State v. ThompsonState v. Thompson
Christopher J. Thompson, pro se.
PIPER, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Christopher J. Thompson, appeals his convictions for intimidation, OVI, and having weapons under disability after a jury trial in the Madison County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Thompson‘s convictions.
{¶2} Beginning in 2020 and continuing through 2021, Thompson called the Madison County Sheriff‘s Office at least every other week, sometimеs making ten or more calls in a single day. Each time, Thompson would rant, insult sheriff‘s office personnel, and demand to speak to the sheriff. Thompson regularly told the dispatcher that he was coming to the office and would “have [their] badges.” Thompson‘s rants and threats would later prove to be escalating in nature.
{¶3} On September 22, 2021, Thompson made an especially vicious series of calls demanding to speak to the sheriff. The dispatcher informed Thompson that the sheriff was not in the office, but he could leave a message. Thompson refused to accept this and told the dispatcher “You need to hang up your badges and walk the fuck out of your offices now,” and “you‘re all complicit in crimes against humanity” that are “punishable by death.” Thompson then demanded that the sheriff speak with him by six o‘clock, gave the ultimatum “If not, I‘m coming,” and hung up. Later that afternoon, Thompson called again, reiterated his demand to speak to the sheriff, and stated “I‘ll take it to the end and all the way until the lаst fucking shell is loaded in my gun.” Thompson further threatened the dispatcher, stating “I‘m taking the heads off of every fucking one of you” and “I‘m coming for your asses.” As a result, the sheriff‘s office implemented increased security measures and the dispatchers requested to be able to carry firearms.
{¶4} Later that day, several deputies were patrolling Ohio State University‘s Farm Science Review exhibition in London, Madison County, Ohio. As the exhibition closed and attendees were exiting, deputies observed Thompson in the driver‘s seat of a white panel van, parked near one of the traffic gates. As Deputy Scott Henry approached, he could see that Thompson appeared to be upset, confused, and yelling incoherently at another deputy. Deputy Henry asked Thompson why he was there and so upset. Thompson appeared scattered and aggressively responded with profanities and slurred
{¶5} Around this time, Deputy Henry was advised by dispatch that Thompson had been calling the office threatening to use a gun on law enforcement. Deputy Henry again approached Thompson and asked for his license and registration, but Thompson just responded with more screaming and profanity. Deputy Henry asked Thomрson if he had consumed alcohol, to which Thompson replied he was “allowed to drink alcohol and smoke marijuana in this bitch.” As Deputy Henry came into close contact with Thompson to detain him, he could smell a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage.
{¶6} Sergeant Jacob Gibson then arrived on the scene and observed that Thompson‘s eyes appeared glassy. Sergeant Gibson searched Thompson‘s van and found a loaded Colt 1911 handgun sitting on the center console. Dеputy Kyle Kaufman transported Thompson to jail and observed that Thompson was unsteady on his feet, smelled of alcoholic beverage, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and slurred his speech. Deputy Kaufman asked Thompson to take a field sobriety test at the jail, but he refused.
{¶7} On October 20, 2022, Thompson was brought to trial on four counts: intimidation, a felony of the third degree in violation of
{¶8} The jury found Thompson guilty on all four counts. The state stipulated that Thompson‘s convictions for improper handling and having weapons under disability merged for purposes of sentencing and elected to proceed with sentencing for having weapons under disability. Thompson was sentenced to 24 months in prison for intimidation, 24 months in prison for OVI with an additional 12 months in prison for the firearm speсification, and 24 months in prison for having weapons under disability. Each of these terms were ordered to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of seven years.
{¶9} Thompson now appeals his convictions, raising six assignments of error for our review.
