State v. Stackhouse
APPEARANCES:
Brian A. Smith for Appellant
Stephanie J. Kiser for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tyrice Stackhouse (“Stackhouse“), appeals the January 14, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from a single-vehicle accident in Fostoria, Ohio, where Stackhouse was found therein unresponsive. The vehicle, which was registered to his then girlfriend, April Iannantuono (“Iannantuono“), contained large quantities of drugs that Stackhouse initially claimed were his, allegedly to protect Iannantuono.
{¶3} On June 20, 2024, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Stackhouse on Count One of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of
{¶4} The case proceeded to a jury trial on December 16-17, 2024. Before the presentation of evidence, the State moved to exclude evidence of Iannantuono‘s
{¶5} On January 14, 2025, the trial court sentenced Stackhouse to a minimum term of 6 years to a maximum term of 9 years in prison on Count One; to a minimum term of 8 years to a maximum term of 12 years in prison on Count Two; and to 16 months in prison on Count Three. The trial court ordered the sentences imposed as to Counts One and Two to be served consecutively, and the sentence for Count Three to be served concurrently to the others, for an aggregate indefinite prison term of 14 to 18 years. The trial court also ordered this aggregate sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence that Stackhouse was already serving in a Wood County case.
{¶6} Stackhouse filed his notice of appeal on January 14, 2025. He raises three assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
Because the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting Appellant, Appellant‘s convictions, with respect to all counts, were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Stackhouse argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, Stackhouse contends
Standard of Review
{¶8} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997). In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of witnesses and determine[] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.‘” Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court‘s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Analysis
{¶9} Stackhouse was convicted of aggravated possession of drugs, possession of cocaine, and possession of a fentanyl-related compound. Ohio‘s drug
{¶10} On appeal, Stackhouse argues his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence, contending that the evidence suggesting Iannantuono possessed the drugs is more compelling than the evidence against him. “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”
{¶11} “Possession of drugs can be either actual or constructive.” State v. Bustamante, 2013-Ohio-4975, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.). “‘A person has “actual possession” of an item if the item is within his immediate physical possession.‘” Id., quoting
{¶12} “[T]he State may prove the existence of the various elements of constructive possession of contraband by circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. See also Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 272-273. “Readily usable drugs in close proximity to an accused may constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of constructive possession.” State v. Ruby, 2002-Ohio-5381, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.). “Absent a defendant‘s admission, the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the defendant‘s actions, are evidence that the trier of fact can consider in determining whether the defendant had constructive possession.” State v. Voll, 2012-Ohio-3900, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.).
{¶13} Consequently, since it is the only element that he challenges, we will address the weight of the evidence supporting whether Stackhouse possessed the drugs. Here, Stackhouse points to the evidence that the violent collision could have dislodged the drugs from a concealed part of the vehicle, meaning he never knowingly possessed them. He further contends that his on-scene admission was a false statement made only to protect Iannantuono, whose own drug history and
{¶14} Decisively, the evidence presented at trial reflects that Stackhouse actually possessed the drugs because he admitted to Officer Jared Lindig (“Officer Lindig“) of the Fostoria Police Department that the drugs were his. Accord State v. Pollard, 2025-Ohio-1706, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.). Indeed, Officer Lindig testified at trial that he was dispatched to the scene of a single vehicle accident where he found Stackhouse unresponsive and slumped across the front seat of the damaged vehicle. According to Officer Lindig, as he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he immediately saw two bags of a white powdery substance in plain view on the passenger seat, in the proximate location where Stackhouse was found. After rousing Stackhouse by shaking him, Officer Lindig observed Stackhouse move his hands toward the area where the suspected drugs were located. He further testified that, after being read his Miranda rights and asked about the packages, Stackhouse first asked, “how much“—which Officer Lindig understood to be a question about the quantity of drugs found—and then admitted, “It‘s mine.” (Dec. 16, 2024 Tr. at 114). Officer Lindig also testified that Stackhouse admitted to using cocaine earlier that evening.
{¶15} Nevertheless, Stackhouse contends that his on-scene statements should be given little weight because he was disoriented from the accident and had just been woken up. Specifically, he argues that his question of “how much” was
{¶16} “Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses is primarily a determination for the trier of fact.” State v. Banks, 2011-Ohio-5671, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). “The trier of fact is best able ‘to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures[,] and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.‘” Id., quoting State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24.
{¶17} In this case, the jury was presented with two competing narratives. Specifically, the jury was free to credit, based on Stackhouse‘s explicit admission of ownership, along with the drugs’ placement in plain view and his admission of recent drug use, that he actually possessed the contraband. Alternatively, the jury was free to accept Stackhouse‘s testimony that he was merely “taking the hit” for Iannantuono. However, the jury was free to disbelieve his explanation, just as it is free to reject any defendant‘s claim that another person is responsible for contraband. Compare Ruby, 2002-Ohio-5381, at ¶ 44 (2d Dist.) (holding that Ruby‘s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the jury, as the arbiter of witness credibility, was free to disbelieve the defendant‘s claim that a known drug dealer who was also in the vehicle was responsible for the contraband).
