legislation and its effects in determining whether it is “punitive” so as to constitute a double jeopardy violation. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. at 493, 139 L.Ed.2d at 459.
A. Legislative Intent
{¶ 22} One need only look to the statute to see that all of the money received under
{¶ 23} This court noted in Gustafson that we have “historically and repeatedly characterized driver‘s license suspensions imposed pursuant to Ohio‘s implied consent statutes as being civil in nature and remedial in purpose.” Gustafson at 440, 668 N.E.2d at 446. Further, we have stated that ”
B. Purpose or Effect
{¶ 25} Even where the legislature indicates an intent to establish a civil penalty, the second part of the Hudson analysis requires the court to inquire as to ” ‘whether the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect’ ” * * * as to ” ‘transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. at 493, 139 L.Ed.2d at 459. In order to analyze this prong of the test, it is helpful to refer to the guidelines enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 661: (1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,” (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,” (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,” (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,” (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,” (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,” and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” Further, ” ‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” (Citations omitted.) Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. at 493, 139 L.Ed.2d at 459, citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 249, 100 S.Ct. at 2641-2642, 65 L.Ed.2d at 749.
1. Not an affirmative disability or restraint
{¶ 26} We have held that “[i]n Ohio, a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege, and not an absolute property right.” Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 554 N.E.2d 97, paragraph two of the syllabus. In fact, it is not a substantial private interest, but a state-regulated privilege.
{¶ 27} Therefore, the suspension of a privilege voluntarily granted does not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint.
2. Not historically regarded as punishment
{¶ 28} In Hudson, the United States Supreme Court noted that it has long been recognized that ” ‘revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted’ ” (such as a driver‘s license) is ” ‘characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.’ ” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. at 495-496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462, quoting Helvering v. Mitchell (1938), 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917, 922, and at fn. 2. Further, the court held that ” ‘the payment of fixed * * * sums of money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been recognized as enforceable by civil proceedings.’ ” Id., 522 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462, quoting Helvering at 400, 58 S.Ct. at 633, 82 L.Ed. at 922.
{¶ 29} Accordingly, the reinstatement fee cannot be said to have been historically viewed as punishment.
3. Scienter not required
{¶ 30} Clearly, the reinstatement fee of
4. Not retribution and deterrence
{¶ 31} The court of appeals below compared the reinstatement fee of
{¶ 32} The defendant in Kurth Ranch was required to pay the tax or face the imposition of more serious penalties. Here, the reinstatement fee is voluntary. The driver may choose whether or not to seek reinstatement. No state, civil, or administrative action would be taken against the driver if he or she chose not to reinstate his or her driving privileges, as long as he or she did not drive. See Thompson v. State (1997), 229 Ga.App. 526, 528, 494 S.E.2d 306, 308. If the state has the authority to revoke driving privileges as a remedial measure, then the state may revoke such privileges subject to ability to reinstate the driving privileges upon certain conditions. See id. This is no more than the suspension of a privilege voluntarily granted.
{¶ 33} Accordingly, the reinstatement fee associated with the ALS cannot be said to promote retribution and deterrence.
5. Behavior to which it applies is not already a crime
{¶ 34} Although OMVI is a criminal offense, the ALS is not a criminal sanction. The fact that the OMVI charge may form the basis of the criminal offense does not transform the ALS or the resulting reinstatement fee into a criminally punitive sanction. See Herbst v. Voinovich (N.D.Ohio 1998), 9 F.Supp.2d 828, 835-836. Further, to the extent that the underlying behavior is already a crime, “[t]his fact is insufficient to render the money penalt[y] * * * criminally punitive.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462.
6. Alternative purpose to which it may be rationally connected
{¶ 35} As previously noted, the reinstatement fee is not merely used administratively by the BMV to process the return of the license to the driver. Instead, the funds generated from the reinstatement fee are deposited into the state treasury and credited to driver treatment and intervention programs, the reparations
{¶ 36} Thus, the state has a compelling interest to promptly remove careless drivers from the road as a public safety measure. Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 17-18, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2620-2621, 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 334. “[T]he right to operate motor vehicles on public roadways of this state may be regulated by the lawful exercise of the police power for the benefit of public safety and welfare.” Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 446, 668 N.E.2d at 450 (Douglas, J., concurring). This unlawful conduct continues to be prevalent, as evidenced by the number of OMVI cases that continue to flood the judicial system. Id. at 447, 668 N.E.2d at 451 (Douglas, J., concurring).
7. Not excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
{¶ 37} The court of appeals found that the reinstatement fee “has no rational relationship whatsoever to any remedial aspect and purpose of the implied consent statute, which is to prevent persons from driving while a criminal case is pending.” While the reinstatement fee of
{¶ 38} In 1995, there were 17,274 alcohol-related traffic fatalities and approximately 300,000 persons injured in alcohol-related crashes.2 In addition, in 1995, more than 1.4 million people were arrested for driving while intoxicated, nearly ten percent of all arrests made that year.3 Approximately three in five
{¶ 39} “When one considers the staggering costs to enforce our DUI laws, to train the officers, to equip them with chemical tests, to pay them to patrol the highways, to provide rescue services and medical attention for those who are involved in alcohol-related accidents, and to initiate drug and alcohol awareness programs, $250 does not seem grossly out of proportion to [the defendant‘s] role in contributing to this state-wide problem.” State v. Schrock (Nov. 20, 1998), Trumbull App. No. 97-T-0176, unreported.
{¶ 40} Therefore, we find that the reinstatement fee of
{¶ 41} Accordingly, we hold that the reinstatement fee of former
{¶ 42} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court so that it may lift the stay on the reinstatement fee and order that the defendant is required to pay it.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and COOK, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment.
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent.
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting.
{¶ 43} No test embraced by this court to determine whether a civil sanction is punitive should undermine the basic principle that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 435, 441; North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-665. Because I believe that the $250 reinstatement fee sanctioned in former
{¶ 44} Sanctions imposed in civil proceedings have been found to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Hudson v. United States (1997), 522 U.S. 93, 110, 118 S.Ct. 488, 499, 139 L.Ed.2d 450, 466-467 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), and cases cited therein. The concurring opinion recognized that these cases reconfirmed the settled proposition that the government cannot use the civil label to escape entirely the Double Jeopardy Clause‘s command. The concurring opinion notes that this proposition is extremely important because the states and federal government have an enormous array of civil administrative sanctions at their disposal. Thus, this provides government with the capability of punishing persons repeatedly for the same offense, violating the bedrock double jeopardy principle of finality. Id. at 110-111, 118 S.Ct. at 499, 139 L.Ed.2d at 466.
{¶ 45} Here, in order to get his license back after the administrative suspension, the defendant was required to pay the reinstatement fee. This fee was in addition to many other costs an offender is required to pay.
{¶ 46} I recognize, and support, the very laudable purpose of the DUI laws, which is to prevent dangerous drivers from being on the road. However, I am concerned with the use of a superficial civil remedy to address the exigencies of the present day drunk-driving problem. See United States v. Ursery (1996), 518 U.S. 267, 300, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2152, 135 L.Ed.2d 549, 574 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, I believe that governmental action should be scrutinized very closely when government stands to gain with the enforcement of a mandatory fee. See Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), 501 U.S. 957, 979, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2693, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 854, fn. 9 (“There is good reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence. Imprisonment, corporal punishment, and even capital punishment cost a State money; fines are a source of revenue. As we have recognized in the context of other constitutional provisions, it makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.