STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TYRONE SLAUGHTER, Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL NOS. C-170110, C-170111, C-170112
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
January 12, 2018
2018-Ohio-105
DETERS, Judge.
Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court. TRIAL NOS. 16TRC-37026A, 16TRC-37026B, 16TRC-37026C. Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in C-170110 and C-170112; Appeal Dismissed in C-170111.
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Carrie Wood, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
DETERS, Judge.
{1} Defendant-appellant Tyrone Slaughter appeals his convictions, following his no-contest pleas, for operating a vehicle with a prohibited breath-alcohol content and a marked-lanes violation. In this appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress evidence on the basis that an Ohio State Highway Patrol trooper lacked probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle for a marked-lanes violation.
{2} The trial court based its decision to overrule the motion on a second marked-lanes violation that it noted after viewing a video recording taken from the trooper‘s cruiser camera. But the trooper testified he had not seen that violation. Since the trooper‘s unrebutted testimony was that he had witnessed a prior marked-lanes violation, and that testimony was not inconsistent with the video recording of the traffic stop, the trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Slaughter‘s vehicle. We, thus, affirm the trial court‘s judgments albeit for reasons other than those stated by the trial court.
Trial Court Proceedings
{3} Slaughter was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI“) in violation of
{4} At the suppression hearing, Slaughter stipulated that he had been arrested without a warrant. Trooper Alex Burnett testified that he was in a uniform and in a marked cruiser on patrol on North Bend Road when he observed a Nissan
{5} The video from Trooper Burnett‘s cruiser camera was admitted into evidence and played during the suppression hearing. As the video was playing, defense counsel questioned Trooper Burnett about the basis for the traffic stop. The video showed a vehicle ahead of Trooper Burnett that turned right onto one of the north-south streets. Trooper Burnett testified that while it was difficult to see on the video, he had then followed a red Nissan Altima. He saw the marked-lanes violation and sped up to stop the vehicle. The video showed that Slaughter had committed a second marked-lanes violation near the intersection of North Bend Road and Hamilton Avenue when he had driven his vehicle partly into the left-turn lane and then back into the adjoining lane, before proceeding straight through the traffic light. Trooper Burnett testified, however, that he had not seen that marked-lanes violation.
{6} On cross-examination, Trooper Burnett testified that even though he was 100-110 meters behind Slaughter‘s vehicle, he had a clear and unobstructed view of the marked-lanes violation. He acknowledged it was difficult to see this violation on the video because “the blur from the traffic lights and the headlights of the other vehicles had blurred out some of the violation.”
{7} The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. It found that Trooper Burnett had probable cause to stop Slaughter based on the second marked-lanes violation depicted on the video. Shortly thereafter, Slaughter pled no contest to OVI with a prohibited concentration of alcohol and the marked-lanes violation. The
{8} In a single assignment of error, Slaughter argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress.
{9} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. The trial court, acting as the trier of fact, is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. Id. Therefore, an appellate court must accept a trial court‘s findings of historical fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but it reviews de novo the trial court‘s application of the law to the facts. See id.; see also State v. Sweeten, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150583, 2016-Ohio-5828, ¶ 8.
{10} A traffic stop initiated by a police officer constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the
{11} Probable cause, however, is not required to justify a traffic stop. Mays at ¶ 23. A traffic stop may be based on less than probable cause when an officer possesses reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed, or is committing
{12} In determining whether an officer possesses probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances. Id. at ¶ 7. “[T]he existence of probable cause [or reasonable and articulable suspicion] depends on whether an objectively reasonable police officer would believe that [the driver‘s] conduct * * * constituted a traffic violation, based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop.” Bowling Green, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, at ¶ 16.
{13} Here, the record reflects that Trooper Burnett testified that he had stopped Slaughter‘s vehicle because he had observed Slaughter‘s vehicle, which was ahead of him in the left lane, travel out of that lane and into the right lane approximately one to two feet. Trooper Burnett testified that he then sped up to catch Slaughter‘s vehicle. He testified that it was difficult to see this marked-lanes violation on the video because the traffic lights and the headlights of the other vehicles had blurred out some of the violation.
{14} The video showed Slaughter had committed a second marked-lanes violation when his vehicle traveled out of the left-turn lane into the adjoining lane
{15} The trial court‘s legal conclusion that the second marked-lanes violation provided the trooper with probable cause to stop Slaughter‘s vehicle is erroneous given that the trooper expressly denied observing this second marked-lanes violation. However, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress, because the trooper‘s unrebutted testimony that he had personally observed a prior marked-lanes violation was sufficient to provide him with reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Slaughter‘s vehicle. See State v. Lopez, 166 Ohio App.3d 337, 2006-Ohio-2091, 850 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.); State v. Shisler, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-050860, C-050861, C-050878 and C-050879, 2006-Ohio-5265, ¶ 7; State v. Burwell, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-09-06, 2010-Ohio-1087, ¶ 14.
{16} Slaughter argues that this court cannot rely on the trooper‘s testimony because the trial court chose not to rely on the trooper‘s testimony when overruling the motion to suppress. Thus, he contends, the trial court must have found the trooper‘s testimony lacking in credibility. We disagree. The trial court did not expressly address the credibility of the trooper‘s testimony. Our review of the record reveals that the trooper‘s testimony conforms to the video of the traffic stop, which reflects that the trooper‘s vehicle was 100-110 meters behind another vehicle and that the glare of oncoming headlights blurred out the violation. The trooper‘s vehicle accelerated and he initiated the traffic stop. Because the trooper‘s testimony that he had observed Slaughter‘s vehicle, which was in the left lane, travel out of that
{17} We, therefore, overrule Slaughter‘s sole assignment of error and affirm the judgments of the trial court in the appeals numbered C-170110 and C-170112. We dismiss the appeal numbered C-170111, which was taken from the trial court‘s judgment dismissing the
Judgment accordingly.
CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.
Please note: The court has recorded its own entry this date.