State v. Tonya Withers
172 A.3d 765
| R.I. | 2017Background
- In Feb. 2014, landlord Maria DiPaola and employee Paul Barros encountered former tenant Tonya Withers and an accomplice at a Providence duplex; DiPaola alleges Withers pushed her down the interior stairs causing injury.
- DiPaola gave a written statement to police and told Officer Auclair she was pushed; Barros testified he found DiPaola on the floor upset and saying Withers had pushed her.
- At trial DiPaola’s testimony contained inconsistencies about whether the fall occurred on interior or exterior stairs and about the mechanics of the fall; the trial justice found parts of her trial testimony confusing.
- A jury convicted Withers of simple assault under G.L. 1956 § 11-5-3; she was sentenced to probation, ordered to undergo mental-health counseling, and subject to a no-contact order.
- Withers moved for a new trial and sought to discharge counsel and proceed pro se mid-trial; the trial justice denied both requests.
- On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, giving deference to the trial justice’s credibility assessments and applying de novo review to the pro se-waiver inquiry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Withers) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial justice erred in denying motion for new trial after finding the primary eyewitness (DiPaola) partly not credible | The evidence (including officer and Barros testimony and DiPaola’s statements to them) sufficed for a reasonable jury; trial justice properly found reasonable minds could differ | Withers argued the trial justice discredited the only witness who could prove assault and thus should have granted a new trial | Affirmed: trial justice did not clearly err; circumstantial evidence and other credible witnesses supported the verdict |
| Whether trial justice erred by denying Withers’ mid‑trial request to proceed pro se | The request was untimely and not a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver given her absence for much of trial and inability to show she could do better than counsel | Withers sought to discharge counsel and represent herself, asserting dissatisfaction with representation | Affirmed: trial justice reasonably found waiver not knowing/intelligent (applied totality of circumstances) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cruz, 109 A.3d 381 (R.I. 2015) (de novo review of validity of waiver to proceed pro se and guidance on waiver standards)
- State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377 (R.I. 1996) (six-factor guide for evaluating knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver of counsel)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Sixth Amendment right to self-representation; waiver must be knowing and intelligent)
- State v. Kizekai, 19 A.3d 583 (R.I. 2011) (deference to trial justice’s ruling on a new trial when trial justice articulates sufficient reasoning)
- State v. Whitaker, 79 A.3d 795 (R.I. 2013) (upholding denial of new trial where trial justice discredited some witnesses but found circumstantial evidence sufficient)
