STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joseph Richard SKOUSEN, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20110353-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 16, 2012.
2012 UT App 325 | 291 P.3d 919
Ryan V. Peters, Provo, for Appellee.
Before Judges ORME, DAVIS, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ORME, Judge:
¶ 1 Defendant Joseph Richard Skousen was convicted in February 2011 of failing to stop his vehicle at the command of a conservation officer, a class A misdemeanor.1 See
¶ 2 Early in 2009, two conservation officers employed by the Division of Wildlife Resources were driving northbound on Interstate 15 in Provo. The officers were driving a brown pickup truck equipped with red and blue flashing lights as well as a siren. The truck was clearly marked on both front doors with the Division of Wildlife Resources emblem, under which were the words “Law Enforcement Conservation Officer.”
¶ 3 As the officers neared the Center Street freeway exit in Provo, they noticed two vehicles being driven in an erratic fashion. The drivers later proved to be Defendant and his brother. The brothers were swerving their vehicles at each other and weaving in and out of traffic. Defendant was aggressively changing lanes without signaling and appeared to be trying to run his brother‘s vehicle off of the road. At one point, Defendant actually pulled up alongside his brother‘s vehicle and smacked the trunk with his hand through the open window of his car.
¶ 4 After following and observing the two vehicles for some time, the officers activated their truck‘s red and blue lights. Defendant‘s brother exited the freeway in his vehicle soon after, but Defendant continued heading north. The officers followed Defendant and activated their truck‘s siren. Despite being aware of the lights and siren, Defendant did not stop, and as he drove he repeatedly pointed what appeared to be a camera in the officers’ direction. After the officers followed him for four miles, Defendant finally exited the freeway, stopped, and was placed under arrest.
¶ 5 At trial, Defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State‘s case, arguing that the State failed to prove that the officers were “conservation officers” as that term is defined in the Wildlife Resources Code. See
¶ 6 “A trial court‘s ruling on a motion for directed verdict ‘is a question of law[,] which we review for correctness[,] giving no particular deference to the trial court‘s legal conclusions.‘” State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ¶ 15, 167 P.3d 503 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, ¶ 10, 975 P.2d 489). Trial courts may deny a motion for directed verdict if the State has produced “believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.” State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶ 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When a party challenges the denial of a motion for directed verdict alleging insufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e will uphold the trial court‘s decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 7 At the time of the incident, it was a class A misdemeanor under the Wildlife Resources Code
for any driver, who having received a visual or audible signal from a conservation officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, to operate his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to endanger or harm a conservation officer or other person, ... or to increase his speed and attempt to flee or elude the conservation officer.
¶ 8 At trial, both officers testified that they are, and were at the time of the incident, Division of Wildlife Resources conservation officers. The officers also testified that their department-issued vehicle was clearly marked with the Division of Wildlife Resources emblem and the words, “Law Enforcement Conservation Officer.” While both mentioned that they were POST-certified peace officers, neither of the officers specifically testified whether they were employed full time. And neither mentioned whether he was a permanent or temporary employee. Although no direct evidence on these points was offered at trial, it has long been accepted that “an element of an offense in a criminal prosecution may be established ... indirectly, by an inference drawn from such evidence, where that inference is the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence offered.” State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1980).
¶ 9 Defendant contends that although it is possible to infer that the officers were full-time, permanent employees, it is equally reasonable to infer that they were not. He reasons that no direct or circumstantial evidence of full-time or permanent status was presented and, therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to infer that the officers were part-time, temporary, or both. We disagree.
¶ 10 Very simply, the testimony from both officers was that they are Division of Wildlife Resources “conservation officer[s].” This is not an amorphous, nonsensical, or mysterious term, but rather is a term defined in the applicable statute. See
¶ 11 In testifying that they were Division of Wildlife Resources conservation officers, as opposed to some other variety of public or private employee, the officers necessarily testified that they were “conservation officer[s]” as that term is legally defined, i.e., “full-time, permanent employee[s] of the Division of Wildlife Resources who [are] POST certified as ... peace or ... special function officer[s].”
¶ 12 Affirmed.
¶ 13 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.