State v. StephensState v. Stephens
Defendant, Gregory Stephens, was convicted by a jury of armed robbery in violation of
On March 30, 1982, the trial court conducted a re-sentencing hearing. Finding that Stephens had liеd when he named one Calvin Easley as his accomplice, the court vacated the ten year sentence and re-sentenced defendant to thirty years. On April 5, 1982, defеndant‘s conviction and original
Defendant contends the trial court was without jurisdiction to increase the sentence while his appeal was pending.3
The trial court relied on
“Although the sentence imposed is legal in every respect, the court may amend or change the sentence, within the legal limits of its discretion, prior to the beginning of execution of the sentеnce.”
The discretion conferred by
“The jurisdiction of the trial court is divested and that of the appellate court attaches, upon the entering of the order of appeal. Thereafter, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the matter except to:
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“(3) Correct an illegal sentence, or reduce a legal sentence in accordance with Artiсle 913(B); ...”
The trial court is divested of jurisdiction to amend a sentence once the order of appeal is signed, except to correct an illegal sentencе or to reduce a legal sentence under certain circumstances. State v. Battaglia, 377 So.2d 264 (La., 1979); State v. Alexander, 376 So.2d 146 (La., 1979). Defendant‘s ten year sentence was legal. State v. Stephens, supra. After the order of appeal was signed on July 22, 1981, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set asidе or increase the sentence. The order vacating the original sentence and re-sentencing defendant is without effect.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the order setting aside the original sentence and re-sentencing defendant is reversed and vacated.4
REVERSED.
LEMMON, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
LEMMON, Justice, dissenting.
The fact that the appeal of a conviction and sentence is рending in the appellate court does not deprive the trial court of the jurisdiction (meaning power and authority) to adjudicate a motion to nullify the sentence as fraudulently obtained, especially when the motion is based on evidence discovered since the order granting the appeal.
The majority holds that the pendenсy of an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to change a sentence. However, this general rule, which simply provides that the appellate court is the aрpropriate forum to contest the sentence when the case is on appeal, assumes that the sentence was not obtained by fraud. A fraudulently obtained sentence may be attacked at any time, even after affirmation on appeal, and the trial court is obviously the proper forum for such an attack, becausе additional evidence relating to the fraud will need to be presented.1
Neither the pendency of an appeal nor the completion of appellate review insulates a sentence from an attack based on fraud, because no system of justice can tolerate such a result. When there is an allegation that a sentence was obtained by the fraudulent representation, the trial court (where the misrepresentation was made) is the proper forum to receive the pleading attacking the sentence, as well as to conduct the contradictory hearing and to adjudicate the merits of the contention of nullity.
Perhaps it would have bеen preferable, as a housekeeping measure, for the trial court to have requested the appellate court to remand the matter for the nullity determination so that the entire case could have been adjudicated in one appeal, rather than piecemeal.3 Or perhaps it would have been prefеrable for the trial court to defer the hearing on the nullity of the sentence until completion of appellate review, since reversal of the conviction might hаve rendered moot any issues relating to sentence. However, such considerations do not address the basic question of the jurisdictional power and authority of the court of original jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the contention that the sentence was a nullity as being fraudulently obtained. That contention can be presented tо and adjudicated by the trial court at any time, regardless of the status of any appeal.4
Notes
“A. Armed robbery is the theft of anything of value from the person of another or which is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.
“B. Whoever commits the crime of armed robbery shall be imprisonеd at hard labor for not less less than five years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.”
The record of the original proceedings shows merely that the defendаnt was found guilty and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, and that defendant appealed his conviction and sentence.
The issue of defendant‘s fraudulently obtaining a more lenient sentence did not arise until after the appeal from the conviction and sentence. The record of the subsequent proceedings established that the trial judge, upon discovering the possibility that fraud had been practiced, set the matter for an adversary hearing. The evidence at the hearing clearly established thаt the judge initially announced his intention to impose a 30-year sentence and that defendant thereafter deliberately supplied false and misleading information to inducе the judge to impose a more lenient sentence. Defendant, who was represented by counsel, had a full opportunity to contest or rebut the nature of the willful misrepresentation (in which defendant falsely accused another of being his accomplice) and the purpose of inducing the trial judge to impose the lesser sentence.
See, by analogy,
See also, by analogy,