STATE OF OHIO v. RONALD E. STARKS
No. 109444
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
September 3, 2020
[Cite as State v. Starks, 2020-Ohio-4306.]
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-83-186387-A.
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Katherine E. Mullin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Ronald E. Starks, pro se.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶ 1} This case came to be heard on the accelerated calendar pursuant to
Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶ 2} On October 19, 1983, Starks was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder in violation of
{¶ 3} A jury trial commenced on or about February 27, 1984 and resulted in a mistrial. A second jury trial commenced on or about January 28, 1985. Starks was found guilty of all four counts. On or about February 15, 1985, the trial court sentenced Starks to life imprisonment on the aggravated murder counts and 4 to 25 years on the aggravated robbery counts. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Stark appealed. This court affirmed his convictions. State v. Starks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 50087, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5845 (Mar. 6, 1986).
{¶ 4} In 1996, Starks filed, pro se, a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the motion. Over the next 23 years, Starks filed, pro se, five motions to correct his sentences. The trial court denied each of Starks’ motions.
{¶ 5} In 2014, Starks appealed the trial court’s denial of his fourth motion to correct his sentences, which Starks had filed, pro se, on November 20, 2013. In that motion Starks argued that the trial court had erred in sentencing him to “life
{¶ 6} Starks filed his most recent motion to correct his sentences, titled “motion to correct a facially illegal sentence,” pro se, on August 21, 2019. Starks argued that his sentences on the aggravated murder counts were contrary to law and void because the trial court had imposed sentences of “life” imprisonment on those counts instead of sentences of “life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment.” This was the same argument Starks had made in his first motion to correct his sentence, titled “motion to correct judgment entry of sentencing pursuant to Crim.R. 36(A),” which Starks had filed, pro se, in September 2012. The trial court denied the motion.
{¶ 7} Starks appealed, raising the following two assignments of error for review:
Assignment of Error No. I: A trial court commits prejudicial error in denying a motion to correct a facially illegal sentence when a defendant’s sentence is void as a matter of law.
Assignment of Error No. II: A trial court commits prejudicial error when a defendant is convicted on two aggravated murder counts involving a single killing when it imposes separate sentences on each count.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Starks contends that his sentences for aggravated murder are void because the version of
{¶ 9} While there is no constitutional right to appellate review of a criminal sentence,
{¶ 10} In this case, however, Starks does not challenge the evidentiary basis for his sentence. Rather, Starks contends that the trial court imposed a sentence that is not authorized by statute and is, therefore, void.
{¶ 11} A void sentence can be attacked anytime. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108919, 2020-Ohio-3286, ¶ 7, citing State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 22, and State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 25. In support of his argument that his sentences are void, Starks cites this court’s decision in State v. Houston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107538, 2019-Ohio-355. In Houston, this court held that where the trial court failed to include a reference to “parole eligibility after serving 20 years of imprisonment” in the defendant’s sentence as mandated by former
{¶ 12} Furthermore, after Houston was decided, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Harper, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2913. In Harper, the Ohio Supreme Court “realign[ed]” its “void-sentence jurisprudence” with “the traditional understanding of what constitutes a void judgment.” Id. at ¶ 4. The Ohio Supreme
A sentence is void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused. When the sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors in the imposition of postrelease control render the sentence voidable, not void, and the sentence may be set aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal.
Id. at ¶ 42. The court explicitly “overrule[d] [its] precedent to the extent that it holds that the failure to properly impose postrelease control in the sentence renders that portion of a defendant’s sentence void.” Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶ 13} In State v. Brooks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108919, 2020-Ohio-3286, this court applied the Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning in Harper to another type of alleged sentencing error. In that case, the defendant argued that his sentence was void and that the trial court had erred in denying his motion to vacate his sentence because his sentence of “life, without the possibility of parole until serving twenty (20) years” was contrary to the language of former
{¶ 14} The court found that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s case and had personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at ¶ 9. Based
{¶ 15} A similar conclusion is warranted in this case. Here, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Starks’ case and had personal jurisdiction over him.
{¶ 16} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the
{¶ 17} Accordingly, we overrule Starks’ first assignment of error.
{¶ 18} In his second assignment of error, Starks argues that his aggravated murder convictions were allied offenses that should have merged for sentencing and that the trial court erred in sentencing him on both counts. However, this is an appeal only from Starks’ motion to correct a facially illegal sentence. Starks’ allied offenses argument was not raised below and is outside the scope of the present
{¶ 19} Accordingly, Starks’ second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR