for the Court.
Following a jury trial in Providence County Superior Court, the defendant, Tonya Withers (Withers or defendant), was found guilty of one count of simple assault in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-3. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial justice erred in denying her. motion for a new trial and her request to proceed pro se. This case came before the Supreme Court on September 26, 2017, pursuant to an order directing the parties tо appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the parties’ memoranda, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the appeal at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel
In February 2014, Maria DiPaola owned a rental property located at 167 Admiral Street in Providence. On February 11, 2014, DiPaola was at the property — a “split ranch duplex” — with her employee,Paul Barros, cleaning the property and preparing it for a rental showing to' a prospective tenant. The previous renter, Withers, had been a tenant for only two months when she left a note indicating that she had moved and would pick her mattress up at a later date.
At trial, DiPaola testified that, as she was cleaning, Barros yelled to her that Withers and a man — later identified in the police report as Antonio Bryant —
DiPaola walked down-the interior stairs and began yelling at Withers,' “[y]ou can’t come in.” At this point, DiPaola observed Withers .“barrelling [sic]' up the stairs,” before Withers “grabbеd [her] on [her] arm” and “threw [her] down the stairs.” DiPaola tumbled down about four or five stairs and landed at the very bottom of the stairwell. In response, DiPaola called out to Barros, “Help me. She threw me downstairs.” DiPaola testified that Barros was located on the exterior stairs at this time.
At trial, Barros recalled walking out of the building to the exterior stairs" as Withers and Bryant were walking up those stairs. He called the pоlice to report Withers’ arrival on the property without DiPao-la’s consent, and at the' same time he noticed DiPaola “on the- floor, yelling, Call [sic] the police. She just pushed me down the stairs.”’ On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Barros whether he had seen Withers walking up the inside stairs, to which Barros responded, “She went passed [sic] me with the other guy * * ⅜ and she started going up the stairs.” Barros thеn clarified that he did not actually see Withers going up the stairs because he was
Officer Brian Auclair responded to DiPaola’s apartment budding for a reported assault, and he spoke with DiPaola who “appeared upset. I believe she was crying.” Officer Auclair testified that DiPaola told him she was pushed down the stairs by the seсond-floor tenant. Officer Auclair took a written statement from DiPaola, who was “shaking” while she wrote. In his police report, Officer Auclair memorialized the events as follows:
“DiPaola and Barros stated that Tonya Withers * * * and Antonio Bryant * * * came rushing up the stairs and began to force the door open. When DiPaola ran down the stairs telling her to stop, Withers pushed her causing DiPaola to fall down the stairs. Pоlice observed DiPaola holding her left shoulder but she refused Rescue.”
In her written statement, DiPaola wrote that Withers “came up to [the] door, and was pushing it in[.] I ran down the stairs to open [the] door. And she grab[ed] me and push[ed] me down outside stairs.” On redirect, the prosecutor asked DiPaola what she considered “outside” stairs, and DiPaola responded that she meant the stairs outside the apartment, meaning the interior stairs.
On cross-examination, defense counsel confronted DiPaola with her prior testimony from a housing court hearing a few weeks after the purported assault. In those proceedings, DiPaola described the incident: “I came to the front door, and [Withers] started screaming at me, and I was in front of the door, and she was trying to move me out of the door, and she literally picked me up and threw me down the stairs.” When defense counsel asked DiPaola at trial to what stairs she had been referring, DiPaola clarified that she considered the apartment door the front door, indicating that the stairs she was thrown down were the interior stairs.
After the close of -the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of simple assault. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied. The defendant was sentenced to one yeаr of probation, including mental health counseling. The trial justice also ordered no contact between defendant and the victim. The defendant timely appealed to this Court. In her appeal, defendant raises two issues — (1) the trial justice erred in denying a motion for a new trial; and (2) the trial justice erred in not letting defendant proceed pro se, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and аrticle 1, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution. 1
II
Standard of Review
A
Motion for a New Trial
When this Court reviews a motion for a new trial, we give “great weight” to a trial justice’s ruling when she “articulate[s] sufficient reasoning in support of the ruling.” State v. Kizekai,
B
Sixth Amendment Right to Proceed without Counsel
When this Court reviews a trial justice’s determination of whether a defendant’s request to waive his or her right to counsel is “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,” the analysis is conducted de novo.
2
State v. Cruz,
III
Discussion
A
Motion for a New Trial
The defendant contends that the trial justice should have granted her motion for a new trial because she found the only witness capable of proving that an assault actually happened to be not credible. In determining whether to grant a new trial, “the trial justice must ‘(1) consider the evidence in light оf the jury charge, (2) independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and' then (3) determine whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the jury.’ ” State v. Moore,
The trial justice cited to her role as the “13th juror” in passing “independent judgment on the credibility of the witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.” The trial justice first remarked on her concerns with DiPaola’s credibility as a trial witness, especially given DiPaola’s conflicting statements and “jumbled” version of events. The apartment building had two sets of stairs — one intеrior and one exterior. DiPaola’s description of Withers’ assault “troubled” the trial justice as DiPaola placed the assault on the interior stairwell, while she had referred to the location in the witness statement as occurring on the “outside stairs.”
