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State v. Krueger
975 P.2d 489
Utah Ct. App.
1999
Check Treatment

*1 VRW, Accordingly, we award Thiele VRW, 1994 WL C93-1928 C93-1927 Rule of Civil 803, extraordinary relief *1, at 36907, U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 65B(d) 1994) (“No Judge Anderson (N.D.Cal. 31, Procedure order court *1 Jan. jurisdiction.” Utah R. [his] “has exceeded notice of dismissal Plaintiffs required. 65B(d)(2)(A). action.”); hereby P. It is ordered Civ. by itself terminate effective notice of dismissal under Rule 92-CV-76881-DT, that Thiele’s Nevers, No. v. Green 41(a)(1) Further, hereby it is (E.D. or is valid. 7348, at *23 Mich. LEXIS U.S. Dist. 1993) 41(a)(1) jur Judge was without Anderson 13, is ‘self- dered (stating “Rule Apr. Septem ”). petition Thiele’s as of isdiction over executing’ 16, 3, 1998, September his ber is vacated.13 order Judge Anderson’s Jurisdiction II. analysis controls The above T. 27 I CONCUR: PAMELA Thiele’s jurisdictional question.

lingering GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge. Associate 41(a)(1) voluntary under Rule dismissal valid IN THE RESULT: 281 CONCUR proceedings in Seventh District renders ORME, Judge. K. though “‘the GREGORY nullity”’ is as “‘a Court —it ” brought.’ Barton v. been had never action Auth., Utah Transit 1994) Piper re (quoting In Aircraft Sys. Litig., F.2d Antitrust Distrib. Cir.1977)). (8th petitioner has When 41(a)(1), “no with Rule

properly complied and, longer controversy exists case in App.054 UT hence, jurisdiction to would lack the court Utah, Appellee, Plaintiff and STATE action.” Green proceed further 92-CV-76881-DT, Nevers, 1993 U.S. No. (E.D. Apr. at *23 Mich. Dist. LEXIS Mary Joseph K. KRUEGER 1993). Judge Consequently, we conclude Sawyers, Defendants Ann adop jurisdiction over Thiele’s Anderson lost Appellants. the date she filed her dis petition tion No. 981035-CA. his sub therefore vacate missal notice. We sequent order. Appeals of Utah. Court Feb.

CONCLUSION the Utah Rules of conclude that 25 We generally apply adoption Civil Procedure Likewise, pe- conclude that

proceedings. we adoption proceedings use titioners 41(a)(1) voluntarily an dismiss uncon- Rule Finally, adoption petition. we con- tested jurisdiction over Judge Anderson’s clude petition when she adoption ended Thiele’s voluntary dismissal. filed her notice of incorrectly Judge purported Anderson thus voluntarily right her dis- deny Thiele petition in District adoption miss Seventh her jurisdiction over the and to maintain Court petition. her, case, by showing inappropriate bias toward disposition need of this we

13. Based our Judge adoption petitioner. address assertion that Thiele’s unmarried Anderson violated Code Judicial Conduct *3 Skordas, Dunning, T. G. Elizabeth Gregory Watkiss, Delporto, and Brett J. Salt David B. City, Appellants. for Lake Strate, Schindler, John E. Gene E. Jr., Price, Harmond, Appellee. George M. Swanson, Hunt, Jeffrey J. Salt Lake Brett City, Chapter of the for Amicus Curiae Utah Society Journalists. of Professional P.J., WILKINS, DAVIS and Before BILLINGS, JJ.

OPINION

WILKINS, Presiding Judge: have been 1 Defendants delinquency of minors

contributing to the Code Ann. 78-3a- violation of Utah 801(l)(a)(ii) court denied trial these criminal motions to dismiss their successfully sought they each charges interlocutory bring appeal permission doing prior punished court to trial. We have consoli- students would not be so. this they appeals because facts defendants maintain that dated their nearly identical. For presented issues are did not “ask” or “instruct” the admit purposes appeal, of this defendants rather the stu- but told charges they ordinarily are do the factual bases dents “to what would do.” correct, statements, reserving right to contest certain none of the students allegations factual event of trial. provided chewing claimed defendants

