State v. T. M. H.State v. T. M. H.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Doyle, Andrews, Boggs
T. M. H. was prosecuted as an adult in the superior court, and he was 16 years old at the time of his negotiated plea. The superior court sentenced T. M. H. to “confinement in such institution as the Commissioner of the State Department of Corrections may direct[.]”3 Because T. M. H. was sixteen years old at the time of his sentencing, he was committed by the Department of Corrections (“DOC“) into the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ“) and housed in a juvenile detention facility.
A few weeks before his seventeenth birthday, the superior court held a status conference at the DJJ‘s request to review T. M. H.‘s commitment order. The superior
The State argues that the superior court was not authorized to probate the remainder of T. M. H.‘s sentenсe. We disagree.
We note at the outset that, as the parties point out, there is little if any case law interpreting precisely how the applicable statutes govern this scenario. Even so, as in any case, our analysis begins with
[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction[, which] is to seek the intent of the Legislature[. In so doing,] language in one part of a statute must
be construed in the light of the legislative intent as found in thе statute as a whole. . . [, and] we must first focus on the statute‘s text. In order to discern the meaning of the words of a statute, we must look at the context in which the statute was written, remembering at all times that the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words. In addition, [when] interpreting a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly had full knowledge of the existing state of the law and enacted the statute with reference to it. We construe statutes in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts.5
Also, when “interpreting criminal statutes, it is axiomatic that any ambiguities must be construed most favorably to the defendant. . . [And f]or purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.”6
Turning to the issue before us, the governing Code sections are
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article and except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, in any case where a person under the age of 17 years is convicted of a felony and sentenced as an adult to life imprisonment or to a certain term of imprisonment, such person shall be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice to serve such sentence in a detention center of such department until such person is 17 years of age at which time such person shall be transferred to the Department of Correctiоns to serve the remainder of the sentence. This Code section shall apply to any person convicted on or after July 1, 1987, and to any person convicted prior to such date who has not been committed to an institution operated by the Department of Corrections.
(b) If a child is transferred to superior court pursuant to Code Section 15-11-5617 and convicted of aggravated assault as defined in Chaрter 5 of Title 16, the court may sentence such child to the Department of Corrections. Such child shall be housed in a designated youth confinement unit until such person is 17 years of age, at which time such person may be housed in any other unit designated by the Department of Corrections.8
Thus, this Code section serves as the default instruction on how to house certain child offenders under the age of 17.
(a) Any child who has previously been adjudged to have committed an act which is a felony if tried in a superior court and who, on a second or subsequent occasion, is convicted of a felony in a superior court may, in the discretion of the court, be sentenced into the custody of the department as otherwise provided by law or be committed as a youthful offender as authorized in Chapter 7 of Title 42; provided, further, that any child convicted of a felony punishable by death or by confinement for life shall only be sentenced into the custody of the Department of Corrections.
(b) Any final order of judgment by the court in the case of any such child shall be subject to such modification from time to time as the court may consider to be for the welfare of such child. No commitment of any child to any institution or other custodial agency shall deprive the court of jurisdiction to change the form of the commitment or transfer the custody of the child to some other institution or agency on such conditions as the court may see fit to impose, the duty being constant upon the court to give to all children subject to its jurisdiction such oversight and control in the premises as will be conducive to the welfare of the child and the best interests of the state; provided, however, that thе release of any child committed to the department for detention in any of its institutions under the terms of this chapter during the period of one year from the date of commitment shall be had only with the concurrence and recommendation of the commissioner or the commissioner‘s designated representative; provided, further, that upon releasing any child adjudicated for committing a delinquent act for the
commission of a class A designated felony act or class B designated felony act as defined in Code Section 15-11-2 and committed to the department for detention in any of its institutions under the terms of this chapter, the department shall provide notice to any person who was the victim of the child‘s delinquent acts that the child is being released. So long as a good faith attempt to comply with the notice requirement of this subsection has been made, the department and employees of the department shall not be liable for damages incurred by reason of the department‘s failure to provide the notice required by this subsection. (c) After the expiration of one year from the date of commitment, the committing court shall review the case and make such order with respect to the continued confinemеnt or release of the child back to the committing court for further disposition as the court deems proper.
(d) In the event adequate facilities are not available, the department shall have the right to transfer youths committed to the department under this Code section to the Department of Corrections for incarceration in an appropriate facility designated by the Department оf Corrections.
