STATE OF OHIO v. JAMES M. TANKSLEY
Appellate Case No. 2015-CA-80
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
Rendered on the 13th day of May, 2016.
2016-Ohio-2963
WELBAUM, J.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
JAMES M. TANKSLEY
Defendant-Appellant
: Appellate Case No. 2015-CA-80
: Trial Court Case No. 2001-CR-0128
: (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
. . . . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
. . . . . . . . . . .
MEGAN FARLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0088515, Assistant Clark County Prosecuting Attorney,
50 East Columbia Street, 4th Floor, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
FRANCISCO E. LUTTECKE, Atty. Reg. No. 0082866, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400,
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
WELBAUM, J.
Clark County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to vacate the prison sentence
he received for violating post-release control. For the reasons outlined below, the
judgment of the trial court will be reversed and Tanksley’s sentence for violating post-release control will be vacated.
{¶ 2} On December 27, 2000, Tanksley was indicted in Clark County Case No.
2001-CR-0128 for one count of aggravated robbery in violation of
felony of the first degree, with a firearm specification. Thereafter, Tanksley entered into
a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty to the charge in exchange for the State
dismissing the firearm specification and recommending a three-year prison term.
Following his plea, the trial court sentenced Tanksley to three years in prison. Tanksley
did not provide a copy of the sentencing hearing transcript; however, the sentencing entry
states, in pertinent part, the following:
The Court has informed defendant that post release control is
mandatory in this case up to a maximum of five years, as well as the
consequences for violating conditions of post release control imposed by
the Parole Board. Defendant is ordered to serve, as part of this sentence,
any such term of post release control imposed and any prison term for
violation of that post release control.
Judgment Entry of Sentence (July 21, 2001), Clark County Case No. 2001-CR-0128,
Docket No. 15, p. 2.
{¶ 3} On December 26, 2003, Tanksley was released from prison and placed on
Tanksley was convicted of murder in violation of
years to life in prison. As a result of that conviction, the trial court filed an entry in Case
No. 2001-CR-0128 sentencing Tanksley to five years in prison for violating his post-release control obligations. The five-year prison sentence was ordered to run prior to
Tanksley’s sentence in Case No. 2004-CR-0219.
{¶ 4} Approximately 11 years later, on July 23, 2015, Tanksley filed a motion to
vacate the five-year sentence for violating post-release control, which he completed in
2009. The trial court overruled the motion to vacate and Tanksley timely appealed from
that decision, raising the following single assignment of error for review.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. [TANKSLEY’S] MOTION
TO VACATE HIS VOID JUDICIAL-SANCTION SENTENCE.
{¶ 5} Under his sole assignment of error, Tanksley contends he was not properly
sentenced to post-release control in Case No. 2001-CR-0128 due to the language in the
sentencing entry indicating that post-release control was mandatory “up to a maximum of
five years.” Tanksley claims the use of this language renders the post-release control
portion of his sentence void and thereby prevents the trial court from imposing a sanction
for violating the void post-release control obligations. Due to this error, Tanksley
maintains that he was not required to serve any time for violating post-release control and
that all the prison time he has served since his 2004 murder conviction should be credited
toward the sentence he received as a result of that conviction.
{¶ 6} “Post-release control” is “a sanction that is authorized under sections
2929.16 to 2929.18 of the Revised Code and that is imposed upon a prisoner upon the
notify the offender at the sentencing hearing about post-release control, and is further
required to incorporate the specifics of that notice into its judgment of conviction setting
forth the sentence the court imposed.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Terry, 2d Dist.
Darke No. 09CA0005, 2010-Ohio-5391, ¶ 14.
{¶ 7} “[A]mong the most basic requirements of post[-]release control notification
per
both notify the offender of the length of the term of post-release control that applies to his
conviction(s) and incorporate that notification into its journalized judgment of conviction
pursuant to
exercise the authority that
v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 69.
{¶ 8} “[W]hen a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated post[-]release control as
part of a defendant’s sentence, that part of the sentence is void and must be set aside.”
