State v. SmithState v. Smith
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Karen A. Sheppert, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Ron M. Graham, 6988 Spinach Drive, Mentor, OH 44060 (For Defendant-Appellant).
O P I N I O N
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Mitchell S. Smith, appeals from the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, committing appellant to a facility operated by the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities for life, pursuant to
{¶2} Appellant was indicted on the following counts: (1) rape, a felony of the first degree, in violation of
{¶3} Prior to arraignment, appellant filed a motion for competency evaluation, pursuant to
{¶4} Based upon the results of the foregoing evaluations, the trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, appellant was incompetent to stand trial. The court further found that, based upon appellant‘s level of mental retardation, there was not a substantial probability that he would become competent to stand trial within one year. The court held the state‘s motion to retain jurisdiction in abeyance pending the resolution of appellant‘s motions to dismiss and suppress.
{¶5} After considering appellant‘s motions, the court denied appellant‘s motion to dismiss the state‘s motion to retain jurisdiction. The court concluded, pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, that
{¶6} An evidentiary hearing was subsequently held on the state‘s motion to retain jurisdiction. At the commencement of the proceedings, defense counsel orally converted his motion to suppress into a motion in limine. In so doing, appellant requested the court, based upon the finding of incompetence, not to permit appellant‘s inculpatory statement to police. Appellant also requested the seven-year-old eye witness be declared incompetent to testify. The court overruled each request.
{¶7} After considering the evidence, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that appellant committed the underlying offenses and that he was a mentally retarded person subject to institutionalization by court order pursuant to
{¶8} Appellant‘s first assignment of error provides:
{¶9} “The trial court erred by admitting appellant‘s statement into evidence since he was found incompetent to stand trial.”
{¶10}
{¶11} (A) If a defendant who is charged with an offense described in division (C)(1) of section 2945.38 of the Revised Code is found incompetent to stand trial, after the expiration of the maximum time for treatment as specified in division (C) of that section or after the court finds that there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will become competent to stand trial even if the defendant is provided with a course of treatment, one of the following applies:
{¶12} * * *
{¶13} (2) On the motion of the prosecutor or on its own motion, the court may retain jurisdiction over the defendant if, at a hearing, the court finds both of the following by clear and convincing evidence:
{¶14} (a) The defendant committed the offense with which the defendant is charged.
{¶15} (b) The defendant is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order or a mentally retarded person subject to institutionalization by court order.
{¶16} To retain jurisdiction under
{¶17} Appellant cites no authority for his position that statements made to police, by a person later deemed incompetent to stand trial, are inadmissible for purposes of an involuntary civil commitment hearing.
{¶18} (B) In making its determination under division (A)(2) of this section as to whether to retain jurisdiction over the defendant, the court may consider all relevant evidence, including, but not limited to, any relevant psychiatric, psychological, or medical testimony or reports, the acts constituting the offense charged, and any history of the defendant that is relevant to the defendant‘s ability to conform to the law. (Emphasis added.)
{¶19} This subsection specifically gives a trial court the discretion to consider all relevant evidence.1 In his statement, appellant admitted he masturbated and performed fellatio on the victim. It is beyond cavil that this statement was relevant to
{¶21} Appellant was deemed incompetent to stand trial; in effect, this means evidence was presented to show he was either unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. See e.g. State v. Wise, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2012-T-0028, 2012-Ohio-4896, ¶21. Simply because appellant was found incompetent to stand trial, however, does not imply he was “incompetent” to give a truthful rendition of the incident which led to the criminal charges. Detective Petro testified appellant capably responded to the questions she posed to him. According to the detective, appellant was able to recount the entirety of the incident and provide clear, specific details of his actions.