{¶19} For these reasons, we conclude that the trier of fact did not lose its way in determining that the evidence that Stackhouse did not possess the drugs is not more compelling and credible than the evidence that he committed the offenses of which he was convicted. Therefore, Stackhouse‘s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶20} Stackhouse‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court abused its discretion in granting the State‘s Motion in Limine to exclude records from April Iannantuono‘s prior case in the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas, case number 18 CR 0292, in violation of Appellant‘s right to Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Stackhouse argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the records from Iannantuono‘s prior
Standard of Review
{¶22} Generally, the admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the trial court‘s discretion, and a reviewing court should not reverse absent an abuse of discretion and material prejudice. State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 62. See also State v. Boyd, 2025-Ohio-3248, ¶ 101 (6th Dist.) (acknowledging that a trial court‘s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard). An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{¶23} A motion in limine is a pretrial request requesting a court to prohibit the opposing side from presenting evidence that is so prejudicial that no instruction from the judge could cure the damage. State v. Miller, 2018-Ohio-4648, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.). See also State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995). “‘A ruling on a motion in limine reflects the court‘s anticipated treatment of an evidentiary issue at trial and, as such, is a tentative, interlocutory, precautionary ruling.‘” Id., quoting French at 450. “‘The established rule in Ohio is that the grant or denial of a motion
{¶24} “In order to preserve for appeal any error in the trial court‘s resolution of a motion in limine, the objecting party must ‘seek the introduction of the evidence by proffer or otherwise’ at trial ‘to enable the court to make a final determination as to its admissibility.‘” Miller at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199 (1986), paragraph two of the syllabus. “Then, ‘[a]n appellate court will . . . review the correctness of the trial court‘s ruling on the objection rather than the ruling on the motion in limine.‘” Id., quoting State v. Wild, 2010-Ohio-4751, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.).
{¶25} Here, prior to the presentation of evidence, the State made an oral motion in limine to exclude evidence of Iannantuono‘s prior intervention in lieu of conviction for trafficking in cocaine for conduct that occurred in 2018. In particular, Stackhouse sought to have the clerk of courts testify to authenticate the criminal case documents. The trial court granted the State‘s motion after determining that the evidence of Iannantuono‘s prior drug conduct was over five years old and did not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in the current case.
{¶27} On appeal, Stackhouse argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Iannantuono‘s prior drug conduct, which he sought to introduce as part of his third-party guilt defense strategy. The Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. State v. Wesson, 2013-Ohio-4575, ¶ 59. “However, ‘[a] defendant‘s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restriction.‘” Id., quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). To ensure that juries are presented with reliable evidence, the Constitution grants states broad latitude to create rules that exclude certain evidence from criminal trials. Id. Rules that exclude evidence are constitutionally permissible and do not violate a defendant‘s right to present a defense, provided they serve a legitimate purpose without being arbitrary or disproportionate to that purpose and do not infringe on a weighty interest of the accused. Id.
{¶28} “’ “A complete defense” may include evidence of third-party guilt.‘” State v. Nurein, 2022-Ohio-1711, ¶ 38 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Gillispie, 2009-Ohio-3640, ¶ 120 (2d Dist.). “But in making such a defense, the accused ‘must
{¶29} In this case, the trial court did not prevent Stackhouse from presenting a complete defense by excluding the evidence of Iannantuono‘s prior criminal case. Critically, consistent with the rule that evidence of third-party guilt must sufficiently connect that person to the crime, the trial court properly excluded Iannantuono‘s five-year-old criminal conduct. Indeed, this prior conduct, which resulted in an intervention in lieu of conviction, was properly excluded because Stackhouse did not establish a direct link between her prior criminal conduct and the drugs found in this specific incident. Accord id. at ¶ 42. That is, the evidence of Iannantuono‘s prior criminal conduct is too remote and does not sufficiently connect her to the crimes at issue in this case.
{¶31} Stackhouse‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
Because the trial court‘s findings to impose consecutive sentences were, by clear and convincing evidence, not supported by the record, the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive sentences was not supported by the record.
{¶32} In his third assignment of error, Stackhouse challenges the trial court‘s decision to impose consecutive sentences. He specifically contends that the record does not support the trial court‘s findings for imposing consecutive sentences.
Standard of Review
{¶33} Under
Analysis
{¶34} “Except as provided in * * * division (C) of section 2929.14, . . . a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, another state, or the United States.”
the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
(c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
{¶35}
{¶36} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
{¶38} Stackhouse‘s arguments are without merit, and the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive sentences is supported by the record. To begin with, Stackhouse‘s claim that the trial court‘s imposition of consecutive sentences is disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct is unpersuasive. Indeed, the record reflects he was found with significant, trafficking-level quantities of contraband—namely, 55.62 grams of methamphetamine, 71.3 grams of cocaine, and 1.83 grams of a fentanyl-related compound. The sheer volume of these substances belies the argument that this was a simple possession offense and supports the trial court‘s finding on the seriousness of Stackhouse‘s conduct. See State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-72, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.).
{¶39} Furthermore, the trial court‘s finding that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public under
{¶40} Nevertheless, Stackhouse asserts that his criminal history does not justify consecutive sentences because he was never offered treatment—that is, he contends that his previous sanctions were punitive and not rehabilitative. Stackhouse‘s argument is not persuasive. Rather, a trial court‘s finding under
{¶41} In this case, Stackhouse‘s own testimony confirmed this pattern of recidivism. In particular, he testified at trial that he had been on post-release control and probation multiple times, had violated the terms of his supervision repeatedly, and was sent to a community-based correctional facility (“CBCF“) in 2023. This history of repeated failures while under supervision—regardless of their label—is precisely the evidence that the trial court can use to conclude that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime. See id. at ¶ 49-50
{¶42} Consequently, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court‘s consecutive sentence findings are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record.
{¶43} Stackhouse‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶44} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court‘s judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED:
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