State v. StuberState v. Stuber
Michael W. Stuber, Appellant
John R. Payne for Appellee
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Michael W. Stuber (Stuber), pro se, appeals the August 10, 2017 judgment entry of the Lima Municipal Court. We affirm.
{¶2} On May 1, 2017, Stuber was cited for driving under suspension in violation of
{¶3} On June 9, 2017, Stuber filed a motion to dismiss the charge arguing that the trial court lacked “jurisdiction in this matter” for a number of reasons. (Doc. No. 5). On June 14, 2017, the trial court denied Stuber‘s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 7).
{¶4} After a bench trial on August 10, 2017, the trial court found Stuber guilty of the charge in the citation. (Doc. No. 9). The trial court imposed a $50 fine plus court costs and assessed two points on his operator‘s license. (Id.).
{¶5} On September 8, 2017, Stuber filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 10). He raises four assignments of error for our review. Because they raise jurisdictional issues, we will begin by addressing Stuber‘s first and third assignments of error, followed by his second and fourth assignments of error.
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court Judge, Without Justifiable Cause, Failed to Make a Valid Final Appealable Order of Judgment and the State of
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Stuber argues that the June 14 and August 10, 2017 judgment entries of the trial court do not constitute final, appealable orders because those entries do “not contain an entry on the journal by the clerk.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 5).
{¶7} Courts of appeal in Ohio have appellate jurisdiction over “final appealable orders.”
{¶8} Stuber contends that the trial court‘s June 14 and August 10, 2017 judgment entries do not constitute final, appealable orders because those entries
{¶9} Although interlocutory during the pendency of the case, the trial court‘s June 14, 2017 entry denying Stuber‘s motion to dismiss the charge merged into the trial court‘s August 10, 2017 judgment entry of sentence. See State v. Eberhardt, 56 Ohio App.2d 193, 198 (8th Dist.1978) (“Generally speaking, the overruling of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case or a civil case is not considered a final appealable order. Ordinarily, after a motion to dismiss is overruled, the case will proceed to trial and in the event of judgment adverse to the moving party, the trial court‘s action overruling the motion may become one of the assignments of error on appeal.“). See also State v. Shaffer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87552, 2006-Ohio-5563, ¶ 21 (noting “that it is well-established that an order overruling a motion to dismiss an action is not a final order from which an appeal may be taken” because “an order denying a motion to dismiss does not determine the action, nor does it foreclose the possibility of relief in the future“); State v. Leece, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA89-06-084, 1990 WL 49993, *2 (Apr. 23, 1990) (“The denial of a motion
{¶10} Further, even though Stuber‘s statement of his first assignment of error does not state that he is presenting the issue for review, Stuber contends that the trial court erred by notifying him that “‘[t]he clerk shall use license forfeiture and registration block as a means to collect unpaid fines and cost[s].‘” (Appellant‘s Brief at 6, quoting Doc. No. 9). Despite Stuber‘s failure to comply with the rules of appellate procedure, in the interest of justice, we will address his argument. See State v. Thomas, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-10-17, 2011-Ohio-4337, ¶ 25;
{¶11} Stuber‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
The Trial Court Lacked Personal Jurisdiction, as well as Subject Matter Jurisdiction in this Matter.
{¶12} In his third assignment of error, Stuber argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction in this matter because (1) the law enforcement officer failed to sign the citation as required by
{¶13} We review de novo the existence of a trial court‘s subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. State v. Williams, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-06-144, 2015-Ohio-1090, ¶ 7; Columbus v. Ford, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-260, 2004-Ohio-5715, ¶ 4. As we stated in Stuber‘s first assignment of error, de novo review is independent and without deference to the lower court‘s determination. Hudson, 2013-Ohio-647, at ¶ 27, citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d at 147.