{¶22} Moreover, Dr. Rinsberg testified he did not believe appellant had the capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional Miranda rights; during the hearing, the doctor clarified that this did not imply appellant was incapable of rendering a truthful and voluntary statement to the police. Given the foregoing, there was an adequate foundation for the court to conclude appellant was sufficiently coherent during the interview such that his rendition of the incident could assist in the
{¶23} Furthermore, even assuming appellant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights under Miranda, the admissibility of the statement is not dependent upon the constitutionality of the waiver. Unlike a typical criminal prosecution, this case proceeded pursuant to
{¶24} Pursuant to the foregoing, we hold appellant‘s inability to understand the nuances of the criminal proceedings against him or his arguable inability to enter a valid Miranda waiver do not render his statement to police inadmissible for purposes of
{¶25} Appellant‘s first assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶26} Appellant‘s second assignment of error asserts:
{¶27} “The trial court [erred] by finding the child witness competent to testify.”
{¶28} Under this assignment of error, appellant argues a seven-year-old eye witness, M.P., was not competent to testify and, as a result, the trial court erred in admitting the child‘s testimony. We do not agree.
{¶29}
{¶30} “Every person is competent to be a witness except:
{¶31} “(A) Those of unsound mind, and children under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.”
{¶32} The state, as the proponent of the child, shouldered the burden of demonstrating M.P.‘s competence to testify. State v. Clark, 71 Ohio St.3d 466, 469 (1994). And the trial court conducted a proper hearing to determine the child‘s competency to testify. See State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 250-251 (1991). In considering whether a child under the age of 10 is competent to testify, a court must analyze the following factors: “the child‘s ability to receive accurate impressions of fact, the child‘s ability to recollect those impressions, the child‘s ability to communicate what is observed, the child‘s understanding of truth and falsity, and the child‘s appreciation of his or her responsibility to tell the truth.” Clark, supra, at 469, citing Frazier, supra.
{¶33} Once the court concludes that the threshold requirements have been satisfied, a witness under the age of ten will be deemed competent to testify. Clark, supra.
{¶34} Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting M.P. to testify because, during the course of the competency hearing, the child was unable to answer certain autobiographical questions. Appellant further underscores that M.P. was unable to explain the importance of telling the truth and did not know “what happens if you lie.” In support, appellant cites this court‘s opinion in State v. Jett, 11th Dist. Portage No. 97-P-0023, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1451(Mar. 31, 1998).
{¶35} In Jett, this court reversed the trial court‘s decision that a five-year-old sex abuse victim was competent to testify. This court observed the child only responded “yes” or “no” to the trial court‘s leading questions during the competency hearing and the child gave no personal narrative about the incident. This court determined that, with the “yes” and “no” inquiries, the child had a fifty percent chance of being correct simply by guessing. This court also emphasized that the child could not “articulate clearly the distinction between telling a lie and telling the truth.” And, during the trial, this court pointed out the child was completely incorrect about independently verifiable circumstances relating to the abuse. Hence, this court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in finding the child competent to testify.
{¶36} This matter is different from Jett. M.P. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie without the assistance of leading questions. When asked “do you know what it means to tell the truth?” M.P. responded “It means you tell the real thing, don‘t lie.” Although he stated he did not know what happens when one lies, he specifically explained lying means “You don‘t tell the truth.” Furthermore, the trial court and the prosecutor tested M.P.‘s understanding of the difference between a true statement and a false statement by asking him empirically verifiable questions. For
{¶37} A review of the hearing demonstrates M.P. was able to receive and discuss accurate, factual impressions and assure the court he remembered the incident and the individuals involved. As emphasized above, M.P. had a demonstrable appreciation for the distinction between truth and falsity. And, although he initially told the court he did not know what happens if one lies, he later, without prompting, explained that “you get in trouble” if you lie. And, finally, during his testimony, M.P. was able to provide clear and articulate responses to the questions posed to him regarding the incident that were almost entirely consistent with past statements. The fact that M.P. was unable to answer certain autobiographical questions, such as his birth date, or identify geographical facts, such as the town in which he lives, does not bear upon the Frazier inquiry. A child‘s inability to remember a specific date or identify his home town or the street on which he lives does not undermine his competence to testify to events he witnessed; this is particularly true where, as here, the child has demonstrated the ability to understand the concepts of truth and falsity as well as the import of telling the truth. In the totality, therefore, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding M.P. competent to testify pursuant to Frazier.
{¶38} Appellant‘s second assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶39} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.