tobacco or asked a non-user to chew. How- ever, HOLDING reported Krueger one student chewed tobacco with the students. 2 For that we will detail reasons opinion, we the statute in fact hold that purposes For of both of their motions *4 (2) to; prohibits stipulated the the conduct to dismiss the trial court and also of this necessary trier fact find the intent of appeal, the defendants concede that some of (3) alleged; present from the facts as the testify the students involved would that Saw- vague to language of the statute is not so as yers Krueger asked them to tobac- clause; process render it void under the due “for images co the camera” so video of (4) neither the First Amendment chewing tobacco could be used press the free United States Constitution nor part story. as of news protections of Article Section 15 ¶ 7 charged The defendants were each with Utah prosecution Constitution acts to bar contributing five counts of to the this case. aof minor in violation of Utah Ann. Code (1996). 78-3a-801(l)(a) § Both defendants BACKGROUND filed a motion charges. to dismiss the The ¶ City 3 KTVX in Salt Lake television agreed trial court defendants could employs Mary Sawyers reporter Ann as a (i) prosecuted be of subsection Joseph Krueger a as cameraman its statute.1 the trial court ruled that 18, 1997, February they operation. news On defendants could be prosecuted under sub- Price, High were invited to School in Carbon (ii) of prohibits the statute which report to observe and on a school as- doing any adult from act which “tends to sembly designed discourage students from cause minors to become or remain delin- using chewing tobacco. quent,” and also concluded that subsection (ii)

