STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. TODD STOWERS, Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL NO. C-150095
TRIAL NO. B-1400038
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
November 25, 2015
[Cite as State v. Stowers, 2015-Ohio-4846.]
CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge.
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas; Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Marguerite Slagle, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
O P I N I O N.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant state of Ohio has appealed the judgment of the common pleas court granting defendant-appellee Todd Stowers‘s motion to dismiss the indictment for failing to provide notice of an address change and ordering that Stowers‘s name be removed from the sex-offender registry. We reverse the trial court‘s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedure
{¶2} On May 11, 1978, Stowers was convicted of attempted rape and sentenced to two to 15 years’ incarceration. He was paroled on July 19, 1981. On March 4, 1982, Stowers was convicted of two counts of theft and sentenced to concurrent terms of two to five years. Because Stowers had committed the thefts while on parole, the term for the theft offenses was required to be served consecutively to the sentence for attempted rape pursuant to former
{¶3} Effective July 1, 1997, the General Assembly enacted former
{¶4} In 2005, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Champion, 106 Ohio St.3d 120, 2005-Ohio-4098, 832 N.E.2d 718, which held at the syllabus that
A person whose prison term for a sexually oriented offense was completed before July 1, 1997, is not required to register under [former]
R.C. 2950.04(A)(1)(a) or periodically verify a current address under [former]R.C. 2950.06(A) , even if the person returns to prison on a parole violation for a term served concurrently with the sexually oriented offense.
{¶5} In 2006, Stowers filed a motion to set aside the order requiring him to register as a sex offender. Citing Champion, Stowers argued that he had finished serving his sentence for the attempted rape prior to July 1, 1997, and therefore, he had not been in prison for a sex offense when former
{¶6} On January 7, 2014, Stowers was indicted for failing to give notice of an address change. Stowers‘s 1978 conviction for attempted rape was the basis of his registration duty. Stowers, citing Champion, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the registration statutes did not apply to him because he had finished serving his sentence for attempted rape prior to July 1, 1997, and
Analysis
{¶7} The state‘s sole assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in granting Stowers‘s motion to dismiss the indictment and ordering that his name be removed from the sex-offender registry. The state argues that the issue of whether Stowers is required to register as a sex offender is res judicata, because that issue was decided when the trial court overruled his 2006 motion, and he did not appeal from that judgment.
{¶8} Stowers counters that the order requiring him to register as a sex offender was void ab initio and subject to collateral attack at any time. It is true that a judgment that is void because the court exceeded its jurisdiction may be attacked at any time. See Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11; Lyttle v. State, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-04-089, 2012-Ohio-3042, citing State v. Wozniak, 172 Ohio St. 517, 520, 178 N.E.2d 800 (1961), and State v. Williams, 53 Ohio App.3d 1, 5, 557 N.E.2d 818 (10th Dist.1998). But that judgment may not be attacked repeatedly.
{¶9} In Claxton v. Simons, 174 Ohio St. 333, 189 N.E.2d 62 (1963), paragraph four of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court stated,
Where a person appears in an action for the purpose of contending that a judgment is void as a judgment against him, such person thereby submits to the court for its determination whether such judgment is or is not void as a judgment against him; and, if the court determines that such judgment is not void as a judgment against him, even though that determination is erroneous on the facts and on the law, the determination is res judicata between the parties and can only be attacked directly by an appeal therefrom.
{¶10} In Claxton, the trial court overruled the defendant‘s motion to vacate a default judgment on the basis of lack of proper service. The defendant did not appeal the court‘s judgment. Subsequently, when the court entered a judgment against the defendant‘s insurer, the defendant appealed that judgment and attempted to argue the merits of her motion to vacate. The Supreme Court held that the trial court‘s ruling on the jurisdictional question raised by the motion to vacate was binding under the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶11} “Once [a] jurisdictional issue has been fully litigated and determined by a court that has authority to pass upon the issues, said determination is res judicata in a collateral action and can only be attacked directly by appeal.” State ex rel. Arcadia Acres v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Servs., 123 Ohio St.3d 54, 2009-Ohio-4176, 914 N.E.2d 170, citing Citicasters Co. v. Stop 26-Riverbend, Inc., 147 Ohio App.3d 531, 2002-Ohio-2286, 771 N.E.2d 317, ¶ 33 (7th Dist.), quoting Squires v. Squires, 12 Ohio App.3d 138, 141, 468 N.E.2d 73 (12th Dist.1983). The jurisdictional issue becomes binding upon the parties even if the determination is wrong on the facts and the law. Rindfleisch v. AFT Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 84551, 84897 and 84917, 2005-Ohio-191, ¶ 6, citing Claxton at 337.
Conclusion
{¶13} We sustain the assignment of error. The judgment of the trial court granting Stowers‘s motion to dismiss the indictment and ordering that Stowers‘s name be removed from the sex-offender registry is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with law and this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DEWINE and STAUTBERG, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.