OPINION
1 Defendant Mark D. Talbot appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, alleging that he was subject to an unconstitutional search and seizure. Talbot also seeks reversal and a new trial, arguing that he was not provided with a critical part of the record-the jury voir dire. We affirm.
BACKGROUND 1
12 In March 2007, after obtaining evidence from multiple sources that Talbot was distributing methamphetamine, the Garfield County Sheriff (the Sheriff) decided to obtain a warrant to search Talbot's person, home, and vehicle. The Sheriff called a dеputy (the Deputy) who was on patrol in the area and told him "what was going on and what had happened." The Sheriff further informed the Deputy that he was in the process of obtaining a search warrant for Talbot's possessions and person and instructed the Deputy to stop and detain Talbot should the Deputy encounter him. Soon after the phone call, while on patrol, the Deputy saw Talbot driving and pulled him over. The Deputy patted Talbot down for weapons and placed him in handcuffs "for [Talbot's] and [the Deputy'sl safety." In the meantime, thе Sheriff discussed the matter further with another officer who had assisted the Sheriff in taking possession of methamphetamine from a witness who said that Talbot had given him the methamphetamine. Moments after the Deputy had conducted the initial stop, the Sheriff called the Deputy and told him to arrest Talbot. When questioned as to why he did not wait for the search warrant to be issued before giving the instruction to arrest Talbot, the Sheriff explained that he already "had probable cause that ... [Talbot had] distributed methamphetamine[ ] just a few minutes ... earlier."
T3 After рlacing Talbot under arrest and reading him his Miranda rights, the Deputy searched Talbot's person and found methamphetamine. Other officers also found marijuana and drug paraphernalia during an impound inventory of Talbot's ear. Soon afterward, a magistrate granted the search warrant, but the only additional evidence found pursuant to the search warrant was drug paraphernalia in Talbot's home.
T 4 Talbot was charged with distribution of a controlled substance with prior convictions, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-87-8(1) (Supp. 2010), 2 possession of a controllеd substance in a drug-free zone, see id. § 58-37-8(2), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, see id. § 58-87a-5(1). Prior to trial, Talbot moved to suppress the evidence that was found on his person and in his *115 vehicle following his arrest, arguing that the evidence was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Talbot was later convicted by a jury.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1 5 Talbot challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia found on his person and in his vehicle
3
before the search warrant was granted, arguing that this evidence was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. Specifically, he asserts that because the underlying arrest was invalid, the ensuing search incident to his arrest were unlawful. "In an appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the trial court's factual findings for clear error{,] and we review its conclusions of law for correctness." Salt Lake City v. Bench,
ANALYSIS
I. Talbot's Arrest and the Search Incident to His Arrest Were Constitutional.
T6 Talbot asserts that some of the evidence supporting his convictions was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amеndment of the United States Constitution
4
See generally U.S. Const. amend. IV (providing protection from unreasonable searches and seizures). The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Mapp v. Ohio,
T7 Genеrally, searches conducted without the benefit of a warrant are per se unreasonable. See State v. Chansamone,
A. Whether the Deputy Exceeded the Sheriff s Instructions Is Not Relevant in Determining Whether Talbot's Arrest Was Constitutional.
T8 Talbot contends that the Deputy exceеded the authority given to him by the
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Sheriff, which Talbot alleges made his arrest and the ensuing search unconstitutional. Specifically, Talbot asserts that the Deputy's actions violated the Sheriff's instructions to merely detain Talbot, arguing that by detaining and handecuffing him, the Deputy "effectively placed] him under arrest." See generally State v. Applegate,
19 The Utah Supreme Court recently ruled in State v. Harker,
110 For purposes of this appeal, we accept Talbot's assertion that the Deputy's initial encounter with Talbot was an arrest rather than a detention. 6 Talbot makes no claim that the Deputy's inherent authority as a serving peace officer to arrest malefactors was constrained by anything other than the Sheriff's instructions and constitutional boundaries. Applying the reasoning of Harker, we conclude thаt so long as Talbot's arrest was justified by probable cause, the fact that the Deputy may have exceeded the instructions given to him by the Sheriff has no bearing on whether Talbot's arrest was "lawful" under the Constitution. 7 If an arrest in violation of a statutory restriction does not itself raise constitutional issues, then, a fortiori, an arrest that exceeds a superior's immediate directive in a particular *117 cireumstance does not do so. Therefore, the pivotal question in determining whether Talbot's arrest was constitutional is whether the arrest was supрorted by probable cause.