¶4 of unconstitutionally the statute was not assembly, Before the the defendants vague, given possible implications even of a employee contacted school and asked her protections the constitutional applicable to presently find students who chewed tobacco press. § Utah Code Ann. 78-3a- willing and who were to be after interviewed 801(l)(a)(ii) assembly. employee identi- school fied two such students. appeal, On defendants contend that (1) assembly, 5 After the defendants and the is proper dismissal the stipulated building two students left the school not prohibited of (2) statute; walked into parking they the school’s lot where possess did not they they necessary met other also required students who said intent for conviction un- (3) statute; chewing used tobacco and wanted to be inter- der the the statute itself is so on, point vague viewed. From this the facts are in constitutionally defective un- dispute. police, In their process statements der the due of clause the Fourteenth several students claimed that defendants Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion; during asked them to chew special tobacco the inter- press rep- their role as resentatives, view and that the defendants stated that the engaged in the coverage 78-3a-801(l)(a)(i) charged Section crime makes defendants could not be under this sub- solicit, command, request, encourage, or inten- section because the offense the students were tionally possession aid or with a in the "act[] minor viola- with was and the federal, any tion of state or local law or provided munici- State did not contend that defendants pal trial ordinance.” The court ruled that the tobacco. (ii) § 78-3a- Subsection prosecution story, prevents news legitimate 801(l)(a) make it crime for purports to instance. in this or older to take person be to cause minors to action that “tends ANALYSIS delinquent,” and does come or remain proof did in fact be require that the minor § Prohibitions of A. delinquent committed a come that, that the trial argue first maintain a matter 9 Defendants act.3 Defendants motions dis- denying their this case cannot alleged court erred facts in actions do not the fact-finder miss because lead to conclusion (ii) Specifical of subsection prohibitions come within defendants violated statute. 78-3a-801(l)(a) (1996),2 ly, Ann. cannot of Utah Code defendants contend (ii) allegation of accepting the State’s because the prosecuted even when under subsection pos is the “delinquency” alleged students’ facts. in violation chewing tobacco session 76-10-105,4 ruling on mo and because defendants trial court’s A coming nothing which we do the students question is a law had tion dismiss tobacco, they giving particular possession no correctness into review for *5 for legal possibly conclu held accountable to the trial court’s cannot be deference Taylor, 884 P.2d re tending to cause minors to become or sions. See State Moreover, the in this Ct.App.1994). delinquent. main Defendants bolster presents argument of were by noting a statute an issue that minors terpretation of charged possession which we review for of tobacco under statutory construction with Centre, 76-10-105, possessed, Berube v. Fashion and that once See section correctness. (Utah 1989). 1033,1038 Ltd., legally prohibited not a the use of tobacco is therefore act for minors. Defendants that Although the State contends by the argue of the tobacco that because use Sawyers Krueger suggested that not, itself, delinquent a students was in already in the stu- chew tobacco students charged, be it for which the minors could suggest that it does not possession, dents’ can encouraging that that use must follow reporters the tobacco or encour- provided to tends to cause minors not be conduct that already possession in of aged students delinquent. or remain become The record to also chew. reveals tobacco prevail in 13 For defendants to students who reporters simply asked accept analysis, required to legal it this we would be age at which is to under the were pur already premise delinquency, for had chew- possess and who statute, only in contributing possession, poses to of the ing in their individual tobacco they may be reporters acts minors for which so that the could cludes the tobacco a criminal or delinquency under for inclusion videotape us to con requires It also anti-chewing juvenile as- statute.5 the news of the in account encouraging the use of tobacco sembly. clude that misdemeanor, may guilty be of a C makes it a crime class Section 2. jurisdiction juvenile subject any of the court. any person years to to the or older take for (2) appointed compliance board to A officer a which "tends to cause minors become action may 53A-3-402 of education under Section or remain of this section citations for violations issue 78-3a-801(2) provides: "It is not nec- property. Section Cited viola- committed on school juve- this essary a conviction under reported appropriate in order obtain tions shall be to the a the minor had become statute to establish that nile court. delinquent act.” delinquent or a committed authority clearly it is within the 5.While provides: 76-10-105 4. Section Legislature adult offense contribut- to limit the ing delinquency this of a minor to narrow- Any person of 19 who circumstance, yet has been buys, possession no such restriction accepts, er [or her] or has his adopted. cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in form minor, cannot, already “contributing delinquency” a a to the possessed minor law, causing a minor that those words matter constitute but delinquent. reject these notions. remain We widespread usage give had such clear so, doing we hold that the definition of meaning that de- and understandable “delinquent,” as used section 78-3a- aid, encourage notes actions that will 801(l)(a)(ii), only is not acts limited those children in involve conduct which is con- by a child which can the child be hailed law, trary contrary which so language into court. Given the additional generally accepted decency standards of 78-3a-801(2), that an adult morality that its result will substan- guilty contributing delinquen- found to the mental, tially harmful moral or cy of establishing a minor without that the physical well-being of the child. This con- delinquent minor became or committed a sufficiently notation of those terms is well act, delinquent Legis- apparent it is that the ordinary persons known intelli- category lature intended to include a broader gence judgment who so desire to do Moreover, of acts adults. difficulty no governing would have 78-3a-801(l)(a)(i) clearly provides conduct the statute. prosecution person of a 18 or older who at 808-09. Id. solicits, commands, requests, encourages, or adopt We definition of aids, intentionally or acts with minor by the court in described Tritt.7 Under state, federal, specific violate or local law.6 case, persons ordinary facts intelli It is under this subsection of the statute gence judgment difficulty no would have prosecution encourag- would properly lie for knowing encouraging children to chew ing possess a child to tobacco in direct viola- encouraging tobacco amounts to accept tion of law. state To the defendants’ the child that under the *6 argument prosecution under subsec- —that despite the fact that use of tobacco (ii) tion is also to limited the same acts the separate minor is not identified as a delin (ii) adult make subsection —would quent prohibiting under the statute pos surplusage, mere interpretation and such an of tobacco session a minor. is inconsistent with long standing prac- our ¶ Ironically, acknowledge 16 defendants reading statutory of language tice to so as they grounds that were on the school to give meaning provision. to each See West story cover a about the harmful of effects (Utah Morrison, 445, Jordan v. 656 P.2d 446 fact, tobacco children. the 1982); Bd., v. Grant Utah State Land 26 they assembly had traveled the to to school 100, (1971). 1035, Utah 2d 485 P.2d 1036 directly cover focused on evidence of that knew, import 14 The clear harm. Defendants pre- or be (ii) 78-3a-801(l)(a) known, in subsection of section sumed to have use tobacco comports analysis substantially with the Su the Utah children the harmful to preme Tritt, v. Court 23 2d physical well-being. childrens’ Under 365, Tritt, 463 P.2d 806 delinquency In that case an definition of enunciated in contributing adult was convicted of to the conduct of defendants could be delinquency of a minor. The court noted violating prohibitions construed as change that a recent contributing delinquency the statute then of minors 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii). applicable defendant had in section eliminated described Ac- of “delinquency” cordingly, correctly definition the trial court concluded 78-3a-801(l)(a)(i) holding, plurali- Section it a makes crime that the decision is a itself ”solicit[], any person opinion, older to ty and that as such we are not bound to command[], request[], encouraged, or inten- follow it. we find the definition accu- tionally aid[] [to] act[] with minor rate, useful, adopt part our it as federal, state, violation of or local law holding. Consequently, superior until a court municipal ordinance.” otherwise, delinquency holds the definition of Tritt, here, adopted described in be- now note, Judge thoughtful 7. We as does Davis in his binding authority. comes dissent, that this definition in Tritt question of fact which must be sub- de- ents a could determine a fact-finder v. statutory defi- to the fact-finder. See State mitted -within acts fall fendants’ 1993). (Utah Workman, cause (ii)—tending to of subsection nition Therefore, on this basis also or remain dismissal would to become “minors improper. addition, dispute wheth parties 17 In the students er the defendants instructed Vagueness simply on camera or told C.

