State v. Taylor-BillingsState v. Taylor-Billings
STEVENSON, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common pleas granting a motion to suppress filed by Appellee, Antwan Taylor-Billings. This Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} On August 30, 2021, an Ohio state trooper initiated a traffic stop of Taylor-Billings’ vehicle. After initiating the traffic stop, the trooper discovered a firearm, mаrijuana, and a variety of pills, which contained methamphetamine, inside the vehicle. The trooper had Taylor-Billings exit the vehicle and field sobriety tests and a breathalyzer test were administered. Taylor-Billings failed the field sobriety tests and the breathalyzer test.
{¶3} Several months after the stop, Taylor-Billings was indicted on one count of carrying a concealed weapon with an attendant forfeiture specification, one count of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle with an attendant forfeiture specification, one count of operating a
{¶4} Taylor-Billings filed a motion to suppress, arguing that there was no probable cause to conduct a traffic stop of his vehicle and the trooper did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests. The State filed a brief in opposition to the motion to suppress. After Taylor-Billings filed his motion, the grand jury returned a supplemental indictment that included one count of trafficking in drugs with an attendant firearm specification as well as one count of possession of drugs. Taylor-Billings pleadеd not guilty to the supplemental charges.
{¶5} The matter proceeded to a hearing on the motion to suppress. The trial court subsequently issued a written decision granting Taylor-Billings’ motion on the basis that the State failed to demonstrate that the trooper had an objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation had occurred to justify the stop. The State appealed, raising one assignment of error for review.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
{¶6} The State argues in its sole assignment of error that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop Taylor-Billings’ vehicle and that the trial court’s reasoning to suppress evidence was flawed. We agree.
{¶7} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated:
Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.
{¶8} The
{¶9} “[A] law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an occupant is or has been engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Epling, 105 Ohio App.3d 663, 664 (9th Dist.1995). See also Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996) (“where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.”) A stop is constitutionally valid provided the law enforcement officer has “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Roberts, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21221, 2006-Ohio-3042, ¶ 7; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
{¶10} “Reasonable suspicion is something less than probable cause.” Epling at 664, citing State v. VanScoder, 92 Ohio App.3d 853, 855 (9th Dist.1994). Reasonable suspicion “is something more than an unparticularized suspicion or mere hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” Roberts at ¶7, citing Terry at 1. “Thus, ‘the likelihood of criminal activity
{¶11} The propriety of a traffic stop must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabus. “These circumstances must be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.” Roberts at ¶ 8, citing State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991). When “analyzing whether reasonable suspicion existed, this Court looks to the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search and considers whether those facts would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” (Internal citаtions and quotations omitted.) State v. Blair, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24208, 2008-Ohio-6257, ¶ 5. “Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Bralek, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28727, 2018-Ohio-2496, ¶ 11, citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). The Court must consider “the totality of the circumstances as they were known to [the trooper] prior to the time [the trooper] stopped [the defendant], together with reasonable inferences that could be drawn frоm the circumstances ***.” State v. Tidwell, 165 Ohio St.3d 57, 2021-Ohio-2072, ¶ 40.
{¶12} The trooper was the sole witness to testify at the suppression hearing. When asked “what did you observe that led you to stop [Taylor-Billings][,]” the trooper testified that he saw the lights on Taylor-Billings’ vehicle “toggle on and off. Or off and back on.” The lights on
{¶13} The trial court issued a written decision granting Taylor-Billings’ motion to suppress. The trial court stated in its written decision:
The court finds that on the night of August 30, 2021, [the trooper] and his dashcam, showed that the operator of a car turned off his lights for about a second * * *. From this observation, the trooper thought that this could be a violation of the duty to drive with your lights on at night. [The troopеr], however, could not recall ever being instructed that this was a violation of traffic laws and was able to come up with a number of valid reasons why a person might momentarily turn off or flash his headlights. After [the trooper] turned on his flashing lights and accelerated to pull the defendant over, the defendant reacted by momentarily leаving his marked lane just as he pulled over in compliance with the trooper’s signal. The court cannot use that natural reaction to seeing a law enforcement vehicle’s flashing lights to bootstrap a claim that the trooper had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.
This investigative stop, while viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances, did not provide the basis for an objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation had occurred.
This appeal followed.
{¶14} The State argues that the trooper was justified in initiating a stop after he observed Taylor-Billings operating a vehicle without headlights at night in violation of
{¶15} The August 30, 2019 traffic stop occurred after sunset. Pursuant to
{¶16}
{¶17} The trooper testified that he observed the lights on Taylor-Billings’ vehicle “toggle on and off. Or off and back on.” The trooper obsеrved that the vehicle’s lighted lights were not “displayed during all of the following times: (1) The time from sunset to sunrise.”
{¶18} Further, the question of an
{¶19} The trial court found in its written decision that the trooper did not have “an objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation had occurred.” The trooper testified that he saw Taylor-Billings’ lights toggle off and on, it was dark outside, and the trooper was aware that lights were statutorily required to be on at night. Based on a totality of the circumstances, and when viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer, the trooper had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity, even if only a minor traffic violation, may be afoot. Whether Taylor-Billings could be convicted of a
{¶20} Additionally, once the trooper decided to initiate a traffic stop, and before Taylor-Billings pulled his vehicle over to the side of the road and stopped, the trooper observed the vehicle commit another traffic violation. The trooper witnessed Taylor-Billings’ vehicle “driv[e] over the line, the dash line to the left there, making a marked lanes violation over it.”
{¶21} As is evident from the dash cam video, it was very dark at the time of the traffic stop. The dash cam video and the trooper’s testimony establish that, contrary to
{¶22} The State’s assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶23} This Court sustains the State’s sole assignment of error. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this dеcision.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall bе file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
SCOT STEVENSON FOR THE COURT
FLAGG LANZINGER, J. CONCURS.
CARR, P. J. DISSENTING.
{¶24} I respectfully dissent as I would hold that the trial court’s suppression оrder should be affirmed.
{¶25} This case does not involve a scenario where the trial court failed to recognize that Taylor-Billings toggled his headlights. Instead, the trial court determined that the manner in which
{¶26} During his testimony, the trooper did not connect the basis for the stop to a viоlation of a specific statute or ordinance. The trooper acknowledged that there are multiple reasons why a motorist might lawfully toggle their headlights. At one point, the trooper seemed to suggest that an intentional toggle would not be illegal but he was unsure as to why Taylor-Billings toggled his lights. The trooper testified that he decided to initiate the stop to determine whether the toggle was deliberate or if it stemmed from a mechanical issue with the vehicle. The trooper continued that the toggling of the lights was the sole basis for initiating the stop and that there was no other reason to pull over Taylor-Billings’ vehicle. The State holds the burden at a suppression hearing. See Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). Under these circumstances, I do not think that the trial court committed reversible error in concluding that the State failed to demonstrate that there was a lawful basis for the stop.
{¶27} The trial court further explained that the marked lanes violation was merely an extension of the invalid stop that was already in progress. The trial court stated that “[a]fter [the trooper] turned on his flashing lights and accelerated to pull the defendant over, the defendant reacted by momentarily leaving his marked lane just as he pulled over in compliance with the trooper’s signal. The court cannot use that natural reaction to seeing a law enfоrcement vehicle’s flashing lights to bootstrap a claim that the trooper had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.” I agree with the trial court’s reasoning.
APPEARANCES:
J.D. TOMLINSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.
DOUGLAS W. MERRILL, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.