B. Probable Cause Existed to Support Talbot's Arrest, and the Collective Knowledge Doctrine Imputes the Probable Cause from the Sheriff to the Deputy.
§11 On appeal, Talbot does not directly challenge the trial court's conclusion that probable cause existed to support his arrest. He appears to argue, however, that although probable cause generally existed to support his arrest, the Deputy did not have probable cause to arrest him based on the Deputy's own knowledge at the time. We conclude that, whatever the limitations on the Deputy's own knowledge of the underlying facts and circumstances, the collective knowledge of his law enforcement colleagues was imputed to him and was sufficient to justify Talbot's arrest.
112 An officer must have probable cause to make an arrest without a warrant. See State v. Trane,
113 Under the collective knowledge doctrine, also known as the fellow officer rule, facts known to law enforcement officers who are working together may be aggregated to determine whether there is probable cause for an arrest. See, e.g., State v. Dorsey,
114 The collective knowledge doctrine may take on two forms: horizontal collective knowledge and vertical collective knowledge.
8
See id. at 1345. Horizontal collective knowledge "subsumes situations where a number of individual law enforcement officers have pieces of the probable cause puzzle, but no single officer possesses information sufficient for probable cause." Id. (citing United States v. Shareef,
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115 Vertical collective knowledge, on the other hand, subsumes "situation[s] where one officer has probable cause and instructs another officer to act, but does not communicate the corpus of information known to the first officer that would justify the alrrest]."
10
id. at 1345 (emphasis omitted). In such situations, "an officer may rely on the instructions of" other officers to support an arrest "even if that officer himself or herself is not рrivy to all the facts amounting to probable cause." Id. at 1347; see, e.g., Id. at 1348 (concluding that a patrolman had probable cause to stop and search the defendant's vehicle based on facts known to another officer where that officer simply instruct ed the patrolman to stop the defendant's vehicle); Prows,
{16 In this case, the Sheriff had probable cause to support Talbot's arrest. The Sheriff was aware of statements from multiple witnesses about Talbot's use and distribution of methamphetamine; some of those statements the Sheriff had received directly, while other statements had been relayed to him by other officers. Three witnesses stated that Talbot had supplied them with methamphetamine in January 2007, six weeks prior to his arrest. One of those witnesses added that she and Talbot hаd used methamphetamine that he had supplied. A fourth witness told the Sheriff that Talbot had given him methamphetamine in February 2007 and agreed that he would report to the Sheriff if Talbot again offered him methamphetamine. In March 2007, on the same day as the arrest, Talbot gave the fourth witness methamphetamine,
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which the witness immediately turned over to the Sheriff, along with the information that Talbot had three more "boulders" of methamphetamine on his person. Collectively, this evidence is sufficient to justify a belief in "a reasonable and prudent person in [thе Sheriff's] position" that Talbot had committed an offense and amounts to probable cause to support an arrest. See Trane,
{17 Having probable cause that Talbot was involved in illegal activity, the Sheriff called on the Deputy to act on the Sheriff's behalf in a collective effort to detain and eventually arrest Talbot. Initially, the Sheriff instructed the Deputy to stop and detain Talbot. In giving this instruction, the Sheriff identified Talbot as the alleged perpetrator, told the Deputy "what was going on and what had happened," and explained that he was in the process of obtaining a search warrant. Then, moments after the Deputy had stopped Talbot, the Sheriff gave the Deputy the specific instruction to arrest Talbot. Only after receiving the Sheriff's specific instruction to arrest Talbot did the Deputy conduct the search that resulted in him finding the additional drug evidence in Talbot's vehicle and on his person.
118 The focus of Talbot's argument on appeal appears to be that the exact timing of the Sheriff's specific instruction to arrest and the Deputy's actual arrеst-which Talbot asserts occurred before the Sheriffs specific instruction to arrest-makes his arrest unconstitutional. Utah courts have observed that "[al search of an arrestee's person is valid ... [regardless of whether] it shortly precedes the arrest, 'so long as the arrest and the search are substantially contempora~ neous and probable cause to effect the arrest exists independent of the evidence seized in the search."" State v. Chansamone,
119 We further conclude that the probable cause known to the Sheriff can be vertically imputed to the Deputy through the collective knowledge doctrine. Although the Sheriff did not immediately communicate the specific instruction to arrest Talbot nor detailed facts supporting Talbot's arrest, 11 the communication and coordination between the Deputy and the Sheriff was sufficient to show that the Deputy was not acting on his own but was acting as part of a collective team effort led by the Sheriff. Because there was sufficient communication and coordination for the collective knowledge doctrine to apply, the probable cause known to the Sheriff is properly imputed to the Deputy. Thus, there was probable cause to justify Talbot's arrest by the Deputy. And because the arrest was within constitutional bounds, the ensuing search incident to the arrest was proper, even though it occurred before a search warrant was granted. The trial court therefore properly denied Talbot's motion to suppress.