chew tobacco ordinarily do. they to do what would students contend that ¶ 20 Defendants further could dispute, a fact-finder Based on 78-3a- proper dismissal is because section encouraged certainly that the defendants find 801(l)(a)(ii) vague be unconstitutionally causing the children chew tobacco—thus give adequate notice of cause fails in viola delinquent,” to “remain the students prohibited conduct. forbidding possession of the statute tion Alternatively, a fact- by a minor. tobacco reviewing consti When the defendants finder could determine statute, tutionality presume of a we must prolonged the time in which Tritt, is constitutional. See that the statute violation, causing committing again were A “will not be 463 P.2d at 808. statute in viola delinquent” “remain minors found to declared unconstitutional unless 78-3a-801(1)(a)(ii). Therefore, tion Id.; also beyond so reasonable doubt.” see 78-3a- provisions of section City Lopez, Lake v. 935 P.2d Salt 801(1)(a)(ii) imposition crimi allow for the McKinley, 53 Ct.App.1997); State liability on the facts nal defendants under (holding N.M. 202 P.2d State, correctly trial alleged by the court duty uphold statutes court has sustain these motions to dismiss denied defendants’ them). ignore and defeat rather than charges. constitutionality of a challenging the Those demonstrating its the burden of statute bear Necessary B. Intent City unconstitutionality. See Greenwood they argue 18 Defendants also Lake, North Salt 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) be did violate 1991). such constitutional chal We review state requisite mental cause lacked Lopez, See lenge correctness. They argue that commit the offense. challenge to (providing at constitutional *7 only legitimate to cover a news intention was we ity question is of law which of statute that not intend to encour story, and did correctness). review delin remain age the students become or ¶ Supreme States Court has re 22 The United mistake the intent quent. Defendants in this prove needs to stated: All the State quired. intended for is that the defendants instance principle process of due It is basic sub to chew tobacco. The the children vagueness void for if its enactment is an in want

jective of the defendants motivation clearly defined.... are prohibitions is the tobacco8 ing the children give person of laws insist [W]e Therefore, it would in this case. irrelevant opportu- ordinary intelligence a reasonable to determine be sufficient for fact-finder is so that he nity prohibited, to know what for one or more of intended that defendants accordingly.... must [L]aws possession of the prolong children explicit standards for those provide [also] or remain or to otherwise become impermissi- vague them. A law apply who commonly as are delinquent, those words policy police bly delegates matters to basic defined, recognized again and in Tritt [officers], juries judges, and resolution us here. basis, subjective hoc and with ad arbitrary ¶ and dis- Moreover, dangers of attendant whether defendants 19 criminatory application. required pres- mental state acted with using chewing dangers harms of children expressed was Ironically, intent the defendants’ 8. images story on the tobacco. in a news use the video 496 104, State, City Rockford,

Grayned v. 408 U.S. stitutional attack. See Loveland v. 53 2294, 108-09, 2298-99, 131, 942, (1939); 92 L.Ed.2d Ariz. 86 P.2d 945 S.Ct. 38 State 106, 964, McKinley, 222 53 N.M. 202 P.2d 966 cases); Friedlander, (citing State v. Similarly, Supreme 23 the Utah Court 453, (1926); 250 P. 455 Wash. is has held that statute not unconstitution- Harris, 105 141 S.E. W.Va. 638-39 sufficiently ally vague explicit it is to in- if (1928). Directly point, the court ordinary what form the reader conduct McKinley upheld making it an statute of prohibited in a that does and does so manner encourage fense to to cause or “tendf] arbitrary discriminatory encourage delinquency McKinley, [a minor].” Greenwood, at enforcement. See 817 P.2d statute, Regarding P.2d at 965. 819; Theobald, State v. McKinley Legislature’s court held that curiam). 1982) (per failure to define what acts constitute the 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) (1996) pro- 24 Section 964-66; at offense is not fatal. See id. ac person vides that it is unlawful for Friedlander, (stating cord at 250 P. simi “tend[ or older to cause minors ] proposition lar when statute made it an of become or remain Such lan- cause, “encourage, fense to or contribute to guage provides adequate notice to the ordi- minor”). dependency delinquency aof “It nary prohibited despite reader of province Legislature is within the “delinquent” the fact that the term is not creating particu an offense to define it specifically disputed defined in the statute. it, description constituting lar acts not, 25 This case does as defendants produces to define as an act which a cer believe, present would have us a situation tain McKinley, defined described result.” adequately where Utah law fails to define an added); (emphasis at P.2d Friedlan essential term such ambi- der, (same). 250 P. at 454 The statute in would, effect, guity created violate question complies with the latter of these specificity requirement process. of due See principles. For this reason and because the Swenson, State v. term, “delinquent” term is a well-known suf 1992); Rather, Lopez, 935 at ficiently defined we case hold minors, “delinquent,” applied term that Utah Code Ann. well-defined in this state. vagueness. not void for ¶26 Having adopted Speech D.

