State v. AlexanderState v. Alexander
The issue before us is whether, for a limited period following affirmance of an appealed conviction, the sentencing judge retains jurisdiction to modify a legal sentence not imposed by reason of any error of law.
The defendant was convicted of armed robbery,
On February 1, five days later, he filed a motion in the trial court for reduction of sentence. (He pointed out that a co-defendant of equal culpability received a lesser sentence. We do not consider whether this constituted an adequate reason for the trial court to reconsider its previous sentence, only its power or jurisdiction to do so.)
The trial court denied the motion. It felt that it no longer had jurisdiction to modify the sentence imposed on April 4, 1978, which had been appealed.
We granted certiorari, 371 So.2d 1340 (1979), to consider whether the trial court may still amend the legal sentence since request was made “prior to the beginning of the execution of the sentence”
A majority of the court has concluded that the trial court‘s jurisdiction to amend the sentence is limited by
Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
TATE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., dissent.
TATE, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
An appeal suspends the execution of a sentence,
Execution of the sentence cannot refer to the date of the sentence or the date it is affirmed. It explicitly refers instead to the date upon which ”execution” begins.
Execution of the sentence must commence on the date when a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor actually begins his sentence with the Department of Corrections—or in any event no later (and perhaps no earlier) than the date by which by law the prisoner should be turned over to the custody of the Department to commence execution of his sentence. That a sentence may be considered as “commencing” on the date following imposition of the sentence,
I would therefore hold that the trial court retained jurisdiction to entertain this motion to modify its legal sentence, execution of which had not commenced, upon this motion to reduce the sentence which was filed five days after affirmance of the sentence.
I do not reach the issue of whether the reasons stated by the defendant for the reduction of sentence sought by him required any hearing by the trial court. I dissent simply from the holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain this motion, which was made before execution of the sentence either actually commenced or was required by law to commence.