The trial justice also commented on the trial version of DiPaola’s account of the incident, explaining that she found “the version [DiPaola] offered at triаl” was “really difficult to understand logistically how it occurred.” She suggested that the confusing aspect of DiPaola’s testimony was how DiPaola could have been “thrown down the stairs” without “hit[ting] the
Based on her disbеlief of the sequence of events- as relayed at trial, the trial justice concluded that she would have found that the state had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. However, given the standard for a motion for a new trial,.the trial justice proceeded to decide whether reasonable minds could have differed. The trial justice ultimately found that there was sufficient - evidence, even after discrediting DiPaola’s testimony that defendant committed an assault. 3 In making her determination, the trial justice relied on the testimony of Officer Auclair and Barros, both of whom she found credible, Officer Auclair recalled arriving on the scene soon after the incident and found DiPaola “shaking and crying” while she relayed that she had been pushed down the stairs and her arm was sore. Barros stated that .he saw DiPaola on the floor, telling him to call the police because Withers had pushed her down the. stairs.
After a close review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial justice clear? ly erred or “overlook[ed] * * * material inconsistencies.” State v. Ferreira,
We affirm her denial of that motion.
B
Sixth Amendment Right to Proceed without Counsel
The defendant also argues that the trial justice erred in denying defendant
“[A] [s]tate may [not] constitutionally -hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he. insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.” State v. Kennedy,
“(1) the background, the experience, and the conduct of the defendant at the hearing, including his age, his education, and his physical and mental health; (2) the extent to which the defendant has had prior contact with lawyers before the hearing; (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the proceeding and the sentence that may potentially be [ ]imposed; (4) the question of whether standby counsel has been appointed and the extent to which he or she has aided the defendant before or at the hearing; (5) the question of whether the waiver of counsel was the result of mistreatment or coercion;, and .(6) the. question of whether the defendant is trying to manipulate the events of the hearing.” State v. Chabot,682 A.2d 1377 , 1380 (R.I. 1996).
The defense contends that the trial justice failed to determine whether Withers was. knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving’ her right to counsel. We disagree. The trial justice explicitly referеnced Cruz,
In this case, the trial had already commenced when defendant expressed dissatisfaction with her lawyers. In fact, DiPaola had alrea4y testified, and her cross-examination
Additiоnally, defendant stated her desire to avoid the trial entirely:
“And I still say my lawyers, they don’t— they don’t, um — they don’t impress me. And I’m fine. Again, you wanted to do it. I’m going prepared to drop them, drop this whole court crap, because, okay, it’s on the phone where I was. It’s going to go to Supreme Court on you, like I said before. I want to go back to my cell.
"* * *
“I don’t want to be here anymore. I spoke. .
"* * *
“Leave me alone. I don’t care. I don’t care. Whatever. I don’t сare. I’m going to Supreme. I don’t care. I don’t care. You’re-fired. Leave me alone. Can I go back to my cell now?”
The trial justice also asked defendant to specify her issues with her counsel. The defendant expressed concern with defense counsel’s jury selection because there were no African-American jurors. The trial justice attempted to explain to defendant that there hаd been no African Americans stricken from" the jury because there were simply no African Americans selected— something beyond defense counsel’s control.
The trial justice concluded that she did not believe defendant had “made the requisite intelligent and knowing decision to discharge counsel at this stage to meet the standard,” and she gave the defense attorneys an opportunity to address the mаtter. Defense counsel represented that they were prepared to continue defending Withers notwithstanding her request for them to withdraw. Subsequently, the trial justice denied Withers’ request to discharge her attorneys.
We agree with the trial justice. The defendant’s contentions regarding her counsel elucidated her lack of understanding of the jury selection process, which is evidence that defendant was not knowingly, intеlligently, and voluntarily waiving her right to counsel. Put differently, defendant raised a complaint about her counsel that, had she represented herself, she could not have done better. But see State v. Spencer,
Furthermore, defendant had not been present for the testimony of key witnesses, including that of DiPaola. As such, her choice to represent herself pro se after a significant absence could certainly not be said to be knowing or intelligent where such nonattendance put her at a substantial disadvantage in completing the trial. See Cruz,
Although we have expressed a preferenсe for trial justices to have more than a brief discussion with a defendant before deciding whether a waiver of right to counsel is effective, the defendant’s failure to attend the initial portion of the trial indicates that the defendant was not making a knowing and intelligent waiver of her constitutional rights. See Cruz,
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record shall be returned to that tribunal.
Notes
. Courts now often refer to pro se parties as " ‘self-represented litigants.’ ” Tworog v. Two-rog,
. The state points this Court to a number of federal district court cases in support of its position that this Court's relevant standard of review should be abuse of discretion. See State v. Winkler,
. A "simple assault [is] an 'unlawful attempt or offer, with force or violence, to do a corporal hurt to another, whether from malice or wantonness.’ ” State v. Lomba,
. If there is a question of a defendant’s mental competency, a'trial justice must consider the six factors in deciding whether a dеfendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Cruz,