analysis Free and Press respect Guarantees Tritt what consti- contributing delinquency, tutes Finally, defendants contend child, aof we hold stat- journalists prosecuting engaged in news question unconstitutionally ute is not gathering activities under the circumstances vague. case of this is unconstitutional under the “delinquency” “contributing terms *8 First Amendment and Article 1 Section 15 of delinquency” to the ... ... have such the Utah Constitution. presents This widespread usage give as to clear and un- question of law which we review for correct meaning they derstandable denote ac- Arbon, 1270, ness. See State v. aid, encourage tions that will or involve (reviewing 1271-72 Ct.App.1996) dis contrary children in conduct which is trict court’s decision ques on constitutional contrary general- or which is so correctness). tion for ly accepted standards of decency and mo- argument 29 The essence of defendants’ rality substantially that its result will be regarding the First Amendment to the Unit- mental, physical harmful to the moral or Constitution, guarantees ed States and its well-being child. press, a free as well that of Article 1 Tritt, at 808-09. Constitution, Section 15 of the Utah is this: statute, upholding alleged Even if the we conduct the defen- states, comport with other upheld proscribed which have dants falls within that nearly 3a—801(l)(a)(ii), against identical statutes con- similar and even if alleged 78—

497 prohibited by the First clearly would jury to include may found conduct violation, 1 Section 15 of and Article Amendment necessary criminal intent for a Branzburg v. Constitution. See is constitutional- if statute itself and even the 665, 681-83, 2646, Hayes, 408 U.S. S.Ct. vague- alleged for ly sound when reviewed (1972) 2656-57, (recognizing L.Ed.2d defining “delinquent” specifically in not ness protection gath- for Amendment news First delinquency” of a “contributing to the However, the First Amend- ering). while pro- minor, press of the free application then activities, gathering news it protects ment state constitutions of the federal and tections news, not, securing the interest does of these defendants. prohibits prosecution give criminal press license to violate laws. alleged that the BOWe hold 691, at 92 S.Ct. at See id. pro- fall within that the defendants does special immunity “has (providing media no 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii), that it scribed general laws” al- application from the the neces- may by jury to include be found though violating provide law could newswor- intent, not sary that the statute is void information); thy 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitu- such, we reach the defen- vagueness. for As tional Law 504 challenge.9 dants’ final constitutional ¶ Krueger Sawyers being are not ¶ Defendants and Amicus di simply prosecuted reporting for on activi- number decisions attention to a rect our recording ties of the children or for video principles to apply First Amendment clearly images of the children. These are represen prosecution of prevent the criminal protected the First Amend- activities under arising reporting press from Rather, tatives of the Sawyers Krueger and are ment. However, in of these illegal conduct.10 none setting up allegedly being prosecuted defendant-reporters alleged story” cases were the images “visual to illustrate subjects reports of their journal- have asked the they claim is “essential to television Moreover, in none these presented violate law. From the facts our ism.”11 defendant-reporters alleged review, Sawyers Krueger were the appears cases merely using other anything images done than of children chew- have wanted visual illegal Presumably, they If if had come report ing on the conduct. record tobacco. tobacco, already chewing upon that the alleged the facts were children images impu- with simply videotaped the chil could have collected visual defendants had nity. this did occur. Accord- possessing or with dren more, ing alleged by upon the State and nothing of the defendants to the facts prosecution Among things, activity. Chapter other code alone that The Utah such provides It is this issue Society of the should: Society Journalists has that members of Professional brief, which it filed its Amicus Curiae and on headlines, news teases ... Make certain that argued before us. video, audio, graphics, photos, sound bites and _ misrepresent!,] quotations over- do Co., Publ'g Daily context; 443 U.S. 10. See Smith v. Mail highlight simplify out of incidents 101-06, 2667, 2670-72, 61 L.Ed.2d 99 S.Ct. misleading staged re-enactments or news avoid prosecution newspa- (prohibiting events; compassion for those who show grounds pers when Amendment news- First coverage adversely to news .... be affected published juvenile papers truthfully de- dealing using special sensitivity when obtained); lawfully linquent’s children; which was name using against guard or video audio 809, 829, Bigelow Virginia, audience; 421 U.S. S.Ct. way deceives the material in (1975) (prohibiting 44 L.Ed.2d