II. Legal Analysis
{¶10} Assignment of Error No. 1:
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE APPELLANT HAD SOME SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE THREATENING NATURE OF HIS STATEMENTS TO THE DISPATCHER OF MADISON COUNTY SHERIFF‘S DEPT. [sic]1
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Thompson argues that his conviction for intimidation was not supported by sufficient evidence or by the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompson asserts that the state failed to prove he subjectively understоod his statements to the dispatchers to be threatening. Thompson further argues that his words
Standard of Review
{¶12} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, an appellate court examines the evidence in order to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Intihar, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-05-046, 2015-Ohio-5507, ¶ 9. The relevant inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. In other words, “the test for sufficiency requires a determination as to whether the state has met its burden of production at trial.” State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 34, citing State v. Wilson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-01-007, 2007-Ohio-2298, ¶ 33. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must “defer to the trier of fact on questions of credibility and the weight assigned to the evidence.” State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 132.
{¶13} On the other hand, a manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the “inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.” State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
{¶14} “The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Nevertheless, although the two concepts are different, a finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence is also dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-03-049, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶ 19. Therefore, “[b]ecause sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury, a finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency.” State v. Hart, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2011-03-008, 2012-Ohio-1896, ¶ 43.
Unlawful Threat of Harm
{¶15}
{¶16} Here, the recording of Thompson‘s calls to the sheriff‘s office, as well as the testimony of dispatchers Haskins and Henson, established that Thompson attempted to intimidate the dispatchers into abandoning their duties. Thompson told the dispatchers
{¶17} Thompson‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶18} Assignment of Error No. 2:
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE/IMPAIRED. [sic]
{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Thompson argues that his OVI conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence because no field sobriety test was administered.
{¶20} ”
{¶21} Here, three deputies testified that Thompson smelled of an alcoholic beverage, had slurred speech, and was belligerent, glassy eyed, and unsteady on his feet. When Deputy Henry first attempted to speak with Thompson, he abruptly drove away and nearly hit Deputy Henry. When Deputy Henry later caught up to Thompson‘s van and asked if he had been drinking, Thompson expressed a belief that he was “allowed to drink alcohol and smоke marijuana in this bitch.” Thompson clearly displayed visible signs of impairment. No field sobriety test was administered simply because Thompson refused. However, there was overwhelming evidence demonstrating Thompson was overly intoxicated and impaired when operating the van. The jury did not clearly lose its way in finding Thompson operated his van under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
{¶22} Thompson‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶23} Assignment of Error No. 3:
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION DURING SENTENCING. [sic]
{¶24} In his third assignment of error, Thompson argues that the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing. Thompson asserts that he did not waivе the preparation of a presentence-investigative report and the trial court improperly considered prior offenses that he alleges were dismissed. However, in his brief, Thompson does not
{¶25}
{¶26} Regardless, there is no indication that Thompson‘s prior criminal history was inaccurate, and we disagree with Thompson‘s assertions.
Lack of Necessity for PSI Report
{¶27} “The decision to order a presentence investigation generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court if the court contemplates a prison term and not community control in sentencing upon a criminal offense.” State v. McCauley, 5th Dist. Licking No. 19-CA-84, 2020-Ohio-2813, ¶ 43. Here, the trial court determined that the firearms specification dictated mandatory prison time, therefore community control sanctions were unavailable and a PSI report was not necessary. See
{¶28} A consecutive sentence is contrary to law where the trial court fails to make the consecutive sentencing findings required by
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
(c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{¶29} At sentencing, the trial court specifically found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public and punish Thompson. Additionally, the trial court found that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Thompson‘s conduct, especially where Thompson had instilled fear and caused
{¶30} Thompson‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶31} Assignment of Error No. 4:
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT CONSECUTIVELY IN ALL 4 CHARGES, 3 OF WHICH, CONTAINING FIREARM SPECIFICATIONS “ALLIED OFFENSES.” [sic]
{¶32} In his fourth assignment of error, Thompson argues that each of his four offenses were allied offenses, and the trial court could not impose consecutive prison terms. We disagree.