(Emphasis sic and footnote omitted.) State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 26; State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1
N.E.3d 382, ¶ 7. A void judgment is treated as though the proceedings had never
occurred; the judgment is a mere nullity and the parties are in the same position as if
there had been no judgment. State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980
N.E.2d 960, ¶ 10. “In such situations, the void sanction ‘may be reviewed at any time,
on direct appeal or by collateral attack,’ * * * but ‘res judicata still applies to other aspects
of the merits of a conviction, including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements
of the ensuing sentence[.]’ ” Holdcroft at ¶ 7, quoting Fischer at ¶ 40.
than the [mandatory term] of post-release control’ does not conform to the statutory
mandates, rendering that portion of the sentence void.” State v. Blackshear, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 24302, 2011-Ohio-2059, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Gonzalez, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 09CA009528, 2009-Ohio-5759, ¶ 8-9. (Other citations omitted.) For
example, we have consistently held that the post-release control portion of a sentence is
void when the trial court advises a defendant who is subject to mandatory post-release
control that post-release control is mandatory “up to” a certain period of time. See, e.g.,
State v. Conway, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2010-CA-50, 2011-Ohio-24, ¶ 25, fn. 1. (finding that
“there is a discrete part of the sentencing entry that is ‘void’-the part that provides for post-release control for ‘up to’ three years”); State v. Adkins, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2010-CA-69,
2011-Ohio-2819, ¶ 6 (finding post-release control portion of sentence void where trial
court advised defendant that post-release control was mandatory for “up to a maximum
of five years”); State v. Fleming, 2013-Ohio-503, 990 N.E.2d 145, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.) (finding
post-release control sentence void where trial court advised defendant that he “could be”
subject to post-release control “for up to five years”); State v. Dean, 2d Dist. Champaign
No. 2013-CA-17, 2014-Ohio-50, ¶ 14-16 (finding post-release control sentence void when
trial court advised defendant that he is “subject to post-release control for a period of up
to three years”).
{¶ 10} Generally, “ ‘where a sentence is void because it does not contain a
statutorily mandated term, the proper remedy is * * * to resentence the defendant.’ ”
Fischer at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d
864, ¶ 23. (Other citation omitted.) However, if proper notification is given during the
nunc pro tunc entry. State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, 943 N.E.2d 1010, ¶ 14-15; State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111,
967 N.E.2d 718, ¶ 30. Nevertheless, the trial court’s ability to correct its judgment
through a nunc pro tunc entry or by resentencing ceases when the defendant completes
his prison sentence. State v. Huber, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013 CA 16, 2014-Ohio-2095,
¶ 9, citing Holdcroft at paragraph three of the syllabus and Qualls at ¶ 24. Under that
circumstance, post-release control cannot be imposed. State v. Cooper, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 103066, 2015-Ohio-4505, ¶ 10, citing Qualls at ¶ 24. (Other citations
omitted.) “This is true even if the defendant remains incarcerated on other charges.”
Huber at ¶ 9, citing Holdcroft at ¶ 18.
{¶ 11} In Huber, this court followed the foregoing principles and held that the trial
court could not file an amended/nunc pro tunc entry to correct improper language in a
sentencing entry that imposed mandatory post-release control “up to a maximum of three
years” because the defendant had already completed the prison term for which post-release control applied. Id. at ¶ 6-12. See also State v. Bradford, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 102011, 2015-Ohio-1385 (vacating void post-release control sentence after finding
nunc pro tunc entry was not permitted to correct improper “up to” language because the
defendant had already completed his prison sentence).
{¶ 12} Similar to Huber, the trial court in this case incorrectly provided in the
sentencing entry that post-release control is mandatory for “up to a maximum of five
years[.]” We presume the regularity of the sentencing hearing, i.e., that the trial court
transcript of the sentencing hearing as required by
Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). Based on that
presumption, a nunc pro tunc entry would have been sufficient to correct the error in the
sentencing entry had the correction been made before Tanksley completed his three-year
prison term for aggravated robbery. However, like in Huber, Tanksley had already
served his prison term for the underlying aggravated robbery charge; therefore, the trial
court no longer has authority to correct the sentencing entry to properly impose post-release control.
{¶ 13} The State cites State v. Clark, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2012 CA 16, 2013-Ohio-299,
in support of its claim that Tanksley’s post-release control sentence is not void and
should not be vacated. In Clark, the defendant argued that the post-release control
portion of his sentence was void because the trial court’s sentencing entry did not list the
specific consequences of violating post-release control. Id. at ¶ 8. However, we held
that “a judgment entry need not be corrected to include the specific consequences for
violating post-release control conditions, if the trial court imposes a lawful sentence of
post-release control, properly notifies the defendant regarding post-release control and
the specific consequences of the a violation during the sentencing hearing, and the
sentencing entry contains notification regarding the fact that post-release control is being
imposed and that a prison term could be ordered for any violation.” Id. at ¶ 11.
hearing about his term of post-release control and the consequences of violating it, and
the sentencing entry also correctly notified the defendant about his term of post-release
control and the possibility of receiving a prison term if post-release control was violated,
we concluded that the trial court’s failure to list the specific consequences for violating
post-release control in the sentencing entry did not render the defendant’s post-release
control sentence void. Id. at ¶ 5-7, 72-73. In so holding, we relied on the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s decision in Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, 857
N.E.2d 78, for the proposition that the sentencing entry “ ‘was sufficient to afford notice to
a reasonable person that the [court was] authorizing post[-]release control.’ ” Clark at
¶ 73, quoting Watkins at ¶ 51.