{¶14} “Subject-matter jurisdiction involves a court‘s power to hear a case.” Williams at ¶ 7. “As such, the issue can never be waived and may be raised at any time.” Id., citing State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, ¶ 10. On the other hand, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction goes to the court‘s authority to render judgment against a party to an action.” Cleveland v. Kutash, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99509, 2013-Ohio-5124, ¶ 11. A court acquires personal jurisdiction over a “defendant when: (1) service of process is completed over the defendant, (2) the
{¶15} “Ohio municipal courts ‘are created by statute,
{¶16} Under
{¶17} The ticket issued against Stuber and filed with the trial court was electronically produced and reflects the electronically produced signature of the issuing law enforcement officer. As such, the ticket conforms with the Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket and is a valid complaint. See Lyons at ¶ 9. Moreover, the electronically produced ticket cited Stuber for violating
{¶18} Similarly, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Stuber. Id. at ¶ 10, citing State v. Yoder, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-94-020, 1995 WL 358545, *1 (June 16, 1995) and
{¶19} Turning to Stuber‘s jurisdictional argument that the trial court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction because the OBMV failed to notify him of his license forfeiture, we reject Stuber‘s argument. Whether Stuber was properly notified that his license was suspended does not affect the personal or subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court. Stated another way, whether Stuber was properly notified that his license was suspended goes to the merits of the case involving Stuber, not whether the trial court had the ability to hear the merits of the case against Stuber. Moreover, even if Stuber‘s argument affected the personal jurisdiction of the trial court, Stuber, as we determined above, waived any personal-jurisdiction argument when he voluntarily appeared and entered a plea before submitting any personal-jurisdiction objection.
{¶20} Stuber‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
The Trial Court Judge and Counsel for the State of Ohio/Appellee Erred as a Matter of Law and Abused it“s [sic] Discretion by Not Avoiding Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in Their Respective Capacities in the Proceedings of the Court.
{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Stuber argues that he was prejudiced by impropriety, or the appearance of impropriety, because counsel for the State and the trial court judge share identical surnames—Smith. In presenting his argument, Stuber alleges that counsel for the State and the trial court judge violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.
{¶22} Not only is Smith a common surname, Judge Smith, who is from outside of the area, was sitting by assignment in the Lima Municipal Court. Notwithstanding, “[w]e have no authority to address claimed violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—that authority rests solely with the Ohio Supreme Court.” State v. Montgomery, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99452, 2013-Ohio-4193, ¶ 36, citing State ex rel. Buck v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 250, 2004-Ohio-2590.
{¶23} Accordingly, Stuber‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error No. IV
The Judgment of the Trial Court is Not Sustained by the Evidence.
{¶24} In his fourth assignment of error, Stuber contends that his driving-under-suspension conviction is based on insufficient evidence.
{¶26}
[A] copy of the law enforcement automated data system report or a noncertified copy of a record of the registrar of motor vehicles that shows the name, date of birth, and social security number of a person charged with a violation of division (A) of this section may be admitted into evidence as prima-facie evidence that the license of the person was under suspension at the time of the alleged violation of division (A) of this section.
{¶27} At trial, the State offered the testimony of Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Brandon Schreiber (“Trooper Schreiber“), who testified that he initiated a stop of the vehicle operated by Stuber on April 28, 2017 for “traveling * * * with only one working headlight.” (Aug. 10, 2017 Tr. at 8-10). Trooper Schreiber identified Stuber in court as the person operating the vehicle that he stopped on April 28, 2017. (Id. at 11). Trooper Schreiber testified that, after he initiated the traffic stop, he learned through a Law-Enforcement-Automated-Data-System (“LEADS“) search that Stuber‘s license was suspended. (Id. at 11-12). Trooper Schreiber
{¶28} At the conclusion of Trooper Schreiber‘s testimony, the State moved to admit its exhibit, which was admitted, and rested. At that time, Stuber did not make a
{¶29} “However, ‘[w]hether a sufficiency of the evidence argument is reviewed under a prejudicial error standard or under a plain error standard is academic.‘” State v. Hurley, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-13-02, 2014-Ohio-2716, ¶ 38, citing Perrysburg v. Miller, 153 Ohio App.3d 665, 2003-Ohio-4221, ¶ 57 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17891, 2000 WL 966161, *8
{¶30} The State introduced as evidence a copy of Stuber‘s record of the registrar of the OBMV indicating that Stuber‘s license was suspended on February 23, 2017, and had not been reinstated by the date of the offense. (Aug. 10, 2017 Tr. at 12-13). Trooper Schreiber stopped the vehicle that Stuber was operating on April 28, 2017. As such, the State presented prima-facie evidence that Stuber was under suspension at the time of his violation of
{¶31} Stuber‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶32} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur.
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