*1 A16A0526. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE v. ELLER. Rickman, Judge. Department (“DJJ”), though nonparty The of Juvenile Justice a proceedings appeals superior below,1 to the ing from a court order direct- Eller, DJJ to hold in its Daniel Lee a criminal defendant prosecuted juvenile, as an adult for a crime he committed as a until years contrary superior that, he turns 21 old. DJJ contends plain language (a) directive, court’s the of OCGA 17-10-14 man- Department uрon dates that Eller be transferred to the ofCorrections birthday. agree his seventeenth We and reverse. negotiated guilty
The record shows that in Eller entered a plea burglary Superior to child molestation and in the Court of Hall County years pros- Eller was 15 old at the time of the crime and was superior 40-year ecuted as an adult in the court. He received a sen- confinement,. years tence, with 15 to be served in During sentencing hearing, requested the defense counsel the judge to direct that Eller remain in the ofDJJ until he turned objection request. old, and the State indicated it had no Although judge exprеssly questioned authority impose her that specific ultimately agreed condition on Eller’s she to it after parties position both took the that she was authorized to do so. January Depart-
In when Ellеr turned 17 attempted custody pursuant ment of Corrections to take Eller into its (a). superior to OCGA 17-10-14 The court conducted a sentence hearing,2 review custody after which it ordered that Eller was to rеmain in the twenty-first birthday. appeals, arguing
of DJJ until his DJJ Georgia court’s order violates (a) DJJ, As asserted OCGA 17-10-14 mandated a trans- upon fer of Eller to the of Corrections Eller’s seventeenth birthday: a under the is convicted
*2 [When] of a and sentenced as an adult... to a certain term of under the Constitution or laws of this or court which mandates actions and named in such (“An appeal may judgment DJJ has The hearing of a сourt where the court does not have standing judgment be taken (1) (208 was conducted in appeal contempt and on behalf of the State of 846) (1974) (“Ajudgment which, pursuant state.”). of court is an if valid, to OCGA 49-4A-9 See аlso OCGA 5-6-34 court’s order would authorize the court to hold the appealable judgment.”). Georgia rendered sua pursuant (e), or the order is otherwise void .. . as discussed below. [f]rom (a) (1); to OCGA 5-7-1 sponte by an Darden v. order, decision, persons Ravan, (a) (6) [248]
imprisonment, person Depart- such shall be committed to the ment of Juvenile Justice to serve such sentence in a deten- department person yеars tion center of such until such is 17 age at which time such shall be transferred to the Department of Corrections to serve the remainder of the sentence. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding foregoing statutory mandate, Ellеr asserts that his retention in DJJ is authorized (e). provides That statute that when a child under the who was convicted of a and sentenced in the court as approaches 17, an adult the DJJ notify shall the cоurt that a further ofthe child is necessary ... The court shall review the case and determine upon becoming age, placed child, if the should be reduced, on have his or her sentence be trans- ferred to the of Corrections for the remainder of original subject or be to other determina- tion authorized law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
by directing
Eller maintains that
DJJ to retain
lawfully
of him until he turns 21
court
authority
“any
exercised its
him to
other determination.”3
together,
reject
When read
we
Eller’s contention that OCGA §
disregard
49-4A-9
authorized the
the mandates
(a)
presented
of OCGA 17-10-14
under the circumstances
in this
language
plаin
case. It is axiomatic that
of a statute is
“[when]
susceptible
only
construction,
and
one natural and reasonable
accordingly.” (Citation
punc
courts must construe the statute
and
omitted.) Hough
(2) (а) (620
State,
tuation
v.
279 Ga.
SE2d
380) (2005);
(322
Co.,
see Mullins v. First
Ins.
253 Ga.
General
265) (1984).
judicial
language
fact,
In
construction of the
unambiguous
only unnecessary
of an
statute “is not
but forbidden.”
(Citation
punctuation omitted.) Hough,
(2) (a);
249
(Citation
punctuation omitted.)
can not add a line to the law.”