II. Talbot Has Failed to Supplement the Record, Thereby Precluding Our Review of the Jury Voir Dire.
120 Talbot next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury voir *120 dire is missing from the trial transcript. 12 In support of this argument, Talbot asserts that the trial court has failed "to provide a tran-seript of the jury selection prоcess, despite repeated requests" that the trial court supplement the record with the jury voir dire. Talbot's single request to supplement the record, however, was actually a "Motion Regarding Correction of Transcript Request and Inclusion of Trial Transcripts in the Ree-ord," filed on May 22, 2009. With this motion, Talbot sought to correct his original "transcript request, which [had been] intended" to request transcripts for both the trial and sentencing but "inadvertently only listed the sentencing [dates] and omitted the trial" dates. In a June 8, 2009 order, this court granted Talbot's motion аnd stayed the proceedings so that the trial transeripts could be included in the record. Upon receipt of the trial transcripts, briefing was rescheduled. Nowhere in Talbot's motion is the absence of the jury voir dire mentioned, nor did he make any further motion to supplement the record after the trial transcripts had been included in the record and made available to him.
121 Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure " 'establishes a procedure for supplementing the record [on appeal] when necessary.'" Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc.,
122 Talbot has made no motion under rule 11(b) to supplement the record by including the currently excluded jury voir dire. Because Talbot has "failled] to provide an adequate record on appeal, [we] ... must assume the regularity of the proceedings below." See State v. Litherland,
CONCLUSION
123 So long as Talbot's arrest was supported by probable cause, the fact that the Deputy may have exceeded the instructions given to him by the Sheriff has no bearing on whether Talbot's arrest was "lawful" under the constitution. The arrest was supported by probable сause based on all the facts and cireumstances known to the Sheriff and his law enforcement team, of which the arresting Deputy was a part, and the knowledge of the Deputy's fellow officers was imputed to the Deputy under the collective knowledge doe-trine at the time he arrested Talbot. We decline to consider Talbot's voir dire issue due to his failure to appropriately supplement the record under rule 11(h).
1 24 Accordingly, we affirm.
Notes
. Talbot does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, and we therеfore accept those findings as true.
. For convenience of the reader, we cite the current version of the Utah Code because the relevant sections are unchanged from the versions in effect when the events underlying Talbot's convictions occurred.
. We refer to both the search of his person and the search of his vehicle together as the search incident to arrest.
. Talbot also makes a cursory assertion that the search and seizure violated article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, but he makes nо separate arguments under the state constitution. We therefore consider Talbot's challenge to the search and seizure only under the federal constitution. See State v. Van Dyke,
. The trial court's finding that Talbot was arrested is not as clear as Talbot attempts to portray it because the trial сourt's explanation of the events did not include any indication of whether the arrest occurred before or after the Sheriff instructed the Deputy to arrest Talbot.
. The State, citing to United States v. Perdue,
. This conclusion is consistent with other cases where courts have concluded thаt an officer's exceeding another source of authority in conducting a search was not pertinent to the underlying constitutional analysis. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris,
. "[Tlhe 'horizontal' and 'vertical' collective knowledge categories are by no means mutually exclusive." United States v. Chavez,
. Some courts have restricted the scope of horizontal collective knowledge more than others. In United States v. Shareef,
. The vertical and horizontal distinctions describe the ways that knowledge is gathered and disseminated rather than the hierarchical relationship of the officers to each other. Thus, despite the "vertical" cognomen, an instruction to act need not be from a superior; a request or instruction originating from a fellow officer having knowledge amounting to probable cause can itself be sufficient.
. It is unclear from the record what facts if any the Sheriff communicated to the Deputy. Rather, the Sheriff merely testified that he told the Deputy "what was going on and what had happened." But by operation of vertical collective knowledge, the Deputy was not required to know all the facts known to the Sheriff so long as the Sheriff himself was aware of the facts providing the basis for probable cause.
. At the place in the trial transcript where the jury voir dire would usually be found, the transcript merely reads, "Whereupon, the jury selection process took place and a jury was selected to hear this case."