sponta- by presenting public not mislead the *9 prosecution newspaper editor First staged or news and material which is neous rehearsed; published grounds he adver- Amendment when acknowledge recognize that organization’s abortion tisement out-of-state photojournalists at all times maintain should Co., services); Publ'g. conduct; v. Denver Colorado highest standards of ethical strive (1979) (simi- Colo. 1039-40 high example by to maintain and influence Smith). lar to mercenary ethical free of standards of conduct kind; and, pic- strive considerations brief, truthfully, honestly objec- report Society of Professional Jour- tures 11. In its tively. Orga- cites to the Professional Journalism nalists Organiza- Society of Journalism Professional of Ethics. It instructive and nizations’ Codes Ethics, approve perhaps does Code of 6-9 that the code not tions’ ironic based, DAVIS, Judge which the motions to dismiss are (dissenting): Krueger Sawyers asked children to ¶ 38 I majority opinion. dissent from the videotaped chew tobacco so that it could be my It is view that based on the lan- plain report. for the television news 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) guage ¶ asking It in 83 was children to us, Utah Code and the facts before defen- tobacco, chew the if that is in fact what dants cannot found have caused happened, beyond stepped that defendants minors here “become or remain delin- protections of the First Amendment quent.” § See Utah Code Ann. 78-3a- Simply representa put, Article 1 Section 15. 801(l)(a)(ii) (1996). Therefore, I would re- may press encourage tives of the not crime verse the trial court’s denial of defendants’ it, they my so that report record Motion to Dismiss the Information. prosecution and then claim amounts 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) attempt government provides to restrain Section abridge press. may that an engage the freedom of the adult in that “tends to cause minors become or presented Under circumstances delinquent.” § remain Id. 78-3a- case, imposition rights we find no on the 801(l)(a)(ii). case, In this the information press protected by of free Amend- First identifies the “us[ing] impor- ment or Article Section 15. As possessing] or ... us[ing] tobacco tobacco tant press free and unfettered is to the property.”1 on school majority As the readi- society, survival and prosperity of free concedes, ly the State facts, under these may defendants not insu- late their actions under the cloak of the First suggest does not reporters provid- that the Any applied Amendment. fetters to defen- ed the encouraged tobacco or t[he] stu- conduct, alleged dants were invited their already dents not in possession of tobacco which the may finder fact at trial well also chew. The record reveals conclude was criminal. reporters simply asked students legal who were under the at which it is CONCLUSION tobacco, possess already and who had properly The trial court denied de- chewing tobacco pos- individual fendants’ motions dismiss. The conduct session, to chew the tobacco so that engaged to have been the de- reporters videotape could the students fendants falls within that described as con- chewing for inclusion the news account tributing to of a minor and the anti-chewing assembly. proscribed by § Utah Code Ann. 78-3a- added.) (Emphasis Thus, because it is undis- 801(l)(a)(ii). necessary required intent puted already students possessed for conviction be found the trier of it is accordingly undis- fact Moreover, from the alleged. facts as puted that defendants did not do anything to unconstitutionally vague statute is not cause the students to “become ... delin- failing on its face for to define the term “de- 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii). quent.” § See id. linquent.” Finally, the defendants’ acts are protected by the First Amendment or issue, therefore, 40 At is whether Article 1 Section 15 of the Utah Constitu- asking the chew the tobacco al- tion. ready possession, in their defendants caused the students to delinquent.” “remain See id. 36 The order of the trial court is affirmed added). § (emphasis and the matter remanded for trial. When interpreting statutory language, “[w]e ¶ 371 CONCUR: JUDITH M. presume Legislature that the used each word BILLINGS, Judge. advisedly, give and we effect to each term Although separate appeal, not a issue on to "remain Utah Code Ann. 78- language in the (1)(a)(ii) (1996). information does not track sec- apparently 3a—801 Defendants *10 3a—801(1)(a)(ii), tion as none of the counts object. 78— not did charged allege that defendants caused the minors time but would have waited until ordinary accepted mean- according its to property. Accordingly, & were off school the Summerhayes ing.” State Bar Utah 1995). (Utah. way encouraged by were in no de- students Hayden, P.2d delinquency, stay prolong same fendants to but “to in the “Remain” is defined as form, already to were determined remain delin- unchanged in or “to continue place” condition, status, quent. Webster’s quantity.” Dictionary 1919 International