аnd
(629
Fielden,
444,
280 Ga.
SE2d
State
(a) explicitly
unequivocally provides that,
OCGA 17-10-14
and
§
upon turning
juvenile
custody
a
in DJJ
who was
court as an adult “shall be transferred to the
sentenced in
Department ofCorrections to serve the remainder ofthe sentence.” In
passing
(e), Georgia legislature
OCGA 49-4A-9
the
authorized the
sentencing
juvenile’s
court to review and reassess a
case as his or her
approaches
impose
transfer date
in order to consider whether to
an
disposition.
express language
alternative
Pursuant
of that
statute, to the extent that the
court reviewed Eller’s case and
judge
warrantеd,
determined that an alternative
was
place
was authorized to:
him on
reduce his
allow
“any
Corrections,
his transfer to the
of
or fashion
other
by
Ordering
determination authorized
law.”
that Eller remain in DJJ
age, however,
until he reaches 21
was neither
by
(e)
any
provision Georgia
authorized
or
other
(e)
proposed
Were we to construe OCGA 49-4A-9
in the manner
by
meaningless
express statutory require-
Eller, it wоuld render
imposed by
sentencing
ment that
alternative determination
court otherwise be “authorized
law.” This we cannot do. See
Findley,
(548
5) (2001);
Chatman v.
274 Ga.
Ramos-Silva
App.
Co.,
v.
(2009).
Farm Mut. Ins.
300 Ga.
State
Our conclusion is furthеr buttressed
the fact that when
passing
legislature expressly provided
Code,
juvenile
the Juvenile
that a
adjudicated
having
child
in
committed a similar
felonious act could be detained in DJJ
until the
of 21. See
(g).
assume,
OCGA 15-11-602
“Wemust
in the absence of evidence
contrary,
that these distinctions are intended
the General
Assembly,
(Footnote omitted.)
and construe them as written.”
State
App.
(
BARNES,
respectfully
majority’s opinion
I
dissent to the
because constru-
ing
OCGA 17-10-14 to remove the
court’s discretion to
*4
jurisdiction
age
exercise
over Eller until he reaches
21 would render
meaningless.
statutory
A cardinal rule of
construc
diligently
tion is that “the courts shall look
for the intention of the
Assembly[.]”
(a).
Generаl
OCGA 1-3-1
This court will not construe
any portion
meaningless.
State,
a statute so as to render
of it
Sikes
(2) (
OCGA 17-10-14 any person age case where a under the [I]n is convicted of a imprisonment and sentenced as an adult to life imprisonment, or to a certain term of such person Department shall be committed to the of Juvenile Justice to serve such sentence in a detention center of such department person until such is 17 of at which Department time such shall be transferred to the of Corrections to serve the remainder of the sentence. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) YеtOCGA 49-4A-9 authorizes the sentenc- ing court to review the case once the child is 17 placed determine if the child “should be on have his or her reduced, sentence be transferred to the ofCorrections for original subject any the remainder of the or be other (b) determination authorized law.” Likewise OCGA 49-4A-9 provides: Any judgment by any order the court in the case final subject
such child shall be to such time to modifiсation from may time as the court consider to be such for welfare of any child. Nocommitment of child to institution or other agency deprive jurisdiction custodial shall the court of change the form of the commitment or transfer the agency of the child to some other institution or on such may impose, duty being conditions as the court see fit to upon give subject constant the court to to all сhildren to its oversight premises such and control in the as will be conducive to the the child and the best welfare of interests the state[.\
(Emphasis supplied.) (c) provides Moreover, OCGA 49-4A-9 that judgment the final is to modification and that the *5 respect court “shall review the case and make such order with committing continued or release the child back to the confinement proper.” (Emphasis court as the court deems for further supplied.) majority proposes The that OCGA 49-4A-9 authorizes the sentencing only make determinations “authorized law” remaining custody per and that express language in DJJ is not authorized law (a) mandating
in OCGA 17-10-14 the automatic custody upon turning majority, transfer from DJJ old. The why any sentencing however, fails to reconcile review the court permitted per juvenile would be OCGA 49-4A-9court once a turned unequivocal 17 if transfer to the of Corrections was an operation presume Legislature’s of law. “Wemust failure to limiting language include . . . was a matter of considered choice.” Transp. (524 Restaurants, Ins. Co. v. El Chico legislation clearly contemplates This that a might juvenile court retain over a until the of 21. See (k). directing I would affirm the trial court’s order that Eller remain Accordingly, in DJJ until the of 21. I dissent from the majority’s opinion. Judge joins
I am authorized to state that McFadden in this dissent. July 15,
Decided 2016. Attorney Attaway Olens, General, Burton, Patricia B. Samuel S. Deputy ey Joseph Attorney General, Drolet, Attorn Assistant J. Senior Amy Radley, Hye Attorneys General, eral, Park, M. Min Assistant Gen appellant. for Burruss, Firm, Weaver,Sr., Law Michael L. M. for
Weaver Jason appellee.
A16A0558. CLARK v. RAU. Boggs, Judge. appeals pro Kathrine Clark se from an order of the Chatham County Superior granting Ricky petition Court G. Rau’s for modifi- support. transcript cation of and child No is included in the hearing reported, appear record, and while the at issue was it does not