State v. SpurlingState v. Spurling
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
The Law Office of John D. Hill, LLC, and John D. Hill, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
{1} Defendant-appellant Jermaine Spurling appeals his convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of a fentanyl-related compound, and having a weapon while under a disability. In three assignments of error, Spurling challenges the validity of his guilty pleas, the effectiveness of his trial counsel, and the sentences imposed. Finding no merit to Spurling‘s assignments of error, we affirm.
{2} In the case numbered B-1905121, Spurling was indicted for possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a fifth-degree felony, carrying a concealed weapon and improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, both fourth-degree felonies, and having a weapon while under a disability, a third-degree felony. In exchange for Spurling‘s guilty pleas to the fentanyl and weapon-under-disability charges, the state dismissed the remaining weapons charges. The trial court imposed prison terms of 12 and 36 months respectively, and ordered them to run concurrently to each other.
{3} In the case numbered B-1905397, Spurling was indicted for two first-degree felonies, possession of cocaine and trafficking in cocaine, and accompanying major-drug-offender specifications. In exchange for Spurling‘s guilty plea to a reduced charge of trafficking in cocaine, a felony of the third degree, the state dismissed the possession count and the specifications for both offenses. The trial court imposed a 36-month prison term and ordered it to run consecutively to the sentence in the case numbered B-1905121, for an aggregate prison term of six years.
The Guilty Pleas
{4} In his first assignment of error, Spurling argues that the trial court erred in accepting guilty pleas that were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
{5} Before a trial court accepts a plea in a felony case,
{6} In this case, Spurling concedes that the trial court complied with the requirements of
{7} Spurling concedes that his claim is based on information outside the record, which we cannot consider in deciding the appeal. See State v. Brooks, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190549, 2021-Ohio-425, ¶ 10; State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 405-406, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978). And, on the record before us, it is clear that Spurling understood that the state was seeking a six-year prison sentence, because defense counsel requested that sentencing be deferred so that he could provide mitigation information to convince the court that a sentence of less than six years was appropriate.
{8} Spurling also argues that he construed the trial court‘s statement that he would receive “a very, very good deal” as an indication that the court would deviate downward from the previously rejected offer of an agreed six-year prison sentence. But this claim is equally unavailing. After the court accepted Spurling‘s
[Defense counsel] has on a number of occasions asked that on your behalf. I am not going to do it. I appreciate you asking. You are going to get a very, very good deal at the end of the day. You got nicked with something that could have put you in jail for a long, long time. I think it is best at this point. You get credit for time, anyway. * * * I think it is best at this point to be where you are. I will overrule your request.
{9} Spurling could not have relied on the court‘s statement as an inducement to enter his guilty pleas because the statement was made after Spurling‘s pleas were made and accepted, and the statement likely referred to the fact that defense counsel negotiated a favorable plea bargain for Spurling. Moreover, in entering his pleas, Spurling acknowledged that he had not received promises from the court or anyone else in order to get him to plead.
{10} The trial court did not err in accepting Spurling‘s guilty pleas. We overrule the first assignment of error.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
{11} In his second assignment of error, Spurling argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Counsel will not be considered ineffective unless counsel‘s performance was deficient and caused actual prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Counsel‘s performance will only be deemed deficient if it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland at 688; Bradley at 142. A defendant is only prejudiced by counsel‘s performance if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for the deficient performance. Strickland at 694; Bradley at 142.
Sentencing
{13} In his third assignment of error, Spurling argues that the trial court‘s imposition of a six-year aggregate sentence was not supported by the record and that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
{14} Pursuant to
{15} Here, the trial court made the mandatory consecutive-sentences findings under
{16} The trial court‘s findings are supported by the record. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that Spurling had prior felony convictions for trafficking in marijuana, aggravated robbery, possession of cocaine, trafficking in cocaine, carrying a concealed weapon, robbery, and having a weapon while under a disability. The court stated that Spurling had previously served three prison terms. The court noted that when Spurling was stopped by police, he possessed fentanyl and a loaded firearm. The court also noted that Spurling‘s trafficking charge involved nearly 500 grams of cocaine, “all the trappings * * * that make up what constitutes a pretty major drug dealer.” The court remarked that a drug dealer with a gun posed a danger to the community. The record supports the imposition of consecutive sentences.
{17} Spurling concedes that the individual sentences imposed fell within the authorized ranges for the offenses and were not contrary to law. Rather, he argues that his six-year aggregate sentence was disproportionate to his conduct, amounting to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
{18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, for purposes of review under the
{20} We overrule the third assignment of error, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Judgments affirmed.
CROUSE and BOCK, JJ., concur.
Please note: The court has recorded its own entry this date.