{¶ 15} Watkins involved a habeas corpus action filed by 12 inmates who were
incarcerated for violating post-release control. Watkins at ¶ 1. The inmates sought
immediate release from prison on grounds that the trial court never properly imposed
post-release control because their sentencing entries incorrectly contained discretionary
language when post-release control was mandatory. Id. at ¶ 2-27. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that the sentencing entries erroneously referred to discretionary, instead
of mandatory post-release control, but determined that the entries contained information
that was “sufficient to afford notice to a reasonable person that the courts were authorizing
post[-]release control as part of each petitioner’s sentence” and that “any challenge to the
propriety of the sentencing court’s imposition of post[-]release control in the entries could
have been raised on appeal.” Id. at ¶ 51. Thus, the court denied the defendants’
habeas petition. Id. at ¶ 53.
we noted that Justice Lanzinger’s dissent in Watkins rejected the majority’s
view that “mere substantial compliance is sufficient” for providing notice of post-release
control, and found Justice Lanzinger’s view to be in line with subsequent Supreme Court
decisions regarding post-release control; specifically, Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-
Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, and Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942
N.E.2d 332. Notably, Bloomer held that “in the absence of a proper sentencing entry
imposing post[-]release control, the parole board’s imposition of post[-]release control
cannot be enforced.” Bloomer at ¶ 71.
{¶ 17} In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Lynch, 134 Ohio St.3d
561, 2012-Ohio-5730, 983 N.E.2d 1314, impliedly rejects the application of Watkins in
circumstances similar to the case at bar. In Lynch, the trial court issued a resentencing
entry that imposed post-release control, but mistakenly included some discretionary
language, i.e., that post release control was “mandatory up to 5 years.” State v. Lynch,
9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010031, 2012-Ohio-2975, ¶ 7. After the defendant completed
his underlying prison sentence, he filed a motion to terminate post release control on
grounds that the “up to” language in the sentencing entry rendered the post-release
control portion of the sentence void. Id. at ¶ 3, 7-8. The defendant also claimed that
the trial court could not resentence him because he had completed his sentence. Id. at
¶ 7-8. The trial court, however, denied the motion to terminate post-release control and
the Ninth Appellate District affirmed that decision on appeal. Id. at ¶ 3, 15.
{¶ 18} In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Ninth District relied heavily on
Watkins, and stated:
Although Watkins is procedurally distinct from the present case, the
citation in Qualls suggests that its result is applicable in cases that do not
involve petitions for habeas corpus. See [Watkins at ¶ 51, 53], and Qualls
at ¶ 16. See also State v. Garrett, 9th Dist. No. 24377, 2009-Ohio-2559,
¶ 15-16 (applying Watkins in the context of a substantial compliance
analysis where the trial court denied appellant’s post-conviction motion to
withdraw guilty plea). Here, just as in Watkins, Lynch’s sentencing entry
imposed post[-]release control and mistakenly set forth some discretionary
language. Therefore, because Lynch’s entry “contained sufficient
language to authorize the Adult Parole Authority to exercise post[-]release
control” over him, the trial court did not err in denying Lynch’s motion to
terminate post[-]release control on the basis that the sentencing entry
mistakenly included discretionary language, where the oral notification at
the sentencing hearing properly advised Lynch of the terms of post[-]release
control. See Watkins at ¶ 53.
{¶ 19} The Supreme Court of Ohio summarily reversed the Ninth District’s decision
in Lynch on the authority of Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 960,
a case which involved a sentencing entry that incorrectly imposed a mandatory term of
post-release control “up to a maximum of three (3) years” when the defendant was
actually required to be sentenced to a mandatory five-year period of post-release control.
Id. at ¶ 2. After the defendant in Billiter was released from prison, he eventually violated
the conditions of post-release control, and as a result, was indicted for escape. Id. at
he violated almost immediately. Id. at ¶ 3-4. Following the violation, the trial court
revoked community control and sentenced the defendant to six years in prison on the
escape charge. Id. at ¶ 4.