(e) Any child under 17 years of age who is sentenced in the superior court and committed to the department may be eligible to participate in all juvenile detention facility programs and services including community work programs, sheltered workshops, special state sponsored programs for evaluation and services under the Georgia Vocational Rehabilitation Agency and the Department of Behavioral
Health and Developmental Disabilities, and under the gеneral supervision of juvenile detention facility staff at special planned activities outside of the juvenile detention facility. When such a child sentenced in the superior court is approaching his or her seventeenth birthday, the department shall notify the court that a further disposition of the child is necessary. The department shall provide the court with information concerning the participation аnd progress of the child in programs described in this subsection. The court shall review the case and determine if the child, upon becoming 17 years of age, should be placed on probation, have his or her sentence reduced, be transferred to the Department of Corrections for the remainder of the original sentence, or be subject to any other determination authorized by law.9
Here, T. M. H. was sentenсed to the DOC, but because he was under 17, he was committed by the DOC to the DJJ for confinement.10 As T. M. H.‘s seventeenth birthday approached, the superior court held a hearing and exercised its discretion to modify his sentence pursuant to
Nevertheless, the State argues that, in this case, the superior court‘s authority under subsection (e) does not reach T. M. H.‘s sentence in this case because (1) language in
Looking first at
With respect to
Further, рreserving discretion over juveniles’ sentences is in harmony with the statutory mandate in
[n]o commitment of any child to any institution or other custodial agency shall deprive the court of jurisdiction to change the form of the
commitment or transfer the custody of the child to some other institution or agency on such conditions as the court may see fit to impose, the duty being constant upon the court to give to all children subject to its jurisdiction such oversight and control in the premises as will be conducive to the welfare of the child and the best interests of the state . . . .12
This is part of a unified statutory scheme enacted by the legislature specifically to address juvenile offenders.13 As required by the rules of statutory construction, we credit this specific scheme over the general sentencing provisions in Chapter 10 of Title 17 in which
Finally, this interpretаtion comports with the recent whole-court case of Ga. Dept. of Juvenile Justice v. Eller,15 in which this Court addressed a slightly different
In light of the express authority provided in
The superior court has “exclusive original jurisdiction over the trial of any child 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed” one of several enumerated violent crimes, including “[a]rmed robbery if committed with a firearm.”
[When] a person under the age of 17 years is convicted of a felony and sentenced as an adult to life imprisonment or to a certain term of imprisonment, such person shall be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice to serve suсh sentence . . . until such person is 17 years of age at which time such person shall be transferred to the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of the sentence.
Notwithstanding the foregoing statutory mandate, the trial court found that it was authorized to probate the balance of T.M.H.‘s sentence upon his seventeenth birthday pursuant to
Any child under 17 years of age who is sentenced in thе superior court and committed to the [D]epartment [of Juvenile Justice] may be eligible to participate in all juvenile detention facility programs and services . . . . When such a child sentenced in the superior court is approaching his or her seventeenth birthday, the [D]epartment [of Juvenile Justice] shall provide the court with information concerning the participation and progress of the child in [such] рrograms. The court shall review the case and determine if the child, upon becoming 17 years of age, should be placed on probation, have his or her sentence reduced, be transferred to the Department of Corrections for the remainder of the original sentence, or be subject to any other determination authorized by law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court‘s recent decision in Ga. Dept. of Juvenile Justice v. Eller, __ Ga. App. __ (789 SE2d 412) (2016), does not require a different result. In Eller, the DJJ appealed from a superior court order sentencing Eller, a juvenile, directly into the custody of the DJJ until he turned 21 years оld. Id. at *1. The Eller Court found that although the superior court was authorized to re-evaluate Eller‘s sentence upon his seventeenth birthday under
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to probate the balance of T.M.H.‘s sentence and to order his release. “When a trial court enters a judgment where it does not have jurisdiction, such judgment is a mere nullity; but an appeal from such an illegal judgment will not be dismissed but instead, the void judgment will be reversed.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bush v. State, 273 Ga. 861, 861 (548 SE2d 302) (2001). See e. g., State v. James, 211 Ga. App. 149, 150 (2) (438 SE2d 399) (1993) (as trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a motion to reconsider a defendant‘s guilty please, its judgment doing so was an nullity).
I am authorized to state that Andrews, P. J. and Boggs, J. join in this dissent.