Third New ¶43 impossible it logically Because is to pursue charges the facts of this these case, majority suggests every- that since the case the definition to Applying this body meaning “contributing,” us, charges knows the provide to a basis for before 3a—801(l)(a)(ii), “decency,” “morality,” “delinquency,” defendants’ under section 78— “mental, moral or the to what is harmful must have caused behavior child,” well-being accept- it physical chew- is possession [a] continue or remain in criminally responsible those ing absent able to hold who conspicuously tobacco. statutorily events to assertion cause these undefined allegations from the State’s majority already go did not so far had occur. Even if the students “who allege a delin- possession” were eliminate the need tobacco in their individual act, definition, quent one absent a process dispossessing in the themselves same, by he or she encouraged defen- so would discover whether but were actually keep Regardless contributed another’s dants tobacco. only when the finder of fact makes that merely possessing were whether the students Here, any given by person, determination in case. not- having the tobacco it on their it, withstanding allegation specific, on- by chewing possessing were the tobacco not going act that was caused the fact remains that the students were “re- defendants, help the ma- maining of de- continued acts of delinquent” without the jority defendants could no action nonetheless concludes Accordingly, fendants. there was juveniles to become or remain de- [the to cause cause the “tend[ed] defendants linquent. to ... See remain students] 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) (1996). Utah Code Ann. analysis, majority its support In Tritt, exclusively illogically expands on State v. majority 42 The relies almost (Utah 1970). 3a—801(l)(a)(ii) Ar- 2d 463 P.2d 806 plain language of section 78— (1) authority nothing, encourage- guably, stands as by stating defendants’ Tritt that the urged by majori- already possessed proposition let alone ment chew the tobacco best, was, at opinion the “main” ty students to re- the students caused the merely plurality, which does not amount delinquent; that defendants’ main encouragement binding plurality opinion decision. A op- State v. merely possessing per- “not the law of this state.” posed on their Anderson, son, 1234-35 n. 5 “prolonged time in which the stu- 1996) (“The violation, opinion) plurality again opin- committing (plurality dents were ” only represents two causing delinquent.’ ion ... the views the minors to ‘remain justices of this court and is therefore not analysis support lacks in both section This Giron, 3a—801(l)(a)(ii) state.”); of this see also State in the record. The law 78— (stat- 1114,1121 Ct.App.1997) of the students State has binding authori- already ing plurality opinion possessing the tobacco were addition, it, upon ty). In relied process disposing but retained the to- dicta, responding to encourage- majority was mere as a result of defendants’ bacco expressed the dissenters. Similarly, allegations are no the concerns ment. there upon prolonged Finally, opinion relied “main” Tritt defendants majority to address the planning by the first declined the time in which the students were fact, problem be- vagueness constitutional the tobacco. most of obvious possessing that, defendants, raised in the lower the issue was not the students stated but for cause upon its the case decided facts. they would not have chewed the tobacco at court and was *11 quent/criminal opinion setting two subscribers “main” acts into the statute suggested then the statute was valid for the juvenile out circumstances under which a preceding para- reasons set out in the next jurisdiction juvenile comes within the of the graph. Legislature’s court. The later act of enti tling Part 5 “Delinquency and Criminal Ac 45 Tritt is of little compel a use for more juveniles applies tions” as it makes it has, effect, even ling Legislature reason: our in apparent statutory more that a delinquency, defined definition so there is no need surprise allegations regarding resort exists to delinquen thereof.2 Part what amounts 5, chapter cy of is a delinquent by juvenile. 3a Title 78 the Utah Code or a Actions,” “Delinquency titled and Criminal ¶ 46 Because the information here did al- provides “[proceedings in minor’s lege delinquent a act identified section 78- by petition.” cases are commenced Utah 3a-104, reliance on Tritt majority’s sug- 78-3a-502(l) (1996). § Code Ann. To estab that, gests when an adult is crimi- juvenile jurisdiction lish is within the nally, there is no need to include facts identi- court, juvenile petition the State’s 78-3a-104, but, worse, fied in section the fact provided must include facts in section 78- finder can undisputed convict when the evi- 3a-104 of' the Utah Code.3 See Utah Code dence shows the defendants could not have 78-3a-504(3) pre-Tritt (1996).4 § Ann. A juvenile caused delinquent to remain statutory “delinquent definition of child”5 specific connection with acts incorporated was into an earlier version of Thus, alleged in the Thus, information. Legisla 78-3a-104.6 while the Tritt majority opinion ture extent the at the time relieves the had State removed identifiers, child,” “delinquent obligation allege incorporated delinquency as substantially or, by worse, same definition of Legislature, delin established our majority’s "widespread 2. The "delinquent reliance Tritt's The words child” include: usage” "delinquency” misplaced definition of any any A child who has violated state law or statutory basic rules of regulation construction. ordinance or of a subdivision of the "[Wjords statute, phrases used in if also state. statute, according defined must construed being wayward A child who reason or to that definition.” Utah State Bar v. Summer- habitually disobedient is uncontrolled his hayes Hayden, 1995); & parent, guardian or custodian. § see also Utah Code Ann. 68-3-11 habitually A child who is truant from school ("Words phrases defined [if] statute[ ] are or home. according to be peculiar construed to such deports injure A child sowho himself toas definition.”); appropriate meaning or cf. endanger or the morals or health of himself or Winward, Ct.App. others. 1995) (stating only statutory if term not de- § Utah Code Ann. 55-10-6 fined commonly statute do look to "we its meaning”). By examining understood the statu- provided, part: 6.Section 55-10-77 in relevant tory regarding relationship scheme between juvenile Except Jurisdiction of the juvenile juveniles, courts and defini- court.— provided by otherwise "delinquent” the court shall apparent. tion of have jurisdiction proceedings: exclusive (1) Concerning any case, child who has violated only- 3. Under applicable the facts of this federal, state, any municipal 78-3a-104(l)(a), or local law or section provides: law, would which ordinance, “(1) person Except twenty-one or provided as otherwise juvenile years original who has court has violated such law or exclusive jurisdiction (a) proceedings concerning: becoming eighteen ordinance before mi- federal, state, age, regardless nor who has violated or local law of where the violation oc- § ordinance-” Utah Code Anri. curred. 78-3a- 104(1)(a) (1996). (2) Concerning any child: (b) recently repealed 4. Section 78-3a-504 was whose behavior or condition is such as to reenacted. See Act endanger Juvenile Court Recodifica- his own or the welfare welfare tion, others; § ch. 1997 Utah Laws 1417. The present provision comparable (c) school, former section who is a habitual truant from § 78-3a-504 is found at Utah Code Ann. 78-3a- away who has run from his home or who is (Supp.1998). beyond parent, otherwise the control of his custodian, or school authorities. provided: Section 55-10-6 of the Utah Code (Supp.1967). Code Ann. 55-10-77 *12 find fact finder to allows the decency, morality, and what