{¶ 20} Four years later, the defendant in Billiter filed a motion to vacate his escape
conviction and sentence on grounds that the post-release control portion of his sentence
was void as a result of the “up to” language in the sentencing entry. Id. at ¶ 5. The trial
court denied the motion and the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed that decision
based on Watkins, reasoning that “the trial court’s incorrect sentence had nevertheless
given Billiter proper notice that he was subject to post[-]release control, and so the
sentence was not void.” Id., citing State v. Bill[i]ter, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008-CA-00198,
2009-Ohio-2709, ¶ 13-14. The defendant did not appeal that decision. Id.
{¶ 21} However, 12 years later, the defendant in Billiter moved to withdraw his
guilty plea to escape on the theory that he had never been legally placed on post-release
control. Id. at ¶ 6. The trial court denied the motion on res judicata grounds and the
Fifth District affirmed the decision and certified a conflict with cases from this district on
the issue of whether res judicata bars a defendant from arguing his plea is void due to a
post-release control sentencing violation. Id. Although focusing on the issue of res
judicata, in reversing the decision of the Fifth District, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted
the following:
Here, the trial court failed to sentence Billiter to a correct term of
post[-]release control. Accordingly, his sentence was void. Fischer,
paragraph one of the syllabus. The trial court’s incorrect sentence for
post[-]release control in 1998 was insufficient to confer authority upon the
Adult Parole Authority to impose up to three years of post[-]release control
on Billiter. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864,
¶ 17. Although the Adult Parole Authority actually did place Billiter under
supervision, see
R.C. 2921.01(E) , and Billiter did violate the terms of thatpost[-]release control in violation of
R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) , Billiter’s escapeconviction was based on an invalid sentence. Accordingly, the trial court
was without jurisdiction to convict him on the escape charge.
Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 960 at ¶ 12.
{¶ 22} Although not explicit, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decisions in Billiter and
Lynch, 134 Ohio St.3d 561, 2012-Ohio-5730, 983 N.E.2d 1314 impliedly reject the
application of Watkins’ sufficient-notice principle in cases where a sentencing entry
improperly uses discretionary language when imposing post-release control, as they
indicate that such a mistake renders the sentence void.
{¶ 23} Nevertheless, we find the State’s reliance on our application of Watkins in
Clark is misplaced because Clark concerns an entirely different factual scenario from the
present case. Unlike in Clark, the sentencing entry in this case contains incorrect
information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant could
receive less than the statutorily-mandated term of post-release control. In addition,
based on our presumption of regularity at the sentencing hearing, there is a discrepancy
between what was stated at the sentencing hearing and what was provided in the
sentencing entry. This did not occur in Clark. Rather, Clark concerns a scenario where
the trial court did not provide any incorrect information at sentencing or in the sentencing
in the sentencing entry. Therefore, the holding in Clark is inapplicable here.
{¶ 24} In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s imposition of post-release control for Tanksley’s aggravated robbery conviction is void as a result of the
improper “up to” language that is contained in the sentencing entry. As a result, since
Tanksley has already completed his prison sentence for aggravated robbery, the trial
court no longer has authority to correct the improper language. Therefore, the imposition
of post-release control remains void, as if it had never been imposed, which means the
trial court did not have authority to sanction Tanksley for violating post-release control.
Accordingly, because Tanksley’s sentence for violating post-release control in his
aggravated robbery case arose out of his murder conviction, the time Tanksley served in
prison as a result of violating the void post-release control shall be credited toward the
sentence he received for his 2004 murder conviction. See also State v. Smith, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-14-1189, 2015-Ohio-3612, ¶ 12 (finding the sentence imposed as a result of
the violation of the terms of the void post-release control sanction cannot be counted in
calculating appellant’s release date).
Conclusion
{¶ 25} Tanksley’s sole assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the trial
court denying Tanksley’s motion to vacate is reversed and the five-year prison sentence
Tanksley received for violating post-release control is vacated.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Copies mailed to:
Megan Farley
Francisco E. Luttecke
Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter
ODRC, Bureau of Sentence Computation
Notes
“sentenced to prison for a felony 1 * * *, after [his] prison release [he] will have 5 years
of post-release control under conditions determined by the Parole Board.” (Emphasis
added.) Plea of Guilty (July 12, 2001), Clark County Case No. 2001-CR-0128, Docket
No. 14, p. 2.