STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. DAVID A. THOMPSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 1-19-30
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY
March 2, 2020
2020-Ohio-723
ZIMMERMAN, J.
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court, Trial Court No. CR 2018 0226. Judgment Affirmed.
Marley C. Nelson for Appellant
Jana E. Emerick for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, David A. Thompson (“Thompson“), appeals the January 23, 2019 judgment entry of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
{2} On July 12, 2018, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Thompson on one count of possession of cocaine in an amount equal to or exceeding 20 grams but less than 27 grams of cocaine in violation of
{4} On May 17, 2019, Thompson filed a notice of appeal and a pro-se motion for leave to file delayed appeal which we granted on June 14, 2019. (Case No. 01-19-30, Doc. Nos. 1, 2, 3).2 He raises two assignments of error for our review. We will address his first assignment of error followed by his second assignment of error.
Assignment of Error I
David Thompson‘s sentence is contrary to law because the trial court determined that his offense was committed “for hire or as part of an organized criminal activity” when there was no evidence in the record to support that conclusion.
{5} In his first assignment of error, Thompson argues that the trial court erred by imposing the six-year-mandatory-prison term. In particular, he argues that
Standard of Review
{6} Under
Analysis
{7} “It is well-established that the statutes governing felony sentencing no longer require the trial court to make certain findings before imposing a maximum sentence.” State v. Maggette, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 29, citing State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-67, 2016-Ohio-2882, ¶ 14 (“Unlike consecutive sentences, the trial court was not required to make any particular ‘findings’ to justify maximum prison sentences.“) and State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102710, 2015-Ohio-4907, ¶ 9 (“The law no longer requires the
{8} ”
{9} “Although the trial court must consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in
{10} Thompson argues that because he was sentenced on a possession-of-cocaine conviction and not a trafficking conviction, the trial court was precluded from finding that his conduct more serious as being “for hire” or “as a part of an organized criminal activity” under
{11} At issue are the following statements made by the trial court at Thompson‘s sentencing hearing:
[The Trial Court] In this case I‘m going to make a finding, and I don‘t give it a whole lot of weight under the facts of this case, but I will find that the offense was committed as part of an organized criminal
activity. That‘s not to say that Mr. Thompson was a member of a gang or anything like. That‘s not what I‘m saying. But, organized criminal activity in terms of being a part of the drug culture in this community. I don‘t give that a whole lot weight. As far as for hire, there was really no other explanation of the nine hundred dollars that was seized from him with the drugs. But, I‘ll just make that note. He‘s part of the drug problem in the county. For that purpose, it‘s part of an organized criminal activity. Again, not a whole lot of make it more serious. Its serious enough because of the amount involved. But, I just note that for the record.
(Jan. 22 and 23, 2019 Tr. at 198); (See Doc. Nos. 84, 107). Notwithstanding these comments and finding, the presentence investigation report (“PSI“) details that Thompson has previously been convicted on two counts of trafficking in cocaine
{12} After weighing the seriousness and recidivism factors, the trial court imposed a six-year-mandatory-prison sentence for Thompson‘s possession-of-cocaine conviction. As a result, we conclude that the trial court exercised its
{13} We further conclude that it was within the trial court‘s discretion to impose a six-year-mandatory-prison sentence as “the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code.”
{14} For these reasons, Thompson‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error II
The trial court assessed, and the clerk of courts is working to collect, unauthorized court costs.
Standard of Review
{16}
that court costs are not punishment, State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 15, superseded by statute as stated in State v. Braden, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-4204, ___ N.E.3d ___, and are thus not a part of a sentence, State v. White, 156 Ohio St.3d 536, 2019-Ohio-1215, 130 N.E.3d 247, ¶ 14. However, under
R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) , the General Assembly has nevertheless ordered trial courts to include the costs in an offender‘s sentence and judgment.
Analysis
{17} As an initial matter, we note that Thompson never objected to the imposition of court costs or the costs of prosecution by the trial court at his
{18}
{19} Our review is not without limitation. The Supreme Court of Ohio has previously concluded that there are limitations on an appellate court‘s decision to
{20} Our review of the record conclusively establishes that each of the subpoena-mileage fees were associated with scheduled- or rescheduled-jury-trial dates relative to Thompson‘s court proceeding, and thus, in our estimation, the only remaining question is to identify whether the subpoenas-mileage fees were statutorily authorized under
{21} Moreover, based on the limited facts before us, Thompson has not shown us that the trial court erred in assessing statutorily-unauthorized-court costs predicated on statutorily-unauthorized-mileage fees because the record is unclear as
{22} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr