State v. SmagulaState v. Smagula
CLAPP, S.J.A.D.
The defendants, six members of the Board of Education of the Borough of Wallington, were convicted of bribery under the following statute,
“Any member or officer of any stаte, county or municipal government, or member of any public authority, board, association, commission or committee, who solicits or receives, directly or indirectly, any money or valuable thing, reward or commission for his vote as a member thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Cf. State v. Merkle, 82 N.J.L. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1912), reversed 83 N.J.L. 677 (E. & A. 1912). As to the common law of bribery, see State v. Ellis, 33 N.J.L. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1868). The six defendants appeal.
The State‘s case tended to shоw these circumstances. On August 2, 1954 the board of education accepted the resignation of the principal of Wallington High School. On August 4, 1954, by pre-arrangemеnt, five of the defendants met Bernard E. Piela, principal of Public School No. 1 in Wallington, driving him to a tavern. There, after some social conversation, one of them, Smagula, said:
Piela asked “What for?” Hе was told “campaign money“; or (as he later testified) the money was needed, not for Smagula or the group, but for campaign money. Piela replied thаt he‘d give them his answer the next day. His answer the next day was a refusal. The sixth defendant came to Piela some nine days later, aiding and abetting the others. He had this tо say:
“This is your last opportunity, and if you want the job it will cost you $2,000.”
He, too, declared the money was needed for campaign purposes, though he also stаted that he and another defendant wanted no part of the money. Piela again refused; and subsequently another man was given the appointment.
The prinсipal point on the appeal is presented by that portion of the court‘s charge to the jury in which the court said, after referring to the talk around the table at the tavern:
“There is further evidence of the conversation around the table that the money was to be for campaign funds. Regardless of how thеy labelled the money or reward that is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find these five defendant Board of Education members directly or indirectly solicited money or reward from Piela for their official votes * * *.”
We pass over the fact that the objections to the charge were not made until after the jury had retired.
The defendants’ first point is that the solicitation of money by a public official violates the statute only if the money is to go to the official himself. They сontend that any solicitation of money made by them for campaign funds, in return for their votes as members of the board of education, is not an offense under the statute.
The decisions in New York and Massachusеtts are not dispositive of our question. People ex rel. Dickinson v. Van De Carr, 87 App. Div. 386, 84 N.Y.S. 461, 463, 464 (App. Div. 1903) and People v. Hyde, 156 App. Div. 618, 141 N.Y.S. 1089, 1093 (App. Div. 1913), construing the words “bribe, or any money, property or value of any kind or any promise or agreement therefor” in a New York bribery statute, held that these words have reference, among other things, to a political or other personal advantage of some sort, but not to the mere grаtification of a wish. However, these cases did not have to deal with the word “money” in
We are firmly of the view that an offer by defendants to sell their votes for campaign money violates the statute.
We have decided to rest our decision squarely on this proposition, even though we rather think the court‘s instruction here could be sustained quite apart therеfrom. Assume, if you will, the soundness of defendants’ contention, namely, that a solicitation is not criminal, at least unless it were made for the purpose of securing sоme political or other personal advantage for the solicitor. Are the trial judge‘s instructions at variance with this? Preliminarily it will be observed that he, in the portion of the сharge under attack, was in the course of commenting on the evidence (he amply cautioned the jury that the sole responsibility for the determination of the facts rested with them); more particularly, he was bringing to the jury‘s mind the little scene at the tavern which had been testified to. It seems rather fanciful to suppose that the jury, contemplating this business at the tavern, would have understood the judge‘s comments as referring (inter alia) to campaign money to be devoted exclusively to the political advantages of others — an eleemosynary civic project. For the jury to have put this construction upon his comments would have beеn to ignore realities which are too obvious. The question which he left to the jury to answer, and which he repeated for emphasis again and again, was this: did thе defendants solicit “money or reward” (italics inserted) for their official votes? Such
There is no substance at all to the other points made by defendants. One point is that the issue above stated was also raisеd by the court‘s denial of defendants’ motion for acquittal at the close of the State‘s case. We have no question but that the evidence theretofоre adduced was sufficient to take the case to the jury.
Another point has to do with certain comments on the evidence made in the court‘s charge, starting off with the words “there is evidence, if you find it credible” (italics inserted), etc. The court in preceding and subsequent paragraphs of the charge fully stated (as we have аlready indicated) that it was the jury‘s function to determine the facts; furthermore it discussed at some length the requirement of the law that the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. To say that the court by using the words “if you find it credible,” nullified all that was subsequently said as to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is to neglect the context surrounding these words.
The other points raised have to do with the testimony. Assuming the commission of error, it nevertheless does not appear from the entire record that the defendants suffered manifest injury or were prejudiced in maintaining their defense upon the merits.
Affirmed.