{¶33}
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant‘s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or informаtion may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
As the Supreme Court of Ohio explained, “If any of the following is true, the offenses cannot merge and the defendant may be convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses:
{¶34} Here, Thompson‘s intimidation offense occurred separately from his other offenses, with the separate harm of threatening the dispatchers in the sheriff‘s office, and therefore does not merge. Thompson‘s improper handling and weapons under disability offenses merged, and the State elected to sentence Thompson for weapons under disability only. Thompson‘s OVI offense had the separate harm of Thompson operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Although Thompson had a weapon specification attached to his OVI offense, it does not transform the OVI offense into an allied offense with his improper handling and weapons under disability offenses. Further, it is well established that firearm specifications are penalty enhancements, not offenses, therefore firearms specifications are not subject to merger with other offenses merely because they each involve the use of the samе firearm. State v. Ford, 128 Ohio St.3d 398, 2011-Ohio-765, ¶ 19. Therefore, neither the OVI offense nor its attached firearm specification merge with the weapons under disability offense.
{¶35} Thompson‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶36} Assignment of Error No. 5:
TRIAL COURT FAILED IN PROVING THAT APPELLANT WAS/IS A MENTAL DEFECTIVE AS JUDGE COSTELLO ENTERED A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BY REASON INSANITY, BY ATTORNEY S. FOX ON 2/7/2022. [sic]
{¶37} In his fifth assignment of error, Thompson argues that he was improperly found competent to stand trial. We disagree.
{¶38} Due process and fundamental fairness demand that a criminal defendant
{¶39} An appellate court will not disturb a competency determination if there was some reliable, credible evidence supporting the trial court‘s conclusion that the defendant understood the nature and objective of the proceedings agаinst him. State v. Bullocks, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-01-008, 2010-Ohio-2705, ¶ 7, citing Williams at 19. The adequacy of the data relied upon by the expert who examined the defendant is a question for the trier of fact. Bullocks at ¶ 7, citing State v. Neely, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2002-02-002, 2002-Ohio-7146, ¶ 10. “A defendant‘s failure to cooperate with [a psychological examination] does not constitute sufficient indicia of incompetence to raise doubt about a defendant‘s competence to stand trial.” State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, ¶ 46.
{¶40} Here, Thompson‘s attorney filed a motion to have Thompson evaluated for
{¶41} Thompson‘s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶42} Assignment of Error No. 6:
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT KNEW HE POSSESSED A FIREARM AND THAT APPELLANT KNEW, HE BELONGED TO THE RELEVANT CATEGORY OF ‘PERSON’ BARRED FROM POSSESSING A FIREARM. [sic]
{¶43} In his sixth assignment of error, Thompson argues that the state failed to prove he possessed a firearm for purposes of his weapons under disability conviction. Thompson also argues that he is not a “person” subject to the statute. We disagree.
Possession of the Firearm
{¶44} To “have” a firearm within the meaning of
{¶45} Here, immediately after Thompson was apprehended from his van, Sergeant Gibson found a loaded Colt 1911 handgun sitting in the open on the center console. When Thompson wаs driving his van, he had dominion and control of the handgun. Although it was not necessary for the state to prove actual ownership, during the pendency of the case Thompson personally filed a letter with the court (which was read into the record at trial) requesting the return of his property that was seized from the van. In the letter, Thompson specifically requested that his “Colt Mark IV Government Model 1911 automatic pistol” be returned—the exact model that was seized. The evidence clearly demonstrаted that Thompson had possession of the firearm.
Sovereign Citizen Arguments
{¶46} In his brief, Thompson goes on to argue that he is “an American State National, an alien, nonresident of D.C.” and not a “person” and therefore is not subject to the laws or courts of Ohio. These “sovereign citizen” legal theories have no basis in law and such arguments have been “soundly rejected by every court that has been given the opportunity to do so.” See, e.g., State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-04-019, 2018-Ohio-4258, ¶ 28. “Our whole system of law is predicated on the general, fundamental principle of equality of application of the law. ‘All men are equal before the
{¶47} Thompson‘s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶48} In light of the foregoing, we conclude that each of Thompson‘s convictions were supportеd by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences, and the trial court did not err in finding Thompson competent to stand trial. Additionally, we reject Thompson‘s “sovereign citizen” arguments that he is not subject to the laws of Ohio and that these laws cannot be administered by Ohio‘s judiciary. Each of Thompson‘s six assignments of error are overruled.
{¶49} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.