from its sense “mental, physical moral harmful Tritt, child,” P.2d at well-being of the see ap then section clearly unconsti these defendants plied to McCully, re tutionally vague. See In 1997) (Utah to with (stating, scrutiny, lan stand constitutional “ ‘“sufficiently to in explicit guage must ordinary what conduct reader form the Frampton, v. (quoting prohibited’””) State 1987) (citation (Utah omit 737 P.2d ted)); the Utah State Board Comm’rs (Utah Petersen, 937 P.2d Bar v.

1997) (same); v. Lodges 719 & 2021 Elks Control, Beverage Department Alcoholic 1995) 1189,1202 (stating stat unconstitutionally vague ... ute “will held ambiguous that of the law are so if terms ordinary intelligence are unable persons of their acts conform determine whether law”); Hall, (same). Ct.App.1995) unnecessarily and incor- majority 47 The rectly attempts life into and ex- to breathe value, prece- little

tend decision that has otherwise; worse, opens the dential or that are offenses prosecutions door to rea- statutorily For above undefined. sons, Motion to I would hold defendants’ granted. should be

Dismiss the Information disposition, I would reach Based on by defendants. the other issues raised App UT CITY, Plaintiff FORK SPANISH Appellee, BRYAN, Defendant Debbie Appellant. No. 971662-CA. Appeals Court of Utah. 4, 1999. March

Margaret Lindsay, Aldrich Nelson P. Provo, Appellant. Weight Esplín, &

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Krueger
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Utah
Date Published: Feb 25, 1999
Citation: 975 P.2d 489
Docket Number: 981035-CA
Court Abbreviation: Utah Ct. App.
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